UC-NRLF 


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THE  PROBLEMS 


OF  THE 


COMING  PEACE 


BY 


FEUX  MLYNARSKI,   Ph.D. 


THE  PROBLEMS 

OF  THE 

COMING  PEACE 


By 
FELIX  MLYNARSKI,  Ph.  D. 

Delegate  of  the  Polish  Supreme  National  Committee  to  America 


New  York 
POLISH  BOOK  IMPORTING  CO.,  Inc. 

1916 


Copyright,  1916 
By  FELIX  MLYNARSKI 


•^•^--  '"ii..:^ 


t..  i^  A  \!  V  ^  ^ 


THE  PROBLEMS 

OF   THE 

COMING  PEACE 


333693 


Some  of  the  other  works  of  the  Author: 

Sociology  and  Epistemology" 

Jaroslav,  1910,  312  pp. 


(( 


(( 


The  Problem  of  the  Policy  of  State 
Independence" 
(A  Study  in  the  Theory  of  PoHtics) 

Lemberg,  1911,  211  pp. 


The  Principles  of  Social  Philosophy" 

Vol.    I   (in  print ^ 


CONTENTS 

Page 

I. — Introduction 9 

II. — The  Turkish  Question 19 

III. — The  Part  of  Austria-Hungary 57 

IV. — The  Future  of  Warsaw 91 

V. — The  Causes  of  the  War 141 

VI.— The  Peace  Tribunal 162 


Chapter  I 
INTRODUCTION 


Chapter  I. — Introduction 

There  are  two  examples  in  history  which  could  be 
compared  with  the  present  European  war.  They  are:  the 
struggle  between  Rome  and  Carthago  and  the  war  of  Eng- 
land against  Napoleon.  The  ancient  Carthago  is  the  England 
of  our  day;  Rome  of  yore  is  the  present  Germany.  These 
were  the  wars  of  the  greatest  power  on  land  with  the  great- 
est power  on  the  seas.  Only  the  conflagration  of  Carthago, 
when  its  walls  crumbled  under  the  pressure  of  the  Roman 
legions  and  centuries  later  the  burning  down  of  Moscow, 
the  smoking  ruins  of  which  broke  Napoleon's  sword,  can 
be  compared  with  the  political  importance  of  the  present 
war.  This  war  has  deep  reasons,  employs  frightful  means, 
and  it  is  bound  to  yield  most  important  results. 

No  comparison  in  history  can  be  found  for  the  way  in 
which  the  present  war  is  conducted.  No  longer  armies 
are  facing  each  other  as  was  the  case  in  former  years,  but 
entire  nations  are  lined  up  against  each  other  in  battle  array. 
No  longer  thousands  are  fighting,  but  millions.  There  is 
no  longer  such  a  thing  as  a  decisive  battle  in  which  one 
attack  is  able  to  crush  the  enemy.  The  present  efforts  pre- 
sent something  rather  superhuman ;  the  individual  becomes 
drowned  in  the  mass  of  armies  of  millions  of  men,  having  no 
possibility  of  overlooking  battles  fought  over  hundreds  of 
miles  and  lasting  for  months.  The  soldier  becomes  an  ant 
rather  than  an  eagle.  His  consciousness  does  not  seem  to 
exceed  the  consciousness  of  a  cell  in  the  midst  of  an  organ- 
ism.    The  heroism  of  the  individual  decreases  while  the 


...  .     ,    ^    •  —10  — 

heroism  of  a  nation  grows  proportionately;  the  individual 
character  plays  only  a  secondary  part,  while  the  weight  of 
the  national  character  increases  in  importance.  Not  armies 
but  entire  nations  have  entrenched  for  the  last  year  and 
deluge  each  other  with  fire.  Above  them  all  the  aeroplane 
has  spread  its  wings  and  has  been  pressed  into  regular  army 
service.  On  the  seas  the  submarine  has  come  to  the  front 
and  changed  the  technique  of  naval  warfare.  Thus,  the  two 
supreme  triumphs  of  human  ingenuity,  the  conquest  of  the 
air  and  the  conquest  of  the  deep  seas,  were  first  enlisted 
as  weapons  of  wholesale  murder  before  they  could  serve 
purposes  of  human  happiness. 

The  sacrifices  caused  by  the  present  war  are  enormous. 
The  first  nine  months  have  cost  the  warring  nations  five 
millions  in  killed  and  wounded,  not  including  those  who  were 
taken  prisoners.*  During  the  same  period  the  expenditures 
of  the  principal  warring  nations  amounted  to  $12,000,000,- 
000. t  Thousands  of  villages  and  'cities  were  reduced  to 
ruins;  all  that  were  spared  by  the  artillery  fire  were  de- 
stroyed by  trench  digging;  these  were  the  traces  which 
the  hurricane  of  war  left  behind  when  it  swept  the  country- 
side. Famine,  misery,  contagious  diseases  followed  the 
warring  armies  as  jackals  follow  a  caravan.  The  prosperity 
of  nations  which  were  leaders  in  civilizatory  work  has  been 
ruined ;  ruined  was  also  the  happiness  of  millions  of  families 
from  whom  the  war  tore  away  father,  husband  and  brother. 
Who  will  tell  how  many  tears  have  been  shed?  Who  will 
describe  the  suffering  and  the  agony? 

The  world  is  horror  stricken. 


*  According  to  the  estimates  of  Senator  Henri  La  Fontaine  of 
Brussels,  Chairman  of  the  International  Peace  Union. 

t  According  to  the  estimates  of  the  British  Prime  Minister, 
Asquith. 


—  11  — 

The  consciousness  of  responsibility  for  the  present  war 
grows  every  day.  Slogans  of  the  liberty  of  nations  and  per- 
manent peace  appeared  on  the  banners  of  the  warring  armies. 
According  to  the  general  opinion,  this  is  perhaps  the  last 
act  of  the  human  tragedy — to  some  extent,  a  "war  against 
war  itself."*  The  idea  of  peace,  but  of  permanent  peace,  be- 
comes slowly  something  positive.  It  ceases  to  be  an  idea 
and  begins  to  acquire  the  form  of  an  actual  political  goal. 
The  world  begins  to  feel  the  weight  of  its  own  guilt;  the 
majesty  of  humanity  requires  some  kind  of  satisfaction. 
Human  society  begins  to  look  for  a  guarantee  that  this 
frightful  orgy  of  blood  shall  not  again  be  repeated.  Should 
war  always  remain  the  supreme  manifestation  of  the  life  of 
nations  just  as  the  death  of  an  individual  is  the  supreme 
manifestation  of  his  life  ?  Is  the  heroism  of  labor  going  to 
outweigh,  on  the  scale  of  history,  the  heroism  of  war? 

The  present  war  is  immense,  but  the  coming  peace  must 
exceed  it  in  its  immensity. 

The  condition  of  the  coming  peace  must  be  the  principle 
of  justice.  This  principle,  however,  is  denied  by  those,  who 
by  their  actions  prove  that  according  to  their  opinion  the 
coming  peace  has  to  be  based  on  the  fact  of  physical  victory. 
The  shadow  of  every  victory  is  a  defeat  of  the  vanquished 
party,  and  the  resonance  of  defeat  is  the  thirst  for  revenge. 
Justice  alone  can  mitigate  this  danger  and,  therefore,  the 
idea  of  justice  can  be  the  only  permanent  basis  for  a  future 
peace  treaty.  The  defeat  of  Austria  at  Sadowa  in  1866  did 
not  sow  the  seed  for  a  desire  for  revenge  because  Bismarck 
did  not  take  advantage  in  a  brutal  way  of  the  physical  victory 
of  Prussia,  but  he  limited  himself  to  negotiating  a  just 
peace.  Austria  lost  at  that  time  Venice  to  Italy,  and  this  was 


*  E.  Vanderwelde. 


—  12  — 

in  conformity  with  the  theory  of  nationality  which  was  the 
tendency  of  the  history  of  these  days.  Austria,  however, 
did  not  lose  an  inch  of  her  territory  to  Prussia.  The  result 
of  the  Franco-Prussian  war  of  1870-1871  was  different. 
Prince  Bismarck  basing  himself  on  the  fact  of  physical 
victory  exploited  peace  to  the  disadvantage  of  France.  Ger- 
many has  occupied  not  only  the  portion  of  Lorraine  which 
was  nearest  Germany  in  spirit,  but  has  also  occupied  Alsace, 
which  showed  a  marked  political  inclination  towards  France. 
A  huge  contribution  of  war  did  not  fail  to  increase  the  spirit 
of  animosity ;  all  these  elements  were  the  seeds  of  the  com- 
ing war  of  revenge.  The  entire  policy  of  France  and  the 
education  of  the  young  generation  was  conceived  and  de- 
veloped from  this  ultimate  point  of  view  of  revenge  against 
Germany.  The  fruits  that  grew  from  these  seeds  are  ripen- 
ing in  the  present  conflagration.  This  example  is  frightful 
enough  to  prove  the  correctness  of  the  contention  that  only 
just  peace  can  be  a  permanent  peace.  No  permanent  peace 
can  be  based  on  blind  hatred,  on  the  brutal  fact  of  physical 
superiority;  and,  thus,  the  saving  of  humanity  from  the 
disaster  of  war  can,  just  as  permanent  peace,  be  brought 
about  only  by  the  principle  of  justice. 

An  army  can  be  defeated,  but  a  nation  which  consciously 
and  bravely  goes  to  war  cannot  be  defeated.  A  soldier  dies 
on  the  field  of  glory,  the  sword  breaks,  the  rifle  in  the  dying 
hand  does  not  send  out  any  longer  the  deadly  lead,  but  the 
elements  of  heroism  as  far  as  they  manifest  themselves  in 
heroic  acts  cannot  perish,  because  they  are  immortal.  They 
cannot  disappear  in  the  conflagration,  nor  can  they  be 
drowned  in  the  deluge  of  shrapnel.  They  must  outlive  the 
defeat  and  become  the  songs  of  hatred  for  the  future  gen- 
erations, and  the  flags  of  future  war  for  revenge.  Both 
parties  in  the  present  war  are  guilty  of  wholesale  murder, 


—  13  — 

but  on  the  other  hand,  both  parties,  and  not  only  one  of  them, 
have  to  be  credited  with  boundless  heroism ;  both  sides  can 
claim  for  themselves  a  capital  of  heroism  and  national  en- 
thusiasm. The  Germans  have  astonished  the  entire  world 
with  their  smashing  march  through  Belgium  and  northern 
France,  but  France  also  will  have  a  source  of  eternal  national 
pride  in  the  battle  of  the  Marne.  Amazing  are  the  victories 
of  the  allied  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  armies  over 
Russia,  in  the  eastern  theatre  of  war,  but  still  Russia  too 
can  boast  of  a  series  of  successes  in  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  All  nations  which  hitherto  led  Europe  in  civilization 
are  ablaze  with  war-like  spirit.  The  heroism  that  these 
nations  displayed  in  a  sufficient  number  of  cases  insures 
these  nations  against  eventual  downfall  and  decay ;  national 
honor  is  safe  since  it  covered  itself  with  new  laurel  of 
glory.  No  Joifre  and  no  Hindenburg  shall  ever  be  able  to 
destroy  it ;  this  national  honor  is  a  weapon  which  shall  sur- 
vive even  the  ultimate  defeat,  and  it  shall  continue  to  be 
sharpened  in  the  arsenal  of  national  life  for  the  future 
war  of  revenge  in  case  one  of  the  warring  parties  should 
brutally  take  advantage  of  her  physical  victory  and  thus 
create  in  the  other  nation  the  feeling  of  injury.  Let  us 
beware  of  all  illusions.  The  Germans  will  never  be  able  to 
destroy  France,  the  beautiful;  nor  Britain,  the  proud;  nor 
Russia,  the  resourceful.  It  would  be,  furthermore,  rather 
naive  to  think  that  Germany  can  be  smashed  and  annihilated 
as  one  of  the  leading  powers  of  the  world.  Not  even  Na- 
poleon was  able  to  destroy  Germany,  and  Joffre  certainly 
is  not  a  Napoleon ;  in  the  same  way,  Hindenburg  shall  never 
be  able  to  crush  any  of  the  nations  which  are  fighting  to- 
day against  Germany.  The  armies  of  the  one  or  the  other 
of  the  warring  sides  may  and  undoubtedly  will  be  defeated, 
but  the  nations  are  not  going  to  suffer  defeat.    The  fighting 


—  14  — 

power  of  the  army  may  burst,  but  the  force  of  the  national 
consciousness  shall  never  break,  particularly  after  going 
through  the  hardening  process  of  this  gigantic  struggle. 
The  defeated  armies  will  take  the  honor,  the  tradition  of 
accomplished  feats  of  heroism  home  with  them,  and  this  will 
give  them  the  possibility  of  a  speedy  regeneration  after 
defeat.  This  is  a  fact  of  most  decisive  importance,  because 
it  determines  the  ability  of  preparing  for  revenge  should  the 
future  treaty  of  peace  be  a  treaty  of  brutality  and  injury  to 
any  of  the  two  sides. 

The  problem  of  permanent  peace  requires  that  the  idea  of 
physical  victory  should  yield  before  the  idea  of  justice. 
Therefore,  neither  the  hatred  against  England  nor  the  hatred 
against  Germany  can  form  the  basis  for  mutual  concessions 
and  demands.  Hatred  is  nothing  else  but  a  form  of  moral 
blindness,  and  blindness  can  never  lead  political  wisdom. 
Blindness  bears  errors,  and  an  error  can  never  be  a  substitute 
for  truth.  Hatred,  moreover,  is  a  powerful  breeder  of  lies, 
and  nothing  undermines  national  health  as  much  as  an  orgy 
of  lies.  This  is  a  weapon  which  is  no  less  deadly  to  the  in- 
terests of  civilization  than  the  firearms,  and  the  barbarism 
of  lying  is  one  of  the  greater,  if  not  the  greatest  barbarism. 
The  program  of  future  peace  must  be  free  from  this  method 
of  fighting.  Truth  and  actualities  must  be  the  slogans  of 
just  peace;  this  is  the  only  way  to  be  taken  in  order  that  the 
interests  of  humanity  could  dominate  over  the  selfishness  of 
states  and  nations. 

Over  the  window  in  the  large  meeting  room  of  the  Peace 
Palace  at  The  Hague,  the  following  inscription  can  be  read : 

"Si  vis  pacem,  para  iustitiam." 

Let  us  hope  that  the  victory  in  this  frightful  war  will  be 
the  victory  of  the  idea  of  justice.     It  is  possible  that  the 


—  15  — 

future  peace  congress,  which  will  sit  as  a  tribunal  over  the 
sufferings  of  nations  and  which  will  construct  the  founda- 
tion for  the  history  of  the  twentieth  century,  will  meet  in 
this  very  room  of  the  Peace  Palace  at  The  Hague.  Let  us 
hope  that  when  the  peace  congress  disbands  the  world  will 
be  able  to  exclaim : 

"Glory  be  to  the  humanity  and  peace  to  the  nations  of 
good  will." 


Chapter  II 
THE  TURKISH    QUESTION 


—  19  — 
Chapter  IL — The  Turkish  Question 

The  present  European  war  was  started  for  the  sake  of  the 
freedom  of  nations.  The  permanence  of  future  peace  must 
also  be  based  on  the  same  principle.  This,  however,  is  a 
difficult  and  tangled  question  with  regard  to' its  just  solution. 

In  the  beginning  of  October  of  last  year,  the  British  Prime 
Minister  Asquith  proclaimed  the  principle  that  "the  weak 
have  rights  and  that  the  strong  have  duties."*  This,  how- 
ever, did  not  prevent  England  from  joining  hands  a  month 
later,  in  November,  with  France  and  Russia  for  the  purpose 
of  destroying  the  independence  of  Turkey,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  Turkey  was  and  still  is  "weak."  The  present 
European  war  is  conducted  in  the  name  of  the  liberty  of  na- 
tions, nevertheless,  the  partition  of  Turkey  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  its  liberty  has  been  decided  upon.  There  must 
be,  therefore,  some  tragic  misunderstanding  in  the  entire 
matter. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  world  fails  to  understand  Turkey 
as  a  nation.  Turkey  is  not  a  European  nation;  different 
historical  elements  were  active  in  making  up  Turkey.  Tur- 
key is  the  last  wave  which  the  Islam  has  thrown  on  the 
shore  of  Europe.  Turks  were  the  same  element  in  the 
Balkans  as  the  Arabs  were  in  Spain;  the  Turks  have  se- 
lected the  shorter  road  to  Europe  which  was  in  vain  tried 
by  the  Arabs;  this  road  led  through  Constantinople,  which 
was  the  capital  of  the  Eastern  Roman  empire  and  which 
survived,  while  the  migration  of  nations  destroyed  Rome  it- 
self. The  idea  of  the  Roman  empire,  the  "Holy  Empire," 
was  since  so  much  more  identified  in  the  eyes  of  the  Asiatic 
nations  with  the  throne  of  the  Sultans  of  Constantinople. 
The  day  when  Constantinople  fell  was  an  epoch  in  the 

*  Speech  of  October  3,  1914. 


—  20  — 

history  of  the  Islam,  which  thus  conquered  the  crown  of 
Constantine  the  Great.  The  traditions  of  Rome  and  those 
of  Mecca  became  thus  united  and  the  conceptions  of  the 
Khali f  and  of  Caesar  amalgamated  themselves  in  the  political 
consciousness  of  the  Asiatic  masses  and  began  to  form  a 
close  historical  relationship.  A  racial  relationship,  however, 
was  close  enough  not  to  hamper  these  processes. 

The  Turks  were  very  well  aware  of  the  charm  which  this 
imperial  crown  had  for  the  people  of  Asia.  Soliman  the 
Magnificent  assumed  the  title  of  Emperor  and  denied  the 
right  of  this  title  to  Charles  V,  although  in  the  latter 's  do- 
mains the  sun  was  never  setting.  "His  successors  were  once 
preceded  through  the  streets  of  Constantinople  by  twelve  of- 
ficers bearing  straws  aloft,  a  faint  semblance  of  the  consular 
fasces  that  had  escorted  Quintius  or  Fabius  through  the 
Roman  forum."*  This  was  in  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  or,  in  other  words,  almost  a  thousand  years  after 
the  downfall  of  Rome  in  the  West,  and  fifteen  hundred  years 
after  the  victory  of  Caesar  over  Pompeius  at  Pharsalia.  Asia 
has  recognized  the  new  condition  of  things ;  in  her  eyes  this 
incident  meant  nothing  else  but  a  change  of  the  dynasty 
on  the  throne  of  the  emperors.  There  was  even  triumph  and 
rejoicing  over  the  fact  that  the  Islam,  the  child  of  Asia,  was 
able  to  get  a  hold  of  the  imperial  purple.  From  then  on 
Constantinople  became  still  more  holy,  because  it  became  the 
"garden  of  the  KhaHf."  The  importance  of  Turkey  as  a 
state  grew  immensely;  the  Sultan  was,  prior  to  the  con- 
quest of  Constantinople,  only  the  "shadow  of  the  Prophet." 
In  Constantinople  the  glory  of  the  imperial  crown  fell  on 
the  Sultan's  head  and  in  this  new  character  of  its  majesty, 


♦James  Bryce :   'The  Holy  Roman  Empire,"  page  421,  New  York, 
the  Macmillan  Company,  191 1. 


—  21  — 

Turkey,  situated  on  the  shore  of  Europe,  survived  the  en- 
tire period  of  modern  history. 

Needless  to  say,  this  did  not  fail  to  have  influence  and 
deep  effect  on  the  political  consciousness  of  the  Asiatic 
masses.  All  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  conditions  on 
the  Asiatic  continent  are  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
Sultan  even  in  our  day  is  not  only  the  Khalif,  but  also  the 
"shadow  of  Rome"  for  the  people  of  Western  Asia.*  When, 
during  the  Balkan  war,  a  rumor  reached  Asia  that  the  Bul- 
garians had  entered  Constantinople,  it  seemed  for  a  while 
that  complete  anarchy  and  ruin  would  sweep  Turkey  from 
the.  surface  of  the  globe.  The  victorious  battle  on  the 
Tjataldja  lines  which  was  won  by  the  Turks  saved  not  only 
Constantinople  as  a  strategical  point,  but  also  saved  the 
Turkish  state  in  Asia  and  insured  its  existence  as  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  empire  of  Rome.  Soon  another  triumph 
came  to  the  Turks,  the  retaking  of  Adrianople,  which  con- 
tained the  tombstones  of  the  first  European  Sultans.  Thus, 
the  prestige  of  Turkey  was  saved  from  destruction  and  once 
more  the  ''shadow  of  Rome"  was  victorious.  The  peace 
treaty  of  Bucharest  did  not  kill  Turkey  as  a  state,  but  healed 
it,  because  it  solved  the  problem  of  nationalities  in  the  Bal- 
kans. Since  this  problem  of  nationalities  in  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula became  exclusively  a  Bulgaro-Serbo-Greek  problem, 
Turkey  has  to  some  extent  ceased  to  be  a  European  country 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Constantinople  still  lies  on 
the  European  side  of  the  Bosporus.  Turkey  can  be  wounded 
mortally  only  by  losing  Constantinople,  because  this  would 
be  at  the  same  time  a  blow  to  the  political  consciousness  of 
Asiatic  Turkey,  and  because  it  would  destroy  the  synthesis 
of  the  Khalifat  and  of  the  Caesarian  purple  of  the  Sultan. 
The  Turkish  state  was  based  on  this  very  synthesis  and  can- 

*  "Turkey  in  Europe  and  Asia,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914,  page  11 


—  22  — 

not  do  without  it;  it  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  kill  first  the 
"shadow  of  Rome"  before  killing  Turkey. 

Previous  to  the  Turks'  entering  Constantinople,  the  latter 
had  been  the  seat  of  eastern  Asiatic — Christian  separatism 
and  thus  became  the  seat  of  the  schism,  and  the  forming 
place  of  the  Oriental  Church.  At  the  head  of  this  Church 
was  the  patriarch  of  Constantinople,  and  just  as  there  were 
two  Roman  emperors  for  a  while,  there  were  now  two  popes ; 
one  of  them  was  the  legal  successor  of  St.  Peter,  while  the 
other  one  resided  closer  to  Palestine,  the  cradle  of  Chris- 
tianity. One  of  them  prevailed  in  the  West,  while  the  other 
held  sway  over  the  East.  It  was  in  itself  the  same  historical 
process,  the  combination  of  the  cosmopolitan  Christianity, 
with  a  universal  Roman  empire.  The  idea  of  the  ''world- 
church"  and  the  idea  of  a  "world-state"  completed  each 
other,  both  in  the  West  and  in  the  East.  The  division  which 
sprang  from  this  was  only  a  division  of  territory  in  the  con- 
ception of  the  "Holy  empire,"  and  not  a  division  of  the  idea 
itself.  In  theory  this  process  was  the  same,  but  as  far  as  its 
results  are  concerned,  the  break  proved  to  be  a  deeper  one. 
The  Orient  has  never  questioned  the  priority  of  the  imperial 
crown  before  the  mitre  of  the  patriarch.  In  the  West  the 
papal  tiara  struggled  against  the  imperial  crown  for  priority 
of  the  "spiritual  sword"  before  the  "lay  sword."  The  east- 
ern patriarch  was  the  shadow  of  the  emperor."*  In  the 
West  the  Roman  emperor  had  to  make  pilgrimages  from 
time  to  time  to  the  papal  Canossa.  When  Rome  fell,  yielding 
to  the  flood  of  the  migration  of  nations,  the  papacy  was  able 
to  substitute  the  glory  of  the  papal  tiara  for  that  of  the 
imperial  crown;  Odoaker  succeeded  in  liquidating  the  ma- 
terial side  of  the  western  Roman  empire,  but  the  charm 


*  James  Bryce,  1.  c.  page  338. 


—  23  — 

exercised  by  the  idea  of  this  empire  was  stronger  than  all 
the  invasions  of  the  barbarian  nations.  This  charm  was  so 
strong  that  even  Bonifatious  VIII,  in  1300,  when  thousands 
of  pilgrims  assembled  in  Rome  for  the  famous  jubilee  year, 
appeared  before  the  people  wearing  a  crown  on  his  head, 
a  sword  attached  to  his  side,  and  a  sceptre  in  hand,  and 
publicly  spoke  from  the  height  of  the  papal  throne,  "I  am 
Caesar — I  am  Emperor."*  Under  these  conditions  a  peace 
between  the  tiara  of  the  popes  and  the  crown  of  the  re- 
established Roman  Empire  could  never  be  a  permanent  one, 
and,  therefore,  the  struggle  between  the  empire  and  the 
papacy  was  the  main  characteristic  feature  of  the  Middle 
Ages  in  Europe.  On  different  occasions  the  pope  in  the 
name  of  obedience  to  God  pubHcly  demanded  the  people 
to  disobey  emperors  and  kings.  The  result  of  this  was  the 
defeat  of  the  papacy,  and  the  political  expression  of  it  was 
the  creation  of  a  modern  state,  which  gave  birth  to  all  the 
European  nations.  All  these  elements,  however,  which  were 
the  source  of  the  emancipation  of  European  states  and  na- 
tions, did  not  exist  in  the  East  and,  hence,  the  European 
nations  are  so  different  from  the  states  and  nations  of  the 
Orient. 

This  is  to  a  certain  extent  a  paradox,  but  it  still  contains 
a  lot  of  truth — that  the  Islam  in  its  political  psychology  was 
closer  to  Constantinople  than  western  or  central  Europe. 
The  Islam  was  primarily  a  religious  movement,  from  which 
emanated  subsequently  political  configurations  such  as 
Arabia,  at  first,  then  Turkey,  until  finally  all  of  them  united 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Sultans  of  Constantinople.  The 
emperor  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire  was  not  only  a  sov- 
ereign of  the  state,  but  was  at  the  same  time  the  head  of  the 


*  James  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  109. 


—  24  — 

Orthodox  Church.  The  Sultan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not 
only  the  head  of  the  Moslem  Church  but  also  of  the  Moslem 
state.  In  the  first  case  the  state  was  older  than  the  Orthodox 
Church,  in  the  second  case  again  the  militant  Moslem  Church 
was  older  than  the  Turkish  state.  This  was,  however,  only, 
a  difference  of  age  and  not  a  difference  in  structure.  In 
both  cases  the  church  organization  was  a  component  part  of 
the  state  and  remained  so.  The  Church  was  the  state,  or 
the  state  was  the  Church.  The  Orient  did  not  go  through 
the  experience  of  the  struggle  between  the  Church  and  the 
state,  and  this  fact  is  the  basic  feature  of  the  political  history 
of  the  Orient. 

The  traditions  of  Constantinople  were  preserved  until  our 
day  by  Turkey  in  Asia  and  by  Russia  in  Eastern  Europe. 
Russia  has  taken  from  Constantinople  its  religion  and  the 
form  of  state  organization.  Until  our  day,  the  Czar  ap- 
points the  Oberprokurator  of  the  Holy  Synod,  who  is  the 
chief  of  the  religious  life  of  Russia ;  the  Sultan  appoints  the 
Sheik-Ul-Islam,  who  is  the  chief  of  the  religious  life  of 
Turkey.  The  Turkish  Church  and  the  Orthodox  Church 
have  essentially  the  same  political  character,  because  they 
both  were  influenced  by  Constantinople.  The  lay  power 
regulates  from  the  height  of  the  throne  the  religious  life  of 
the  country,  and  the  Church  is  the  spine  of  the  state.  "The 
Russians  who  are  as  much  a  religious  as  a  political  com- 
munity, carry  with  them  over  the  vast  space  of  Northern 
and  Central  Asia  the  traditions  of  an  Empire  conterminous 
with  the  Church,  an  Empire  which  is  at  once  the  oft'spring 
and  the  guardian  of  the  Orthodox  faith."*  This  is  the 
characteristic  feature  which  differentiates  Russia  from  Eu- 
rope and  brings  the  former  closer  to  Asia.f     Europe  was 


*  James  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  351. 

f'The  Eastern  Question,"  page  4,  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914. 


—  25  — 

brought  up  in  the  traditions  of  Rome,  while  Russia,  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  and  Asia  were  brought  up  in  the  traditions 
of  Constantinople.  If  the  Russian  nation  already  is  so  much 
different  from  the  rest  of  Europe,  there  is  hardly  any  rea- 
son why  one  should  wonder  that  the  Turks  are  so  much 
more  different.  No  one  can  say  that  Russia  is  not  a  na- 
tion, although  her  civilization  is  so  much  different  from  the 
civilization  of  Europe,  its  origin  being  exclusively  Con- 
stantinople and  not  Rome.  In  the  same  way  nobody  can 
say  that  Turkey  is  not  a  nation,  although  Turkey  was  the 
result  of  historical  conditions  entirely  different  from  ours. 
Another  fact  is  to  be  credited  to  Turkey,  and  this  is  that 
the  Islam  has  brought  a  portion  of  the  creative  elements  into 
the  civilization  of  the  world  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
activity  of  the  Islam  traveled  over  the  deserts  of  Asia  and 
Africa,  and  not  over  the  fertile  grounds  of  Europe.  The 
Arabian  schools  in  Spain  have  enabled  Europe  to  absorb  the 
teaching  of  Aristotle.  The  Islam  has  not  only  burned  down 
the  library  of  Alexandria,  but  it  also  made  public  the  philos- 
ophy of  Averroes.  St.  Thomas  of  Aquinas  based  his 
philosophy  on  the  system  of  Aristotle,  and  he  is  the  one  who 
represents  the  acme  of  the  scholastical  philosophy.  Tur- 
key absorbed  and  digested  the  entire  spiritual  products  of 
the  Islam.  It  is  erroneous  to  judge  Turkey  by  our  standards. 
It  cannot  be  concealed  that  Turkey  never  learned  how  to  do 
civilizatory  work  on  a  larger,  world-embracing  scale,  but 
this  does  not  mean  that  Turkey  has  ceased  to  develop  as 
a  nation.  Nowadays  the  Turkish  nation  stands  armed  to 
the  teeth  and  fights  for  the  maintenance  of  its  independence. 
Under  the  walls  of  Constantinople  the  Turks  fight  better 
to-day  than  at  Kumanovo,  or  Lule  Burgas  in  the  last  Balkan 
war.  The  soldiers  of  France,  of  England  and  of  Russia 
are  certainly  not  inferior  to  the  Serbian,  Bulgarian  and 


—  26  — 

Greek  soldiers,  but  the  Turks  nowadays  fight  for  the  defence 
of  the  principle  of  nationality  and  not  against  it,  as  they  did 
in  the  Balkan  war,  because  they  fight  for  their  own  inde- 
pendence. This  is  the  reason  why  Turkey  proved  to  be  so 
weak  from  the  point  of  view  of  imperialistic  policy,  and  still 
shows  to-day  enough  strength,  health,  enthusiasm,  sacrifice, 
and  heroism  from  the  point  of  view  of  nationality.  The 
Turkey  of  to-day  is  young,  progressive,  constitutional,  eager 
to  be  regenerated,  and  triumphant  over  the  internal  des- 
potism. During  the  short  breathing  spells  in  this  frightful 
war,  when  the  roar  of  guns  subsides  for  a  while,  the  con- 
science of  the  world  must  be  confronted  by  the  question 
whether  the  present  European  war  is  in  fact  a  war  for 
freedom  and  equal  rights  for  all  nations  ? 

The  main  adversary  of  Turkish  independence  is  Russia. 
It  has  been  an  old  dream  of  Peter  the  Great  to  gain  for 
Russia  an  estuary  on  the  Mediterranean.  Catherine  the 
Second  strained  all  the  resources  of  her  country  in  order 
to  bring  Russia  closer  to  the  realization  of  this  dream.  This 
was  the  so-called  "Greek  Project,"  Russia  being  the  incarna- 
tion of  the  "Greek  Church,"  and  as  such  considering  herself 
a  lawful  heir  to  the  inheritance  that  could  be  left  by  the 
Turks  at  Constantinople.  "Professing  the  creed  of  Con- 
stantinople, Russia  claims  the  crown  of  the  Eastern 
Caesars."*  This  is  a  statement  of  a  historian  and  politician 
of  the  importance  of  James  Bryce,  the  former  Ambassador 
of  Great  Britain  to  the  United  States.  The  Orthodox  faith 
has  anteceded  the  Turks  in  Constantinople,  and  Russia  is 
bent  at  present  on  wresting  the  sceptre  of  the  Caesars  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  Islam.  This  is  the  struggle  between  the 
Islam  and  the  Orthodox  faith  for  the  inheritance  of  Rome 


♦James  Bryce.  1.  c,  page  421. 


—  27  — 

in  Asia.  Islam  is  in  the  defensive,  the  Orthodox  faith  is 
the  attacking  party.  As  a  program,  this  is  only  a  variation 
of  imperialism  and  not  of  nationality.  The  idea  of  religion 
is  the  determining  factor  of  Russian  ambition.  Russia  does 
not  have  any  other  points  of  attack,  neither  from  the  histori- 
cal nor  the  legal  point  of  view.  Constantinople  was  never 
a  part  of  Russia  and  the  Turk  ruled  on  the  Bosporus  for 
nearly  five  hundred  years.  The  conquest  of  Constantinople 
was  once  upon  a  time  the  triumph  of  Turkish  imperialism; 
the  conquest  of  Constantinople  by  Russia  would  mean  the 
triumph  of  Russian  imperialism.  No  illusion  of  any  kind 
should  be  entertained  as  to  the  terms  of  permanent  peace 
when  considering  conscientiously,  justly  and  with  a  spirit 
of  responsibility. 

The  general  belief  of  the  world  is  that  Russia  is  prompted 
mainly  by  economical  reasons.  In  case  of  war  Russian 
commerce  suffers  undoubtedly  through  the  closing  of  the 
Straits  of  Constantinople.  The  Dardanelles  is  the  only  route 
of  export  from  the  Black  Sea  and  the  south  of  Russia,  where 
the  latter  country's  agricultural  life  is  concentrated,  and 
where  she  keeps  her  huge  stores  of  corn  grown  in  Podolia 
and  Ukraina.  The  exportation  of  oil  mined  in  the  enormous 
wells  of  Caucasus,  particularly  the  exportation  from  Batum 
and  Noworossiysk,  is  made  over  the  same  route  through  the 
Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles.  Four  and  a  half  thousand 
ships  of  a  combined  tonnage  of  7,000,000  tons  carry  the 
merchandise  over  the  Black  Sea  within  one  year.  Owing 
to  this  fact  the  harbor  of  Constantinople  is  one  of  the  largest 
ports  of  the  globe,  and  can  be  compared  with  London,  Ant- 
werp and  Hamburg.  It  is  sufficient  to  state  that  the  tonnage 
of  ships  which,  during  1913,  entered  and  cleared  at  Constan- 
tinople exceeded  the  gross  tonnage   of   17,000,000   tons.* 

*"The  Statesman's  Year-book,"  Macmillan  &  Co.,  London,  1915. 


—  2S  — 

This,  however,  does  not  alter  the  facts.  In  times  of  peace 
the  Straits  are  open  to  Russian  merchant  ships ;  the  question 
of  passage  in  times  of  war,  to  which  Russia  is  not  a  party,  is 
a  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  Straits  for  neutral 
vessels,  and  is  by  no  means  the  question  of  tearing  away  by 
force  a  right,  resting  with  somebody  else.  The  closing  of 
the  Straits  not  only  harms  Russian  commerce,  but  it  also 
harms  American  commerce.  But  does  this  constitute  a  title 
for  the  United  States  to  take  Constantinople  away  from  the 
Turks  ?  This  would  be  a  reductio  ad  absurdum.  The  dam- 
ages suffered  by  the  Russian  commerce  are  by  far  greater 
and  by  far  more  harmful,  but  this  only  gives  more  right  to 
Russia  to  try  to  obtain  regulation  by  treaty  of  the  question 
of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  Straits  for  neutral  vessels  in 
times  of  war.  The  program  that  Russia  chose  was  a  differ- 
ent one;  it  was  the  program  of  imperialism.  Russia  does 
not  care  about  safeguarding  by  treaties  the  principle  of  free- 
dom of  the  seas  and  of  the  Straits  to  neutral  vessels,  but  it 
tries  to  occupy  Constantinople  in  order  to  close  it  up  still 
more  tightly  and  fortify  it  for  her  own  benefit  and  to  the 
detriment  of  other  countries.  This  endeavor  Russia  calls 
her  "historical  mission" — the  religious  mission  of  the  tsarate. 
This,  however,  cannot  conceal  the  fact  that  this  is  a  program 
of  conquest  and  expansion,  a  program  of  imperialism,  and  it 
is,  therefore,  in  contradiction  with  the  program  of  the 
present  war. 

The  Russian  imperialism  manifested  itself  as  soon  as  an 
Anglo-French  fleet  approached  Constantinople.  Elated  over 
the  first  triumphs  of  the  Russian  arms  in  Armenia,  Goremy- 
kin,  the  prime  minister  of  Russia,  publicly  declared  in  the 
Duma  that  the  "historical  future  of  Russia  acquires  more 
distinct  outlines  over  there  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea, 
and  at  the  walls  of  Constantinople."   This  happened  on  July 


—  29  — 

9,  1915.*  Members  of  the  Duma  of  all  political  parties  joined 
in  supporting  the  prime  minister.  The  leader  of  the  Opposi- 
tion, Milukoff,  a  member  of  the  Kadet  Party,  expressed  his 
positive  conviction  that  the  "reaching  of  the  main  goal,  viz., 
the  Straits  and  Constantinople,  shall  in  proper  time  be  se- 
cured by  diplomatic  means  as  well  as  military  action." 
Savienko  was  applauded  for  the  phrase  that — "this  great 
and  brilliant  achievement  is  worth  living,  fighting,  and  dy- 
ing for."  Their  reactionary  member,  Levaszoff,  did  not 
betray  any  doubt  that  "the  shield  of  Russia  should  be  at- 
tached to  the  gates  of  Constantinople  and  that  the  Orthodox 
cross  should  once  more  shine  over  the  St.  Sophia."  The 
utterances  of  the  press  and  at  public  meetings  were  no  less 
bold  and  explicit  than  the  speeches  of  the  members  of  the 
Duma.  According  to  the  "statement  of  the  program,"  which 
was  read  off  by  F.  AristoflF,  at  a  Slav  reunion  in  Moscow,t 
the  consequences  of  the  present  war  "should  be  the  extend- 
ing of  the  Russian  territory  to  its  natural  geographical  and 
strategical  boundary,  including  annexation  of  Armenia  with 
an  estuary  to  the  Mediterranean  opposite  the  Island  of 
Cyprus,  the  Straits  of  the  Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles,  to- 
gether with  Constantinople."  Prince  Eugene  Troubetzkoy 
expressed  himself  without  any  "strategical"  circumlocutions 
that  the  "idea  of  St.  Sophia  is  the  idea  of  a  Christian  Uni- 
versal Empire. "J  Is  there  any  need  for  more  proofs  that 
the  question  of  Constantinople  is  the  question  of  imperialism 
with  Russia?  Kinglake  very  justly  estimated  the  political 
psychology  of  Russia,  when  he  stated  years  ago  that  "the 
statesmen  of   St.   Petersburg  have  always  understood  the 


*  Reports  of  the  Russian  press  of  the  meetings  of  the  Duma. 

t  "Gazeta  Warszawska,"  January,  1915. 

t  "Goniec  wieczorny,"  Warsaw,  January  3,  1915. 


—  30  — 

deep  import  of  the  change  which  the  throne  of  Constantine 
would  bring  with  it."* 

Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  war,  when  the 
Russian  armies  crossed  the  Pruth,  Czar  Nicholas  I  issued  a 
manifesto  in  which  he  stated  that,  **It  is  known  to  all  our 
faithful  subjects  that  the  defence  of  the  Orthodox  religion 
was  from  time  immemorial  the  vow  of  our  glorious  fore- 
fathers."t  In  reply  to  the  intervention  of  England  and 
France,  when  the  Crimean  war  had  already  become  a  fact, 
Czar  Nicholas  I  proclaimed  in  a  second  manifesto  that  ''Rus- 
sia fights  not  for  the  things  of  this  world,  but  for  the  Faith 
— for  the  Orthodox  faith.  But  Russia  will  not  alter  her 
divine  mission. "J  Both  manifestoes  were  read  in  the  churches 
all  over  the  empire.  This  mission,  understood  in  that  way, 
has  created  the  conception  of  the  "Holy  Russia"  as  a  coun- 
terpart of  the  idea  of  the  "Holy  Empire."  The  imperialism 
obtained  the  sanction  of  the  religion ;  Constantinople  as  "the 
capital  of  the  Orthodox  Church"  shall  become  the  capital 
of  the  holy  and  great  Russia.  The  limits  of  the  "Holy" 
imperialism  must  of  necessity  be  monstrous.  Domination 
over  the  Straits,  as  Kinglake  says,  "leads  through  the  heart 
of  an  empire  into  the  midst  of  that  world  of  which  men 
kindle  thoughts  when  they  speak  of  the  ^gean  and  of 
Greece,  and  the  Jonian  shores  and  of  Palestine  and  Egypt 
and  of  Italy  and  of  France,  and  of  Spain  and  the  land  of  the 
Moors,  and  of  the  Atlantic  beyond,  and  the  path  of  ships 
on  the  ocean. "§  This  scope  of  feverish  dreams  is  a  very 
good  description,  because  the  limits  of  Rome  reached  in  fact 


*A.  W.  Kinglake:     "The  Invasion  of  the  Crimea,"  1863,  Vol.  I, 
page  62. 
t  A.  W.  Kinglake,  Vol.  I,  page  208. 
t  A.  W.  Kinglake,  ibidem,  Vol.  I,  page  298. 
§  A.  W.  Kinglake,  ibidem,  Vol.  I,  page  57. 


—  31  — 

as  far  as  the  frontiers  of  India.  As  a  scope  of  immediate 
endeavors  of  Russian  policy,  it  is  obviously  an  exaggeration. 
But  there  remains,  however,  the  reality  of  the  enormous 
extent  of  the  inheritance  of  old  Rome.  Constantinople  as  a 
point  of  departure  for  this  inheritance  opens  up  the  road 
even  as  far  as  Palestine.  The  emperors  of  Rome  had  among 
others  the  title  of  ''Protector  of  Palestine,"  and  there  is  a 
deep  reason  for  the  attempt  of  the  Russians  to  effect  an 
insignificant  landing  during  the  present  war  in  Jaffa.  Sug- 
gestions with  regard  to  the  occupation  of  Palestine  can  be 
seen  everywhere  in  the  Russian  press;  these  perspectives 
although  distant  are  unavoidable,  because  they  are  the  direct 
result  of  the  inheritance  from  the  Oriental  Roman  Empire. 
The  question  of  Jerusalem  is  a  question  of  historical  neces- 
sity for  Russia,  at  the  very  moment  when  Russia  succeeds 
in  planting  the  double  cross  on  the  dome  of  St.  Sophia. 

In  order  to  reach  this  goal,  Russia  did  not  hesitate  to  en- 
list the  services  of  a  legend.  The  Russian  people  believe 
that  an  Orthodox  monk,  who  was  praying  in  the  church  of 
St.  Sophia  while  the  Turks  entered  Constantinople,  is  still 
alive  in  the  interior  of  the  walls  of  this  famous  church  which 
opened  miraculously  to  receive  him.  On  the  day  when  Chris- 
tianity regains  the  church  of  St.  Sophia,  its  walls  will  open 
again  and  the  enchanted  monk  will  be  released  in  order  to 
bless  the  victorious  Czar  and  "Holy  Russia."  This  is  cer- 
tainly a  very  clever  imperialistic  propaganda,  because  poli- 
tics joins  hands  with  prayer  and  the  cross  closes  an  alliance 
with  the  sword.  It  is  difficult  to  have  a  grudge  against 
Russia  for  this  ambition  of  hers.  It  is  sure  on  the  other 
hand,  however,  that  the  ambitions  of  Russia,  no  matter  how 
much  hallowed  by  the  aspergill  of  the  Orthodox  religion, 
can't  decide  the  development  of  the  world.  The  goal  of  a 
healthy  and  just  endeavor  should  be :  the  lasting  peace,  the 


—  32  — 

destruction  of  imperialism,  and  supporting  the  freedom  of 
countries  and  nations.  Russia,  unfortunately,  does  not  be- 
lieve in  that ;  the  entire  Russia  believes  at  the  bottom  of  her 
heart  that  the  conquest  of  Constantinople  and  the  making 
of  the  latter  the  capital  of  great  and  holy  Russia  is  a  goal 
which  must  be  reached  "regardless  of  the  results  for  Europe, 
humanity,  liberty,  and  civilization."*  Still  there  is  no  need 
to  become  indignant  over  this  ambition;  it  does  not  bring 
any  dishonor  to  Russia,  although  it  menaces  the  peace  of 
the  world.  The  "divine  mission"  of  Russia  must  rather  be 
understood  than  condemned.  All  the  worldly  ambitions  can 
be  subordinated  to  the  interests  of  humanity  and  even  aban- 
doned for  the  same  reason,  but  "divine  mission"  cannot  be 
abandoned  under  the  penalty  of  a  sin  and  eternal  condemna- 
tion after  death.  The  poor  Russian  Muzhik!  Imbued  for 
centuries  with  the  idea  of  imperialism,  he  is  told  to  wait 
eagerly  under  the  penalty  of  hell  for  the  downfall  of  Turkey. 
When  the  Russian  armies  crossed  the  Pruth,  Emperor  Nich- 
olas I  spoke  of  this  as  the  "divine  mission  of  Russia."  If 
Nicholas  II  ever  crosses  the  Straits,  he  certainly  shall  not 
fail  to  remember  the  words  of  his  great-grandfather  and  un- 
doubtedly will  repeat  that  "Russia  will  not  alter  her  divine 
mission."  And  why  shouldn't  he  repeat  these  words,  since 
this  mission  is  Russia's  tendency  for  the  last  three  centuries  ? 
Nobody  ever  changes  a  victorious  policy,  and  only  silly 
people  believe  in  such  a  possibility.  Russia  must,  whether 
she  wants  or  not,  when  victorious,  to  begin  to  revive  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire.  The  weight  of  the 
inheritance  of  Rome  will  undoubtedly  push  Russia  in  this 
direction,  even  against  the  will  of  the  present  or  any  other 
Czar.    The  double  cross  on  the  dome  of  St.  Sophia  will  be- 

*N.  Danilewskij :     "Russia  and  Europe"   (St.  Petersburg,  1871). 
(In  Russian.) 


—  33  — 

come  the  sign  pointing  toward  Jerusalem.  Over  the  roads 
traveled  by  the  Roman  legions  Russian  imperialism  shall 
make  its  way  to  the  frontiers  of  India.  The  question  of 
Constantinople  is  not  only  the  question  of  the  Straits,  it  is 
something  more  than  the  question  of  simply  driving  the 
Turks  across  the  Bosporus. 

The  question  at  issue  is  the  domination  over  Western 
Asia. 

In  Poland,  Russia  is  busy  ''annexing  purely  Russian  ter- 
ritory." Under  this  pretext  Russia  russified  the  district  of 
Kholm  before  the  war  and  Eastern  Galicia  during  this  war. 
In  the  Balkans  Russia  conducts  a  Pan-Slavic  propaganda 
which  is  nothing  else  but  Pan-Russianism,*  because  it  tends 
to  incorporate  all  Slavic  states  and  nations  into  one  organism 
of  ''Greater  Russia."  In  such  a  case  Roumania  would  have 
to  fall,  in  order  not  to  block  the  "natural"  continuity  of  Slav 
territory,  and  Greece  would  be  thrown  out  of  Saloniki,  which 
once  upon  a  time  was  for  a  brief  period  in  the  hands  of  the 
Slavs.  In  Asia,  after  occupying  Constantinople,  Russia  will 
begin  at  once  to  "annex  Orthodox  territory."  Nicholas  I 
left  an  example  for  Nicholas  II,  and  both  have  inherited  the 
program  from  Catherine  II.  The  interests  of  the  Orthodox 
Church  which  just  happen  to  originate  in  the  shade  of  the 
Basilica  of  St.  Sophia  shall  play  the  same  aggressive  part 
which  they  did  on  the  eve  of  the  Crimean  war.  Historical, 
racial,  and  religious  claims  form  a  threefold  source  of  Rus- 
sian appetite  and  political  expedience.  All  these  elements  are 
the  tools  of  an  imperialistic  policy,  which  is  used  according 
to  the  needs  of  the  moment ;  this  is  by  no  means  degrading 
to  Russia,  but  it  imposes  the  necessity  of  caution  because  the 
seeds  of  imperialism  were  never  the  seeds  of  peace. 

*  Prof.  Masaryk :     "Zur  russischen  Geschichte  und  Religions  Phi- 
losophic." 


—  34  — 

The  defense  of  the  independence  of  Turkey,  and  particu- 
larly the  defense  of  the  Straits  and  of  Constantinople,  from 
the  attacks  of  Russia,  was  once  a  dogma  of  English  policy. 
The  treaty  of  Paris  which  terminated  the  Crimean  war,  pro- 
claimed this  officially  because  it  guaranteed  the  integrity  of 
Turkey.  This  was  also  the  reason  of  the  danger  of  the  war 
between  England  and  Russia  in  the  years  1876-1878,  when 
the  Russian  army  stood  under  the  walls  of  Constantinople 
and  the  English  fleet  demonstratively  entered  the  Straits,  in 
order  to  halt  the  triumphant  progress  of  the  Muscovites. 
Since  that  time  many  things  have  apparently  changed.  In 
Paris,  Lord  Palmerston  defended  not  only  the  Straits  but 
even  the  Black  Sea  and  the  estuary  of  the  Danube  from  the 
appetite  of  Russia.  Beaconsfield  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
defended  only  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  in  the  present  European  war  discarded  not  only  the 
treaty  of  Paris  but  even  that  of  Berlin.  The  British  army 
and  the  British  navy  attacked  Constantinople  in  order  to  turn 
it  over  to  Russia.  The  policy  of  Great  Britain  changed 
its  front  and  works  diametrically  against  the  program  of 
Palmerston.  Those  times  are  gone  forever,  when  Beacons- 
field,  going  to  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  was  greeted  at  every 
railroad  station  in  Germany  by  crowds  of  people  and  his 
car  was  literally  deluged  with  flowers.  The  ''Times"  was 
elated,  together  with  all  England,  that  "Lord  Beaconsfield's 
journey  from  the  German  frontier  to  Berlin  was  a  veritable 
triumph.  Nothing  of  the  kind,  however,  for  Prince  Gortcha- 
koflf."*  To-day  the  English  press  speaks  of  the  mistakes  of 
Palmerston  and  Beaconsfield  and  suggests  that  the  govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  make  a  present  of  Constantinople  to 
Russia.  The  enthusiasm  running  in  this  direction,  or  may  be 
blindness,  has  gone  so  far  that  the  "Times"  of  London,  an 
*  The  "Times,"  London,  1878,  June  14. 


—  35  — 

organ  of  the  Tories,  representing  the  good  old  English  tra- 
ditions of  policy  with  regard  to  the  Oriental  question  has  the 
courage  of  printing  articles  in  which  the  turning  over  of 
Constantinople  to  Russia  is  considered  as  extremely  advan- 
tageous for  England,  because  then  Russia  is  going  to  be 
"far  more  vulnerable."*  The  English  army,  and  particularly 
the  English  fleet,  have  learned  by  their  own  dire  experience 
to  what  extent  the  possession  of  Constantinople  makes  Tur- 
key 'Vulnerable."  Does  Antwerp,  occupied  by  Germany, 
make  the  latter  also  "far  more  vulnerable"  because  it  brings 
Germany  closer  to  London?  It  is  still  an  open  question 
whether  the  program  of  Lord  Palmerston  was  a  "mistake." 
This  question  will  be  settled  at  the  outcome  of  the  present 
war ;  but  at  any  rate  it  is  an  astounding  fact  that  nowadays 
Germany  is  defending  the  program  of  Palmerston  while 
England  seems  to  betray  her  own  traditions. 

England  is  animated  by  the  fear  for  the  future  of  the 
Suez  Canal.  England  occupied  Egypt  "for  the  defense  of 
the  canal,"  when  the  internal  troubles  in  the  land  of  the 
Nile  in  1881-1882  seemed  to  jeopardize  the  safety  of  navi- 
gation, t  At  present  England  seems  to  be  under  the  illusion 
that  "the  elimination  of  Turkey  relieves  Egypt  and  secures 
communication  with  India."J  The  idea  of  the  defense  of 
the  Suez  Canal  has  always  been  a  national  idea  of  Great 
Britain.  At  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  the  leader  of 
the  Opposition,  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  did  not  hesitate  to  sup- 
port Beaconsfield  in  so  far  as  the  latter's  pohcy  involved  the 
principle  that  "England  will  never  permit  at  any  cost  that 
any  power  in  Europe  shall  interfere  with  her  direct  access 


*  Sunday  "Times,"  London,  1915,  March  14. 

tJohn   Morley:     'The   Life  of   W.   E.   Gladstone,"   Book   VIII, 
page  82. 
JTlie  "Westminster  Gazette,"  1915.  April  16. 


—  36  — 

to  India."*  Egypt  protects  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  Suez 
Canal  forms  the  communication  with  India  and  Australia. 
Deep  silence  reigned  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  April  9,  1878, 
when  on  the  eve  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Beaconsfield  put 
up  the  question  to  England :  ''Why  not  march  armies  in 
the  same  way  and  hold  Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal  in  the 
same  state  of  trepidation  as  Constantinople  and  the  Bos- 
porus were  held  at  that  time?"t  This  was  a  hint  at  the 
Russian  armies,  which  began  to  descend  the  southern  slopes 
of  Armenia. 

Armenia  and  Egypt? 

At  the  first  glance  this  fear  seems  to  be  far  fetched,  but 
it  is  real  when  viewed  by  those  who  are  familiar  with  the 
conditions.  The  possession  of  Armenia  gives  the  control 
over  Western  Asia;  Erzerum  and  Erzingan  dominate  the 
northern  part  of  Asia  Minor,  and  Charput  and  Malatia 
control  her  central  and  southern  portion.  Through  Bitlis 
and  along  the  upper  part  of  Tiger  a  road  leads  from  Armenia 
as  far  as  Mosul ;  Mosul  in  turn  is  the  gate  to  Mezopotamia. 
Another  road  leads  from  Charput  through  Djarbekir  as  far 
as  Aleppo,  which  again  is  the  gate  to  Syria.  Domination 
over  Armenia  and  Khurdistan  means  the  strategical  domina- 
tion over  the  main  roads  leading  to  Asia  Minor,  Mezopo- 
tamia, and  Syria.  Russia  is  perfectly  well  aware  of  the 
meaning  of  this  fact ;  having  conquered  Kars,  she  tries  now 
to  conquer  Erzerum  and  from  there  through  the  Khurdistan, 
and  Khilikia  tries  to  open  a  window  to  the  Mediterranean. 
The  estuary  of  the  Russian  plans  in  Armenia  is  Alexan- 
dretta  on  the  Bay  of  Iskanderun  opposite  the  Island  of  Cy- 
prus. The  occupation  of  Cyprus  by  England  had  precisely 
the  purpose  of  putting  the  hand  on  the  approach  to  Alexan- 

*  The  "Times,"  London,  1878,  Speech  of  March  17. 
t  The  "Times,"  London,  1878. 


—  37  — 

dretta  and  thus  barring  the  Russian  access  to  the  Suez  Canal. 
Beaconsfield  made  the  occupation  of  Cyprus  dependent  on 
the  occupation  of  Kars  in  Armenia  by  Russia.  Without 
excluding  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  England  pledged 
herself  to  occupy  Cyprus  as  long  as  Kars  shall  be  occupied  by 
Russia.  This  fact  is  an  excellent  illustration  of  England's 
fear  that  the  occupation  of  the  roads  of  Armenia  by  Russia 
would  bring  the  latter,  through  Mosul,  closer  to  Mezopotamia 
and  through  Aleppo  and  Alexandretta  closer  to  Syria  and 
Egypt.  The  Russian  advance  through  Armenia  against  Tur- 
key, is  equal  to  the  formation  of  a  basis  for  a  future  advance 
against  Syria  and  from  there,  there  is  but  one  step  to  Egypt. 
The  future  of  Armenia  and  of  Khurdistan  is  closely  identi- 
fied with  the  future  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Egypt  will  be  suffi- 
cient for  protecting  the  Suez  Canal  from  Turkey,  but  it  will 
be  inadequate  to  protect  the  latter  from  Russia,  the  moment 
the  latter  enters  Constantinople  and  breaks  through  the 
natural  barrier  of  the  Armenian  highlands. 

England  goes  at  present  through  a  period  of  her  history 
in  which  she  transforms  her  colonies  into  states  within  a 
state.  India,  Canada,  and  Australia  have  already  reached  this 
stage  of  evolution.  It  is  now  Africa's  turn;  Egypt  in  the 
north  and  Cape  Town  in  the  south  form  the  new  political 
center  on  the  African  continent.  The  railroad  connection 
from  Cape  Town  to  Cairo  requires  an  additional  railroad 
connection  between  Cairo  and  Calcutta.  This  plan,  however, 
requires  the  conquest  of  Mezopotamia  and  Arabia  in  order  to 
gain  an  immediate  connection  between  Egypt  and  southern 
Persia  where,  by  virtue  of  an  agreement  of  1907,  Russia 
abandoned  all  her  claims  for  the  benefit  of  England,  and  for 
the  price  of  northern  Persia  has  foregone  temporarily  her 
railroad  plans  in  the  direction  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  Under 
these  conditions  the  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta  could 


—  38  — 

run  exclusively  through  territories  subjected  to  English  con- 
trol. In  order  to  increase  the  fertility  of  the  countryside, 
through  which  the  railroad  line  from  Egypt  to  India  was  to 
run,  English  ingenuity  has  long  before  the  war  elaborated 
plans  of  irrigation  and  improvements  through  colonization 
of  the  neglected,  but  once  upon  a  time  exceedingly  fertile 
stretches  of  the  country  alongside  of  the  Euphrates  and  the 
Tiger.*  The  main  prompting  motives  are  of  commercial  and 
civilizatory  nature,  but  have  above  all  a  strategical  meaning 
of  facilitating  and  increasing  the  ability  of  self-defense  of 
England's  colonial  dominions  in  Asia  and  in  Africa.  This  is 
the  purpose  which  is  supposed  to  console  England  for  her 
abandoning  the  policy  of  Lord  Palmerston  and  Lord 
Beaconsfield.  For  the  price  of  Mezopotamia,  Arabia  and  of 
the  Cairo-Calcutta  railroad,  England  tries  to  think  actually 
of  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey  in  partnership  with  Russia 
and  France.  In  such  a  case  Russia  would  fulfill  the  first  part 
of  her  "divine  mission,"  and  would  enter  not  only  Constan- 
tinople, but  through  Armenia,  Khurdistan,  and  Khilikia  into 
the  gulf  of  Iskanderun.  The  remaining  portion  of  Asia 
Minor  could  easily  be  distributed  among  Italy,  Greece,  and — 
Turkey,  because  even  the  latter's  enemies  cannot  conceal  the 
fact  that  Anatolia  is  "essentially "f  Turkish  and  the  popula- 
tion is  "good  and  peaceful.''^  Syria  is  intended  for  France 
when  the  contemplated  partition  of  Turkey  shall  materialize. 
The  Jesuits  conducted  for  a  number  of  years  a  civilizatory 
work  in  Syria  for  the  benefit  of  France,  for  which  even  the 
socialist,  Herve,  calls  them  very  reverently  "The  Fathers." 
Compared  with  the  shares  of  Russia  and  England,  Syria  is 


*  Schemes  of  Willcock, 

t  "Turkey  in  Europe  and  Asia,"  page  19,  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914- 
$New  York  "Times,"  May  9,  191 5 — Gustave  Herve:     "What  is 
To  Be  Done  with  Turkey?"    Reprint  from  "La  Guerra  Sociale." 


—  39  — 

rather  a  small  gain  for  France,  which  is  menaced  by  enor- 
mous financial  losses  in  case  of  Turkey's  dismemberment, 
because  60  per  cent,  of  the  Ottoman  debt  represents  Tur- 
key's indebtedness  to  France.  The  settlement  of  the  bill, 
however,  is  intended  to  be  made  at  the  expense  of  Germany. 
France  hopes  to  get  back  Alsace  and  Lorraine  and  German 
colonies  in  Western  Africa.  German  East  Africa  is  in- 
cluded, however,  in  the  sphere  of  English  interests,  because 
it  borders  on  the  Lake  of  Tanjanjika  and  strategically 
menaces  the  railroad  line  from  Cape  Town  to  Cairo  and  the 
continuation  of  this  line  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta.  In  case  of 
trouble,  in  the  Moslem  world,  because  of  the  dismemberment 
of  Turkey,  the  public  opinion  of  England  contemplates  the 
transfer  of  the  seat  of  the  Khalifat  to  Egypt.*  Cairo  is 
nearer  to  Mecca  than  Constantinople.  That  means  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  the  completion  of  the  entire  plan,  which  seems 
to  tally  in  the  eyes  of  England  with  the  end  of  the  ''Oriental 
Question,"  while,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  such  a  solution  would 
mean  nothing  else  but  the  end  of  the  first  act  of  this  drama. 
The  transferring  of  the  Khalifat  to  Egypt  is  an  undertak- 
ing of  a  very  doubtful  nature.  The  old  time  fanaticism  has 
died  out  nowadays  in  the  Islamic  world.  The  importance  of 
the  Sultan  is  not  based  as  much  upon  his  purely  spiritual 
dignity,  but  on  the  connection  of  this  spiritual  dignity  with 
the  splendor  of  the  imperial  crown.  The  transferring  of 
the  Khalifat  to  Egypt  would  in  the  eyes  of  the  Asiatic  na- 
tions mean  the  dethronization  of  the  Islam.  Such  a  promo- 
tion of  the  Sultan  of  Egypt  at  such  a  price  would  be  nothing 
else  but  purely  an  ornament  and  political  fiction,  which  is 
not  worth  even  as  much  as  the  bones  of  one  English  soldier. 
The  question  of  the  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta  pre- 

*  "Manchester  Guardian,"  Article  on  the  "Future  of  Turkey,"  by 
Sir  W.  Ramsay,  April,  191 5. 


—  40  — 

sents  a  materially  different  aspect.  Arabia  and  Mezopo- 
tamia  would  shield  Egypt  as  soon  as  England  would  settle 
in  both  countries,  and  it  would  mean  at  the  same  time  a  uni- 
form stretch  of  territory  for  a  connection  between  India  and 
South  Africa  through  Egypt  and  the  Sudan.  The  whole 
transaction  is  very  tempting  at  first  sight,  although  the  value 
of  such  a  railroad  is  rather  doubtful  when  we  consider  the 
lower  cost  of  sea  transportation  through  the  Suez  Canal. 
England  is  confronted  by  enormous  possibilities  of  colonial 
expansion  and  civilizatory  work.  The  only  question  is 
whether  the  entire  deal  is  not  a  little  too  expensive. 

The  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta  is  not  a  very  safe 
enterprise  in  the  long  run.  This  railroad  can  be  carried  out 
only  at  the  price  of  admitting  Russia  to  a  partition  of  Tur- 
key. This  means  ipso  facto  the  admission  of  Russia  to  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  both  through  the  Dardanelles 
and  the  Gulf  of  Iskanderun.  The  internal  necessity  of  the 
Russian  imperialism  will  then  raise  the  question  of  the 
domination  of  Western  Asia  on  account  of  the  inheritance 
of  the  Eastern  Roman  empire.  The  holy  pilgrimages  of 
Russia  to  Christ's  grave  in  Jerusalem  and  the  rolHng  rouble 
will  at  once  start  to  prepare  the  ground.  Owing  to  the  pos- 
session of  Armenia,  Russia  will  take  strategical  advantages 
of  the  roads  to  Mezopotamia  and  Syria.  Erzingan,  Charput 
and  Malatia  will  become  the  key  of  the  situation.  Under 
such  conditions  the  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta  shall 
not  have  great  strategical  importance.  Russia  will  be  able  to 
destroy  at  any  time  the  road  along  the  northern  boundary  of 
Persia  and  interrupt  the  overland  communication  of  India 
with  Eg5rpt.  Through  northern  Persia  the  attack  is  very  easy 
because  of  a  long  front  line.  It  is  so  easy  in  fact  that  a  band 
of  desperadoes  can  at  any  time  destroy  the  track  or  blow  up 
the  bridges  and  tunnels.     Money  can  always  be  found  in 


—  41  — 

Russia  for  such  a  purpose.  The  defense  of  the  railroad 
line  from  Egypt  is  equally  difficult  because  both  in  Mezo- 
potamia  and  in  Syria  there  will  always  be  the  danger  of  a 
flank  attack  of  the  Russian  armies  through  Armenia.  After 
ten  years  of  Russian  domination  in  Armenia,  Khurdistan, 
and  Khilikia,  the  Russian  general  staff  will  undoubtedly 
build  a  military  railroad  through  the  main  mountain  passes 
and  valleys.  An  attack  on  Russia  from  the  side  of  Syria 
and  Mezopotamia  will  always  be  very  difficult  and  very  risky 
owing  to  the  mountain  fortifications,  while  Russian  offensive 
movement  down  the  valley  of  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tiger, 
or  through  Aleppo  towards  Palestine  and  Egypt,  will  be 
easy.  Lord  Beaconsfield  was  not  mistaken  when  he  feared 
that  the  Russian  armies  might  threaten  the  Suez  Canal 
through  Armenia,  because  they  threatened  along  the  same 
road  the  entire  Asiatic  Turkey.  The  price  for  which  Eng- 
land wants  to  build  the  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Calcutta  is 
positively  too  high.  It  is  a  very  risky  undertaking,  still  more 
so  because  Lord  Palmerston's  political  formula  of  ''peaceful 
penetration"  with  the  maintenance  of  the  integrality  of 
Turkey  does  not  exclude  the  plan  of  the  railroad  Cairo- 
Calcutta.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  after  occupying  Ar- 
menia and  Constantinople  will  at  once  begin  to  pray  to  her 
Orthodox  God  to  permit  her  to  finish  her  "holy  mission," 
and  plant  the  double  cross  on  the  grave  of  the  Saviour  in 
Jerusalem.  The  Russian  legend  shall  again  place  in  the 
walls  of  the  Holy  Grave  Church  some  Russian  monk  anx- 
iously waiting  for  the  day  of  the  Russian  troops  entering 
Jerusalem. 

There  was  a  deep  reason  for  the  Russian  attempt  to  land 
in  Jaffa  during  this  present  war. 

Turkey  is  not  able  to  conduct  a  policy  of  imperialism.  On 
the  east  it  borders  with  Persia  where  the  Anglo-Russian 


—  42  — 

treaty  set  up  the  boundaries  of  their  respective  interests,  ex- 
cluding Turkey  from  all  participation.  Turkey  will  not  ven- 
ture without  absolute  necessity  and  alone  a  war  with  Russia 
and  England,  on  account  of  Persia,  which  does  not  present 
for  Turkey  any  such  benefit  that  would  make  it  worth  while 
for  Turkey  to  risk  her  own  independence.  To  the  south 
there  is  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  Arabic  Sea,  the  Red  Sea  and 
the  Mediterranean.  Turkey  does  not  have  sufficient  tradi- 
tion on  the  seas  and  she  has  nothing  to  gain  there.  In  the 
West,  Constantinople  only,  together  with  the  fortified  line 
of  Tjatalja  and  Adrianople  was  left  to  Turkey.  The  Balkan 
war  has  removed  Turkey  from  the  national  struggles  in  the 
Balkans.  Nobody  can  nowadays  conduct  a  policy  against 
the  principle  of  nationalism  for  any  length  of  time,  and  this 
is  still  more  true  of  Turkey  in  regard  to  Greece,  Bulgaria, 
Servia,  Roumania,  and  Montenegro.  A  guarantee  thereof 
is  given  by  the  strategical  character  of  the  Turkish  boun- 
daries in  Europe.  No  offensive  movement  on  a  large  scale 
can  be  started  from  the  line  running  through  Adrianople, 
Tjatalja  and  Gallipoli.  The  strategical  character  of  the  fron- 
tiers of  European  Turkey  is  purely  defensive  since  the  treaty 
of  Bucharest.  There  still  remains  the  Egyptian  .  frontier 
on  the  line  of  contact  between  Asia  and  Africa.  The  geo- 
graphical conditions  of  Sinai  make  the  defence  of  Egypt 
from  the  East  very  easy,  and  attack  very  difficult.  The 
conditions  of  Turkish  offensive  in  the  direction  of  the  Suez 
Canal  require  enormous  sacrifices,  particularly  if  the  defense 
of  the  Suez  Canal  rests  with  a  strong  and  well  supplied 
power.  These  facts  decide  the  problem  of  Western  Asia  in 
favor  of  maintaining  the  independence  of  Turkey.  The 
domination  of  the  Turks  in  Constantinople  neutralizes  to 
some  extent  Western  Asia  with  reference  to  European 
powers.     Turkey  does  not  need  and  cannot  embark  on  a 


—  43  — 

policy  of  imperialism  from  the  shores  of  the  Bosporus. 
The  conditions  are  different  with  Russia.  Even  a  rejuve- 
nated Turkey  and  with  a  constitutional  form  of  government 
cannot  become  a  menace  to  Egypt.  The  renaissance  of  Tur- 
key is  at  the  same  time  an  emancipation  of  her  national 
strength.  Any  step  in  this  direction  will  weaken  the  tutelage 
of  Germany  by  rendering  it  superfluous.  The  rejuvenation 
of  Turkey  means  a  loss  in  the  first  place  to  Russia  and  in 
the  second  place  to  Germany,  while  for  England  there  re- 
mains a  status  quo,  because  the  neighborhood  of  Turkey  will 
never  be  as  dangerous  to  the  Suez  Canal  as  the  proximity 
of  Russia  would  be  after  the  latter  has  crossed  the  Straits 
and  the  Armenian  mountains.  It  is  impossible  to  transport 
the  Suez  Canal  to  the  moon  and,  therefore,  the  one  who  is 
less  dangerous  is  the  better  neighbor,  and  for  this  reason 
the  formula  of  'Lord  Palmerston  does  not  cease  to  be  bind- 
ing for  England  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
apparently  has  ridden  himself  of  this  axiom.  For  the  prize 
of  immediate  gain  nobody  with  a  sound  mind  will  expose 
his  nation  to  bankruptcy  in  the  future.  So  much  less  Eng- 
land can  be  directed  over  this  road — England,  which  gave  a 
decided  political  character  to  many  centuries  and  filled  half 
the  world  with  the  work  of  her  genius. 

The  danger  in  case  of  a  victory  of  Russia  is  a  very  real 
one.  A  new,  terrible  weapon  of  naval  warfare  came  into 
prominence  in  this  war.  This  weapon  is  the  submarine 
which  caused  a  new  era  in  the  technique  of  naval  warfare. 
Within  the  next  few  years  the  improvement  of  submarines 
will  become  a  fact  which  will  make  the  conditions  of  com- 
petition on  the  sea  equal  to  all  the  powers.  Never  since  the 
battle  at  Trafalgar  had  Europe  such  a  chance  against  the 
English  supremacy  on  the  sea.  It  is  impossible  to  be  blind 
any  longer  and  not  to  see  the  results  of  this  fact  for  England 


—  44  — 

the  very  moment  that  Russia  enters  Constantinople  and 
opens  a  window  to  the  Mediterranean,  somewhere  opposite 
the  Island  of  Cyprus.  The  Dardanelles  and  the  Gulf  of 
Iskanderun  shall  become  the  basis  of  operation  for  the  Rus- 
sian Mediterranean  fleet.  Then  Russia  will  become  "d  great 
naval  power,"  and  even  "from  the  Mediterranean  she  might 
be  expected  to  expand  her  operations  to  the  ocean."  These 
are  not  empty  apprehensions,  because  they  were  expressed 
by  a  professional  man,  who  many  times  was  minister  of  the 
Italian  navy,  Admiral  Bettolo.*  In  case  of  a  war  with 
England,  Russian  submarines  could  attack  the  shores  of 
Egypt,  and  the  blockade  of  the  Suez  Canal  would  be  by  far  a 
greater  achievement  than  the  present  blockade  of  the  Eng- 
lish coast  line  by  Germany.  Germany  gave  the  example  and 
Russia  will  not  forget  it,  since  she  has  some  experience  in 
making  speedy  armaments.  The  budget  of  the  Russian  navy 
has  increased. in  the  years  from  1909  to  1913  by  302  million 
roubles  or  by  154  per  cent.  At  the  same  time  the  expenses 
of  England  increased  only  29.6  per  cent,  and  those  of  Ger- 
many 13.8  per  cent.  The  Russian  imperialism,  after  pene- 
trating the  Dardanelles  and  the  Armenian  Mountains,  cer- 
tainly will  not  spare  sacrifices,  and  submarines  are  compara- 
tively inexpensive. 

A  word  to  the  wise  is  sufficient. 

Russia,  however,  has  still  another  weapon  which  is  not 
less  dangerous  for  England.  This  is  Russia's  frontier  line 
in  Asia.  Pamir  is  the  gate  to  India,  and  the  Persian  agree- 
ment made  neighbors  of  England  and  Russia  in  the  Iran. 
The  neutrality  of  Persia  is  nothing  but  fiction,  even  in  this 
war,  and  so  much  less  could  Persia  separate  Russia  from 
England  in  case  of  a  war  between  these  two  countries.  For 
England,  which  is  not  a  military  power,  these  conditions  pre- 

*The  "Evening  Post,"  New  York,  April  to.  1915. 


—  45  — 

sent  a  very  serious  menace.  England  can  blockade  Cier- 
many,  it  can  cut  off  her  military  transports  and  stop  them 
with  her  guns  at  Gibraltar,  even  if  Germany  succeeds  in 
breaking  through  the  blockade  in  the  North  Sea.  Germany 
and  England  have  no  frontier  line,  neither  in  Europe  nor  in 
Asia.  On  the  other  hand  England  cannot  cut  off  Russia, 
and  on  the  second  day  of  the  war  Russian  armies  can  start 
on  their  march  toward  Afghanistan,  India,  Persia  and 
through  Armenia  over  Mosul  and  Aleppo  towards  Mezo- 
potamia  and  Syria.  The  isolation  of  Germany  permits  Eng- 
land to  raise  an  army  and  postpone  the  decisive  struggle 
until  a  favorable  date;  Russia  on  the  other  hand  can  force 
England  to  accept  a  fight  because  it  is  England's  neigh- 
bor in  Asia,  and  in  a  war  with  Russia  England  has  no  time 
for  the  raising  of  an  army  and  cannot  procrastinate  the 
struggle.  On  the  second  day  of  the  war,  English  troops 
must  bar  the  road  to  the  Russians  in  order  to  defend 
India,  which  is  the  most  precious  gem  in  the  British 
crown.  In  this  light,  the  safety  of  the  Suez  Canal  becomes 
more  imperative  to-day  for  England  than  it  was  at  the  time 
of  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  greater 
obligations  in  this  direction  than  Lord  Beaconsfield  ever  had. 
Beaconsfield  had  to  defend  the  Suez  Canal  from  the  Russian 
fleet,  while  Sir  Edward  Grey  must  nowadays  defend  the 
Suez  Canal  from  the  piracy  of  Russian  submarines,  which 
will  not  fail  to  make  a  lightning-like  appearance  in  the  Medi- 
terranean the  very  moment  Russia  is  able  to  penetrate  into 
Constantinople  and  force  the  entrance  inta  the  Gulf  of 
Iskanderun. 

It  looks  like  a  paradox,  but  it  is  a  truth  at  the  same  time 
that  for  England  to-day  a  defeat  jointly  with  Russia  is  less 
dangerous  than  a  joint  victory  with  Russia  for  the  prize 
of  Constantinople  and  Alexandretta.    Hence  the  conclusion 


—  46  — 

that  the  purpose  of  English  poHcy  and  strategy  in  the  pres- 
ent war  seems  to  be  a  double  game:  To  defeat  Russia 
through  Germany  and  to  beat  exhausted  Germany  with  her 
own  army.  This  is  for  England  the  only  way  of  victory  and 
the  only  way  which  can  secure  England's  future.  The  vic- 
tory of  England  for  the  prize  of  the  victory  of  Russia  would 
be  a  Pyrrhus  victory.  Constantinople  is  entirely  too  great  a 
price  to  be  sold  to  Russia  by  England  for  the  price  of  a  tem- 
porary military  advantage  in  the  war  with  Germany.  Eng- 
land goes  jointly  with  Russia  as  far  as  the  military  end  is 
concerned  against  Germany,  but  politically  England  cannot 
afford  to  go  jointly  with  Russia  against  Turkey.  The  ques- 
tion of  Constantinople  can  by  no  means  be  a  question  of 
compromise  but  only  a  question  of  victory — of  England  or 
of  Russia,  should  the  liquidation  of  Turkey  become  the 
inevitable  outcome.  A  deep  reason  prompted  the  attack  of 
the  Anglo-French  fleet  on  the  Dardanelles  before  Russia 
could  menace  Turkey  from  the  land  side.  The  attack  of 
England  and  France  on  the  Dardanelles  began  simultane- 
ously with  the  defeats  of  Russia  in  Poland.  England  pre- 
ferred to  attack  the  Dardanelles  than  to  accelerate  the  of- 
fensive move  in  France  for  the  purpose  of  saving  Russia. 
The  Dardanelles  could  not  be  transferred  to  the  moon  for 
reasons  of  safety,  and  all  arguments  of  diplomatic  or  finan- 
cial nature  cannot  possibly  conceal  the  fact  that  the  attack  on 
the  Dardanelles  after  a  victory  in  France  would  have  much 
greater  chances  of  success.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
military  situation  in  France  and  in  Poland,  the  attack  on  the 
Dardanelles  was  wasting  of  human  life  and  ammunition. 
The  throwing  of  the  same  amount  of  troops  and  ammunition 
on  the  battle  front  near  Arras,  when  the  majority  of  the 
German  army  was  busy  attacking  Lemberg,  could  have  suc- 
ceeded in  piercing  the  German  front  and  saving  Russia  from 


—  47  — 

an  enormous  disaster.  This  is  perfectly  easy  to  understand. 
The  interest  of  England  demanded  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously to  leave  Russia's  army  to  its  fate  and  to  attack  the 
Dardanelles  in  the  meantime  in  order  to  outdistance  the 
Russians  in  the  race  for  Constantinople.  England  has  at- 
tacked Dardanelles  in  order  to  cut  the  way  to  Suez  Canal 
for  Germans,  and  not  with  the  view  of  giving  out  Constan- 
tinople to  Russia.  Russia  has  filed  artificial  and  far-reaching 
claims  to  Constantinople,  while  England  threw  the  first  blood 
on  the  scales  in  the  same  question.  It  is  a  well-known  fact 
that  blood  weighs  heavier  than  claims.  The  program  of 
Lord  Palmerston  and  Lord  Beaconsfield  was  certainly  of 
some  influence  in  this  complicated  game,  although  it  worked 
unnoticed  by  the  masses. 

The  arguments  for  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey  are 
very  flimsy  indeed.  The  argument  that  the  national  con- 
sciousness in  Western  Asia  is  very  indistinct,  does  not  give 
any  right  for  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey.  Doing  this, 
Europe  would  destroy  what  Turkey  did  not  have  time  to  ac- 
complish. Under  the  domination  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia  the  national  consciousness  of  the  Asiatic  masses  must 
necessarily  go  back  because  slavery  is  never  constructive. 
Why  should  not  the  masses  be  left  in  the  hands  of  Turkey 
that  dominated  over  them  for  centuries,  and  has  already 
elaborated  her  traditions  ?  Why  take  for  the  benefit  of  Euro- 
pean countries  the  liberty  from  the  Asiatic  masses  and  de- 
prive them  of  the  hope  of  ever  growing  into  a  nation?  In 
order  to  sweeten  the  pill,  the  Allies  are  promising  to  the 
masses  of  Asia  a  better  administration.  Turkey  always  had 
and  still  has  many  shortcomings  as  far  as  administration 
is  concerned,  but  the  same  shortcomings  are  in  existence  in 
Portugal  and  in  the  South  American  republics.  Is  this, 
however,  a  reason  for  their  dismemberment  and  the  destruc- 


—  48  — 

tion  of  their  independence?  The  lack  of  understanding  for 
the  autonomous  aspirations  is  not  exclusively  a  specialty  of 
Turkey.  Russia  has  still  less  of  that  understanding  and  a 
more  reactionary  form  of  government  than  Young  I'urkey. 
It  should,  furthermore,  not  be  forgotten  that  on  the  thresh- 
old of  the  twentieth  century  England  found  herself  on 
the  eve  of  a  civil  war  for  home  rule  in  Ireland.  The 
sin  of  a  centralized  government  is  not  an  exclusively 
Turkish  sin.  Europe  has  permitted  Russia  to  regenerate 
and  rehabilitate  herself  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  Why 
shouldn't  Turkey  be  given  the  same  chance?  Isn't  it  true 
that  the  slogans  of  the  present  war  are  the  two  principles : 
''The  equality  of  states,"  and  "the  equality  of  rights."* 
While  the  bombardment  of  the  Dardanelles  by  the  English 
fleet  was  going  on,  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  from  the 
speaker's  chair  that  England  champions  in  the  present  war 
the  freedom  of  the  nations,  regardless  "whether  they  be  great 
states  or  small  states. "f  All  this  seems  to  be  some  tragic 
misunderstanding,  because  at  this  particular  moment  nobody 
has  a  right  to  say  lies. 

There  still  remains  the  main  argument.  The  Turks  repre- 
sent the  Islam  while  Russia,  France  and  England  represent 
Christianity.  Because  of  an  antagonism  against  the  Islam 
the  entire  world  is  silent,  when  in  the  name  of  freedom  of 
nations  a  partition  of  Turkey  is  contemplated.  The  question 
of  nationalities  ceased  long  ago  to  be  the  question  of  God; 
the  Middle  Ages  as  well  as  the  period  of  religious  wars  has 
passed  forever.  The  calamity  of  Europe  was  in  times  gone 
by  the  maxim:  ''Cuius  regio,  eius  religio" ;  the  maxim: 
"Cuius  religio,  eius  regio"  will  by  no  means  be  a  lesser  evil. 
This  is  properly  the  basis  on  which  Russia  is  founding  her 

*  L.  Cecil  Jane :    "The  Nations  At  War,"  London,  1914. 
t  Bechstein  Hall,  March  22, 1915. 


—  49  — 

claims  to  Constantinople  and  Jerusalem,  because  the  state 
religion  of  Russia  happened  to  originate  on  the  Bosporus. 
The  domination  of  Russia  never  reached  these  regions,  and 
the  population  inhabitating  Constantinople  and  Jerusalem 
has  no  racial  community  with  Russia.  Russia's  appetite  is 
nothing  else  but  an  imperialistic  fever,  highly  dangerous  to 
the  peace  of  Europe.  Imperialism  never  was  a  basis  for 
the  permanent  peace  and  it  never  shall  be.  So  much  less 
Russian  imperialism  because  it  has  donned  the  vestment  of 
the  Orthodox  Church,  and  religious  imperialism  has  always 
been  the  worst  form.  The  entrance  of  Russia  to  Constan- 
tinople would  be  the  crowning  feat  of  the  principle — "Cuius 
religio,  eius  regio,"  and  the  ground  for  future  aggressive 
wars. 

The  twentieth  century  cannot  afford  to  propagate  the 
idea  of  ''Cuius  religio,  eius  regio"  It  can  do  it  much  less 
because  in  Russia  the  political  reaction  and  the  Orthodox 
Church  form  the  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same  matter. 
The  Orthodox  Church  supports  the  despotism  of  the  Czar 
and  the  latter  protects  the  Orthodox  Church  from  the  in- 
fluences of  constitutionalism  and  the  progress  of  Western 
Europe.  The  Russian  Duma  is  but  a  fiction  of  the  consti- 
tution, a  fig  leaf  which  conceals  the  rotten  condition  of 
things.  The  Duma  does  not  participate  in  government  and 
is,  properly  speaking,  only  a  consultant  body  for  the  gov- 
ernment, which  without  any  reservation  whatsoever  is  ex- 
clusively subordinated  to  the  will  of  the  despotic  Czar. 
The  democratic  strata  of  society  have  a  very  limited  repre- 
sentation, because  the  reactionary  system  of  elections  bars 
them  from  the  Duma.  These  are  the  facts  which  war  time 
sentiments  should  not  obscure  to  the  eyes  of  our  conscience. 
The  current  of  freedom  foundered  and  still  founders  in  Rus- 
sia— on  the  rocks  of  the  Orthodox  Church.    The  victory  of 


—  50  — 

Orthodoxy  can  under  these  conditions  never  accelerate  the 
victory  of  the  principle  of  civic  freedom  in  Russia,  because 
only  the  defeat  of  Orthodoxy  can  facilitate  the  defeat  of 
the  reaction  and  despotism  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  day  of 
Russia's  entering  Constantinople  would  constitute  a  triumph 
for  the  Orthodox  Church  and  would  delay,  not  accelerate, 
the  day  of  liberty  for  Russia's  people.  Russia  is  by  no 
means  a  peevish  child  that  can  stop  bothering  his  entour- 
age for  the  price  of  a  piece  of  candy.  Therefore,  is  there 
any  sense  in  expecting  that  Russia,  after  having  accom- 
plished the  dream  of  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  II  and 
Nicholas  I,  should  change  the  character  of  the  state?  No- 
body changes  and  nobody  can  afford  to  change  a  victorious 
policy.  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  II  and  Nicholas  I  not 
only  suffered  from  the  fever  of  imperialism,  but  they  were  at 
the  same  time  the  pillars  of  reaction  and  despotism.  The 
entering  of  Constantinople  will  mean  a  triumph  for  Russian 
reaction  and  not  the  beginning  of  a  change;  Orthodoxy  in 
Russia  is  still  strong  enough  and  too  strong  that  the  day 
of  its  triumph  should  mean  the  day  of  its  future  suicide. 
The  partition  of  Turkey  prompted  by  antagonism  toward 
Islam  is  from  this  point  of  view  politically  absurd. 

The  participation  in  the  war  of  England  and  France 
against  Germany  has  raised  the  importance  of  Russia  in  the 
public  opinion  of  Western  Europe  and  of  America.  Unfor- 
tunately Russia  has  been  put  on  the  same  level  as  England 
and  France.  Hatred  against  Germany  helped  to  develop 
an  apotheosis  for  Russia.  This  is  quite  plausible  from  the 
point  of  view  of  pure  hatred  towards  Germany,  but  never 
from  the  point  of  view  of  justice  and  truth. 

I — The  program  of  Western  Europe  is  nationalism ;  the 
program  of  Russia  is  imperialism. 


—  51  — 

II — The  program  of  Western  Europe  is  the  expansion 
of  the  freedom  of  nations ;  the  program  of  Russia 
is  the  expansion  in  the  name  of  the  idea :  ''Cuius 
religio,  eius  regio." 

Ill — The  program  of  Western  Europe  is  the  evolution  of 
the  individuality  of  nations ;  the  program  of  Rus- 
sia is  the  obliterating  of  the  individuality  for  the 
benefit  of  a  race  or  rather  of  the  Slavic  Pan- 
Russianism. 

IV — The  program  of  Western  Europe  tends  towards 
making  constitutionalism  and  progress  permanent ; 
the  program  of  Russia  is  to  make  political  reaction 
permanent  through  the  triumph  of  Orthodoxy. 

Russia  participates  in  this  war  in  order  to  gain  enough 
power  for  destroying  what  Western  Europe  promises  to 
bring  about  at  the  expense  of  the  blood  spilled  in  this  war. 
For  England  and  France  the  participation  of  Russia  in  the 
war  against  Germany  is  only  a  matter  of  passing  military 
alliance.  The  respective  governments  are  perfectly  well 
aware  of  this  fact  and  only  the  interested  nations  fail  to 
comprehend  it.  Blind  hatred  against  Germany  takes  advan- 
tage of  this  situation  and  drives  average  public  opinion  to 
an  apotheosis  of  Russia  on  the  basis  of  equality  with  Eng- 
land and  France.  In  fact,  there  is  no  equality  of  merits,  be- 
cause there  is  no  equality  of  programs.  On  the  battlefields 
of  the  present  war  not  only  the  question  of  German  imperial- 
ism is  fought,  but  also  the  question  of  Russian  imperiaHsm. 
Whoever,  in  order  to  hurt  Germany,  wants  to  turn  Con- 
stantinople over  to  Russia,  is  blinded  by  hatred  and  uncon- 
sciously plays  into  the  hands  of  Germany,  because  he  se- 
cures for  the  latter  a  revenge  ally  when  England  succeeds  to 
win  the  war  at  the  highest  price  to  be  paid,  which  means  at 


—  52  — 

the  price  of  a  victory  of  Russia.  It  is  a  political  mistake 
to  form  political  ideas  so  as  to  fit  the  temporary  military 
interests  of  England  and  France,  and  credit  Russia  in  return 
for  her  participation  against  Germany  with  virtues,  which 
she  never  possessed  and  does  not  possess  at  present. 

Falsehood  can  never  be  a  torch  of  progress. 

The  parallelism  of  the  Russian  defeats  in  Poland  and  of 
the  wasting  of  human  life  and  ammunition  in  the  Dar- 
danelles, together  with  the  complete  absence  of  any  offensive 
movement  in  France,  was  explained  by  lack  of  ammunition 
and  sufficient  superiority  in  numbers.  This  is,  however,  a 
very  interesting  document.  The  battle  at  Arras  in  the  spring 
was  fought  at  the  same  time  as  the  battle  at  Lemberg,  where 
Russia  suffered  a  heavy  blow,  because  the  loss  of  Lemberg 
undermined  the  popularity  of  the  war  among  the  Russian 
masses.  It  is  an  exaggeration  but  it  is  true  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent that  behind  the  scenes  of  the  war  of  England  against 
Germany  there  is  an  unofficial  war  going  on  between  Eng- 
land and  Russia  for  Constantinople.  The  program  of  Lord 
Palmerston  still  molds  the  future  of  England  just  as  it  used 
to  mold  her  past.  There  is  no  question  that  the  policy  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  uses  at  present  different  ways  and  different 
means.  It  is  even  hard  to  suppose  that  the  English  govern- 
ment should  put  the  question  in  this  form.  The  logic  of 
facts,  however,  is  stronger  than  the  logic  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  England  must  defeat  Russia  through  Germany  and 
must  herself  in  turn  defeat  Germany  if  she  wants  to  win  at 
all  and  forever.  Whether  this  materializes  under  the  con- 
scious leadership  of  Grey  or  without  his  being  aware  of  the 
fact,  is  of  but  secondary  importance.  England  has  no  choice, 
and  must  either  win  or  lose  in  accordance  with  her  entire 
tradition  of  Oriental  policy.  In  both  cases  England  will 
come  out  of  the  war  with  honors.    In  case  of  victory  it  shall 


—  sa- 
shed new  glory  on  the  Union  Jack,  and  in  case  of  defeat  it 
shall  appease  the  English  conscience  with  conviction  that 
duty  has  been  done.  The  duty  of  England,  however,  has 
two  fronts.  Its  first  and  official  front  is  the  front  against 
Germany.  Its  second  and  unofficial  one,  is  the  front  against 
Russia. 

''Alea  iacta  est." 

The  world  has  grown  accustomed  to  consider  Turkey  as 
the  ''sick  man  of  Europe."  It  has  been  overlooked,  however, 
that  in  Turkey  revolution  has  swept  away  civic  slavery  and 
the  peace  of  Bucharest  has  abolished  the  slavery  of  nations. 
This  fact  cannot  be  obliterated  by  old  journaHstic  yarns 
which  do  not  shrink  from  saying  a  lie  when  it  comes  to  fa- 
cilitate the  progress  of  Russian  imperialism.  The  very 
moment  when  the  work  of  regeneration  of  Turkey  was  be- 
gun, the  present  war  broke  out ;  Russia  has  decided  to  finish 
Turkey  instead  of  curing  her.  This  is  certainly  a  fine  exam- 
ple of  political  therapeutics. 

Turkey,  however,  has  passed  successfully  the  examination 
of  her  maturity.  Not  everything  in  Turkey  can  be  explained 
by  Germany's  aid.  It  is  true  that  Turkey  derives  a  great 
advantage,  as  far  as  armaments,  money  and  professional 
advice  is  concerned,  from  her  alliance  with  Germany,  but 
there  is  a  still  greater  portion  of  truth  in  the  fact  that  Tur- 
key wants  to  and  knows  how  to  derive  these  benefits.  No- 
body will  derive  any  benefit  from  arms  supplied  by  some- 
body else  in  case  the  soldier,  who  has  to  use  these  arms  is  not 
fond  of  them  for  the  sake  of  the  idea  that  he  has  to  defend 
with  these  weapons.  Turkey  fights  consciously  and  wil- 
lingly for  the  defense  of  her  independence  and  it  is  a  ques- 
tion of  luck,  rather  than  of  anything  else,  that  she  is  able  to 
avail  herself  of  Germany's  help. 

In  the  face  of  these  facts,  the  conscience  of  the  world 


—  54  — 

must  pronounce  itself  in  favor  of  Turkey.  It  is  high  time  to 
begin  to  be  honest  with  regard  to  the  slogans  of  the  present 
war,  which  is  supposed  to  be  a  war  conducted  in  the  name  of 
liberty.  The  permanence  and  justice  of  coming  peace  treaty 
requires  imperatively  that : 

I — The  independence  of  Turkey  be  maintained,  and 
Russia  not  admitted  to  Constantinople ; 
II — That,  guarantees  of  autonomy  be  given  to  Armenia, 
Syria,  and  Arabia  within  the  structure  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  and  within  the  frames  of  the 
general  Turkish  constitution. 

There  have  been  and  there  are  unjust  wars  and  unjust 
peace  treaties.  History,  however,  is  just  in  the  perspective 
of  the  ages.  The  Nemesis  avenges  mistakes  and  faults.  The 
partition  of  Turkey,  in  so  far  as  Russia  can  force  it  upon 
Europe,  will  be  one  of  the  acts  which  will  not  bring  honor  to 
humanity.  Following  the  flag  of  the  liberty  of  nations  one 
cannot  afford  to  destroy  the  liberty  of  the  Turkish  nation.  It 
would  mean  throwing  the  seed  of  hurricane  which  may  be 
delayed  but  which  would  be  bound  to  come  some  day  and 
bring  revenge  for  the  crime  against  nationalism. 

History  is  just  in  the  perspective  of  ages,  although  at 
times  it  is  unjust  in  the  perspective  of  the  moment. 


Chapter  III 
THE  PART  of  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 


—  57  — 


Chapter  III. — The  Part  of  Austria-Hungary 

The  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  co-operates  in  the  military 
operations  with  Germany  obscures  in  Western  Europe,  and 
particularly  in  America,  the  political  background  of  Austria- 
Hungary's  participation  in  the  present  war.  The  entire 
world  looks  at  Austria-Hungary's  part  through  the  specta- 
cles of  hatred  against  Germany.  This  is  the  reason  Russian 
diplomacy  was  able  to  make  the  idea  of  a  partition  of 
Austria-Hungary  generally  popular.  Despotic  Russia  taught 
Western  Europe  and  America  to  condemn  a  constitutional 
state  such  as  Austria-Hungary.  Russia,  which  even  during 
the  present  war  did  not  cease  to  oppress  the  conquered 
nations,  began  to  persuade  the  world  that  this  oppression 
is  done  by  Austria-Hungary  which,  for  the  last  half  century, 
has  made  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  nations  the 
basis  of  her  constitution.  Russia  was  able  to  gain  sympathy, 
while  Austria-Hungary  lost  much  although  it  has  granted 
long  ago  what  Russia  is  now  promising.  The  latter  has, 
immediately  after  the  temporary  conquest  of  Eastern  Galicia, 
abolished  the  Polish  autonomy  although  Galicia  never  be- 
longed to  Russia.  Almost  at  the  same  time,  on  October  3, 
1914,  the  Russian  cabinet  decided  to  suspend  the  rest  of  the 
autonomy  of  Finland.*  Austria-Hungary,  on  the  other 
hand,  spreads  the  Polish  language  and  the  autonomous  free- 
dom of  Galicia  wherever  her  victorious  army  dislodges  Rus- 
sian domination.  These  are  facts  acknowledged  by  the  press 
of  the  entire  world.     This,  however,  does  not  prevent  the 


*  "For  a  Lasting  Peace,"  Paris,  1915. 


-58- 

average  opinion  from  demanding  the  partition  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  from  making  Russia  the  pioneer  of  the  Hberty 
of  nations. 

This  is  far  from  being  just. 

The  history  of  Austria-Hungary  is  the  history  of  the 
middle  Danube.  Austria-Hungary  is  a  huge  space,  formed 
by  the  Alps,  the  Sudets  and  the  Carpathian  Mountains,  com- 
bined into  a  natural  wall.  Over  this  road  went  at  ah  times 
the  migrations  of  nations.  Traces  of  passages  of  Celts  can 
be  found  as  well  as  traditions  of  the  migrations  of  the  Goths 
and  of  countless  numbers  of  German  tribes.  Through  there 
went  the  expansion  of  Slavic  tribes  as  far  as  the  shores  of 
the  Adriatic  Sea.  There  also  went  the  invasion  of  the  Mon- 
gols. In  the  territory  of  the  middle  Danube  there  is  to  be 
found  also  the  grave  of  Attila,  who  was  a  "scourge  of  God" 
for  Europe.  Here  are  the  graves  of  the  Avares.  Finally 
the  Hungarians  came  from  the  Far  East  and  by  embracing 
the  Christian  religion  acquired  the  right  of  citizenship  in 
Central  Europe.  The  ethnical  elements  became  mixed  and 
the  frontier  lines  of  territories  became  entwined.  Nobody 
was  strong  enough  to  dominate  the  entire  valley  over  the 
middle  Danube  and  impress  its  character  upon  the  latter. 
The  Bavarians  attempted  it  and  so  did  the  Moravians  in 
the  times  of  Swatopluk;  so  did  the  Bohemians  under  the 
Premyslides  and  finally  the  Hungarians  who  made  several 
attempts  to  attack  Vienna.  These  were  only  temporary  his- 
torical experiments.  Uniform  ethnical  states  came  into 
existence  and  fell  apart,  but  a  combined  ethnical  state  sur- 
vived and  developed  for  the  last  thousand  years.  Uniform 
ethnical  kingdoms  fell  apart  and  a  combined  ethnical  empire 
survived.  This  empire  is  the  monarchy  of  the  Hapsbourgs. 
The  character  of  Austria-Hungary  corresponds  with  the 
character  of  the  historical  conditions  on  the  middle  Danube, 


—  59  — 

where  nobody  was  strong  enough  in  order  to  dominate  per- 
manently the  valleys  of  the  Alps,  the  Carpathians  and  the 
Sudets  and  to  mold  the  multicolor  ethnical  material  into  one 
national  body.  The  territory  of  Austria-Hungary  was  for 
centuries  a  country  through  which  the  nations  of  the  world 
marched;  it  is  a  mixed  ground,  and  every  wave  sweeping 
through  it  has  left  a  certain  amount  of  sediment. 

The  seed  of  Austria-Hungary  was  planted  by  Charles  the 
Great  during  his  expeditions  into  the  valley  of  the  Thais.  The 
road  he  followed  from  West  to  East  was  cut  later  by  German 
armies  when  Otto  I,  the  Great,  crossed  the  Alps  to  go  to 
Rome  for  the  imperial  crown.  Through  there  crossed  the 
papal  messengers  going  to  the  imperial  court  far  back  in 
Germany,  or  to  the  banks  of  the  Vistula,  where  the  kingdom 
of  Poland  was  in  the  course  of  construction.  Through  the 
valley  of  the  Danube,  the  echo  of  the  struggle  between  the 
empire  and  the  papacy,  between  the  spiritual  and  the  lay 
sword,  penetrated  into  Northern  Europe.  This  was  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  At  the  threshold  of  modern  history  the 
Turks  appeared  on  the  bank  of  the  Danube  and  through  old 
Buda  tried  to  make  their  way  to  Vienna.  Christianity  had 
to  confront  the  Islam  in  the  valley  of  the  Alps,  the  Carpath- 
ians and  the  Sudets ;  for  two  centuries,  until  the  peace  treaty 
of  Carlowitz,  the  valley  of  the  middle  Danube  was  the  bat- 
tlefield of  a  bloody  struggle.  As  late  as  1683  at  Vienna, 
when  the  king  of  Poland,  John  III,  Sobieski,  combining  his 
army  with  that  of  the  Hapsbourgs,  secured  victory  for  Chris- 
tianity in  Europe.  Since  then  the  Orient  had  to  recede  to 
its  native  heath. 

The  traditions  of  Rome  founded  Austria  on  the  Danube. 
The  period  of  struggle  with  Turkey  has  established  Hungary 
of  to-day.  The  imperial  crown  of  the  Hapsbourgs,  an  in- 
heritance from  Charlemagne  and  the  Ottons,  combined  both 


—  60  — 

epochs  and  both  of  their  political  offsprings.  The  idea  of 
Austria-Hungary  as  a  state  materialized  into  historical  real- 
ity. Both  elements,  the  traditions  of  Rome,  and  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  struggles  with  Turkey,  impressed  their  stigma 
on  the  character  of  Austria-Hungary  and  made  of  the  latter 
a  complete,  natural  state,  although  apparently  the  ethnical 
differences  would  seem  to  contradict  the  above  contention. 
This  ethnical  variety  is  a  natural,  historical  element  in  the 
valley  of  the  middle  Danube,  and,  therefore,  Austria-Hun- 
gary is  for  these  territories  a  natural  form  of  political  exist- 
ence. Austria  is  a  child  of  Rome,  while  Hungary  originally 
came  from  the  Orient,  but  she  matured  on  the  field  of  glory 
of  centuries-old  battles  with  the  Turks.  Under  the  walls  of 
Vienna  was  enacted  the  history  of  both  elements  and  here 
it  is  where  the  synthesis  in  the  form  of  the  imperial  crown 
of  the  Hapsbourgs  was  established.  The  first  act  of  this 
synthesis  was  the  dowry  of  the  daughter  of  the  Jagellons, 
when,  after  the  battle  of  Mohacs  she  brought  the  crown  of 
Bohemia  and  Hungary  into  the  house  of  the  Hapsbourgs. 
The  battle  with  the  Turks  under  the  walls  of  Vienna  was 
the  day  of  common  glory.  The  covenant  between  Austria 
and  Hungary  in  1867  was  the  act  of  their  political  maturity. 
To  dismember  nowadays  Austria-Hungary  and  to  destroy 
this  historical  synthesis  would  mean  to  create  a  bloody  chaos 
in  the  valley  of  the  middle  Danube. 

History  would  have  to  go  back  for  a  thousand  years  in 
order  to  dismember  Austria-Hungary. 

From  the  political  point  of  view,  Austria-Hungary  has 
solved  on  the  continent  of  Europe  the  same  problem  which 
England  has  analogously  solved  in  her  colonial  policy.  This 
problem  is  a  problem  of  co-existence  of  various  national 
elements  within  one  state.  Thus,  Austria-Hungary  forms  to 
some  extent  the  united  states  in  the  valley  of  the  middle 


—  61  — 

Danube.  Section  XIX  of  the  constitution  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary of  the  year  1867  provides  that  ''all  the  nationalities  in 
the  state  have  equal  rights  and  every  nationality  has  an  in- 
tangible right  to  defend  and  develop  its  own  nationality  and 
language.  Equal  rights  of  all  languages  in  school,  office,  and 
public  life  is  acknowledged  by  the  government."*  Any  cy- 
clopedia can  tell  that  for  half  a  century  all  the  provinces  of 
Austria-Hungary  have  their  own  parliaments,  or  in  other 
words,  an  autonomy  not  only  as  far  as  administration  but 
also  as  far  as  legislation  is  concerned.  In  spite  of  that, 
English  publications  have  the  effrontery  of  writing  about 
"military  slavery"  in  Austria-Hungary  or  to  predict  that 
after  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary  her  "domination  will 
cease;  racial  equalities  will  be  established."t  It  is  hard  to 
say  what  to  wonder  at?  at  the  injustice  or  at  the  ignorance? 
The  fact  that  in  Austria-Hungary  national  strife  is  in  exist- 
ence does  not  alter  the  truth  that  Austria-Hungary  consti- 
tutes an  asset  of  the  principle  of  nationalism  in  Central  Eu- 
rope, and  not  a  liability.  In  Austria-Hungary  there  are 
dissensions  among  individual  nationalities,  but  there  is  no 
oppression  of  nationalities  by  the  government.  No  logic  of 
any  kind  permits  to  deduct  the  conclusion  that  nationalities 
are  oppressed  by  the  government  from  the  fact  that  strife 
among  nationalities  exists  in  Austria.  In  Austria-Hungary 
the  government  is  the  arbiter  in  national  dissensions  and  not 
an  organ  of  oppression.  The  nationalism  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary is  in  a  process  of  evolution  which  of  course  has  its  de- 
fects and  shortcomings,  but  this  does  not  alter  the  fact  that 
Austria-Hungary  is  a  state  in  which  every  nationality  has  its 
autonomy  and  the  possibility  of  development. 

*  Dr.  Edmund  Bernatzik :  "Die  Oesterreichischen  Verf  assungs- 
gesetze,"  Leipzig,  1906. 

t  ''New  York  Times,"  April  23,  Report  on  the  Lecture  of  G,  L. 
Trjtvelyan,  "Grand-nephew"  of  Macaulay. 

SL 


—  62  — 

On  the  eve  of  the  present  war  England  found  herself  on 
the  brink  of  a  civil  v^ar  for  the  home  rule  for  Ireland.  Eng- 
lishmen armed  themselves  against  their  fellow  countrymen 
in  order  to  prevent  the  granting  of  autonomy  to  Ireland. 
Can  we  conclude  from  that,  that  England  should  be  dismem- 
bered, or  that  Ireland  represents  a  centrifugal  element  in  the 
British  Empire?  The  proof  was  given  by  the  attitude  of 
Ireland  after  the  war  against  Germany  broke  out ;  it  has  been 
shown  that  the  movement  in  Ireland  is  only  a  movement  for 
internal  reform  and  not  a  movement  of  treason.  Austria- 
Hungary  showed  the  same  symptoms  in  her  internal  life, 
except  for  the  fact  that  in  Austria-Hungary  there  is  nowa- 
days no  more  to  be  found  any  Ireland,  because  not  one 
province  of  Austria-Hungary  is  without  its  autonomous  par- 
liament, nor  is  there  any  nationality  within  the  state  which 
would  not  have  its  own  national  schools.  The  tendency  of 
increasing  the  autonomous  liberties  proves  the  vitality  of  the 
nationalism  in  Austria-Hungary  and  not  its  lack.  The  Poles 
were  striving  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  for  an  hicrease 
of  the  autonomy  of  Galicia;  the  Tchechs  tried  to  increase 
the  scope  of  the  competency  of  their  parliament  in  Prague. 
The  Croatians  are  struggling  for  an  emancipation  of  their 
parliament  from  the  tutelage  of  Hungary;  the  Hungarians 
in  turn  tried  to  secure  for  themselves  greater  freedom  of 
elbows  in  their  relations  to  Vienna.  The  basis,  however, 
for  all  these  aspirations  always  has  been,  and  always  is  the 
existing  constitution.  The  whole  movement  is  the  movement 
of  reform  and  not  a  movement  of  disruption.  It  is  a  purely 
internal  struggle  between  the  principle  of  centralization  and 
the  principle  of  federalism,  on  the  background  of  the  already 
existing  autonomy,  both  political  and  cultural,  of  all  the 
nationalities  in  Austria-Hungary.  The  discontentment  in 
Austria-Hungary  has  the  same  character  as  the  discontent- 


—  63  — 

ment  of  the  Irish  nation  in  England.  It  is  a  movement  of  re- 
form and  not  a  movement  of  treason.  The  present  war  has 
proved  this  contention  not  only  as  far  as  England  is  con- 
cerned, but  also  with  regard  to  Austria-Hungary.  The 
old  monarchy  of  the  Hapsbourgs  has  demonstrated  the 
strength,  vitality  and  loyalty  of  its  nationalities.  There 
never  was  nor  is  there  any  rebellion.  The  Russian 
rouble  which  demoralized  the  Ruthenians  in  Eastern 
Galicia  and  the  Serbs  on  the  south  was  unable  to  in- 
fluence the  masses.  It  is  easy  to  influence  individuals  in 
order  to  provoke  artificial  symptoms  of  discontentment  for 
the  use  of  a  mendacious  press,  in  case  masses  of  the  people 
participate  in  the  political  life,  and  there  is  no  difficulty  at 
any  time  to  find  corrupt  individuals.  In  spite  of  the  endeav- 
ors of  Russia  and  its  agitation  in  the  name  of  'brotherhood 
of  Slavic  nations,"  the  Poles,  the  Tchechs,  the  Croatians, 
Ruthenians,  Slovaks,  Slovenians,  Moravians,  Silesians,  right 
along  with  Hungarians,  Germans  and  even  Roumanians, 
came  forward  loyally  to  the  defence  of  their  national  free- 
dom against  Russia.  It  is  still  an  unknown  fact  what  the 
definite  physical  result  of  the  war  will  be,  but  nothing  will 
change  the  importance  of  the  fact  that  the  nationalism  of 
Austria-Hungary  demonstrated  in  the  present  war  a  much 
greater  political  power  than  the  Pan-Slavism  of  Russia. 
There  is  nothing  astounding  in  this  fact.  Nationalism  is  a 
program  of  the  liberty  of  nations,  while  Pan-Slavism  is  a 
program  of  imperialism.  Nationalism  is  the  wave  sweeping 
through  the  twentieth  century,  while  imperialism  is  the  cur- 
rent running  against  this  wave. 

Austria-Hungary  has  solved  the  problem  of  autonomous 
co-existence  of  many  nationalities  under  the  sceptre  of  one 
monarch.  Germany  failed  to  solve  this  problem  and  became 
guilty  of  oppressing  the  Poles,  the  Danes,  and  the  Alsatians, 


—  64  — 

although  this  oppression  was  superfluous,  to  say  the  least, 
for  the  power  of  Germany.  Russia  never  even  attempted  to 
solve  this  problem  and  exterminated  mercilessly  the  rem- 
nants of  autonomous  life  in  Poland,  in  Finland,  and  in  the 
Caucasus.  England  was  unable  in  the  twentieth  century  to 
introduce  home  rule  in  Ireland  without  a  civil  war.  France 
and  Italy  have  a  clear  conscience — but  they  do  not  have  other 
nationalities  under  their  sway  in  Europe.  Looking  impar- 
tially and  justly  one  must  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  idea 
of  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary  is  in  contradiction  with 
the  idea  of  nationalism  and  with  the  idea  of  permanent  peace. 
There  are,  however,  opinions  which,  in  the  name  of  the 
liberty  of  nations,  would  like  to  destroy  precisely  what  the 
idea  of  this  liberty  of  nations  succeeded  in  building  up  in  the 
valley  of  the  middle  Danube. 

The  program  of  Russia  is  Pan-Slavic,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  uniting  of  all  Slave  nations  under  the  sceptre  of  the 
Czar.  The  capital  of  Russia  thus  conceived  of  shall  be  Con- 
stantinople ;  it  is  an  idea  of  a  great  and  holy  Russia,  and  a 
materializing  of  this  idea  requires  both  the  partition  of 
Turkey  and  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary.  ''The  road  to 
Constantinople  leads  through  Vienna,"  said  General  Ignatieff 
after  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 

Pan-Slavism  is  a  program  of  race.  The  conception  of 
race,  however,  is  not  synonymous  with  the  conception  of 
national  consciousness,  because  a  race  is  nothing  but  crude 
material  on  which  history  works.  A  nation  is  determined 
by  the  community  of  language,'  but  above  all  other  things  by 
the  history  of  common  existence  as  a  state.  The  community 
of  language  is  a  tool  of  economic  and  civilizatory  activity. 
The  community  of  political  tradition  is  a  tool  of  a  collective 
will  directed  toward  the  development  of  national  independ- 
ence.   The  community  of  language  admits  exceptions  but  the 


—  65  — 

history  of  common  existence  as  a   state  is  an   absolutely 
necessary  feature.     In  Switzerland  there  is  no  community 
of  language  but  there  is  a  tradition  of  common  independence, 
and  this  tradition  decides  the  fate  of  Swiss  nationahty.     A 
nation  is  formed  by  the  existence  of  a  state  of  its  own,  and 
vice  versa  a  nation  must  perish  through  lack  of  the  cohimon 
political  existence  as  a  state.  Such  a  lack  permits  for  a  while 
to  preserve  the  ethnographical  features  of  a  nation  but  does 
not  permit  the  preserving  of  political  features ;  it  denational- 
izes politically,  although  it  permits  for  a  while  to  oppose 
ethnographical    denationalization.     Religion,    language,    art 
culture,  customs  can  subsist,  but  the  ability  for  political  in- 
dependence is  bound  to  be  exterminated.     It  is  a  law  of 
sociological  evolution  and  no  phrases  about  ''racial  brother- 
hood" can  extenuate  the  results  of  this  law.     Pan-Slavism 
and  Pan-Russianism  must  consciously  or  unconsciously  form 
the  two  sides  of  the  same  matter.    Pan-Slavism  must  neces- 
sarily be  anti-national  because  it  is  imperialistic.    The  public 
opinion  in  Russia  certainly  regrets  nowadays  that  Russia 
has  agreed  to  establish  an  independent  Bulgaria.    To  Poland 
.Russia  has  promised  only  autonomy,   but  she  refuses  to 
recognize  Poland's  right  to  an  independent  existence.    "Slav 
banquets"  which  during  the  present  war  busied  themselves 
with  the  question  of  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary,  pro- 
nounced themselves  against  the  independence  of  Croatia  and 
even  against  the  independence  of  Bohemia.     This  was  the 
cause  for  a  scandal  because  the  Bohemians  protested  against 
being  denied  the  right  to  aspire  to  political  independence. 
The  Russian  agitator  Saveloif  declared  that  the  "Russian 
nation  shall  not  spill  its  blood  for  the  formation  of  a  new 
Bulgaria."     This  happened  in  Moscow  in  the  first  days  of 
March,  1915,  at  the  meeting  of  Tchechs  and  Slovac  organi- 
zations of  Russia.    The  details  of  the  discussions  were  pub- 


—  66  — 

lished  by  the  Utro  Rossii  and  the  majority  of  Russian  and 
Polish  newspapers  reprinted  them.  Pan-Slavism  is  an  im- 
perialistic allegation  that  ''even  though  there  are  other  Slavic 
princes,  kings,  and  even  czars,  yet  there  is  only  one  and  only 
ruler  of  Slavdom,  Russian  Lord  and  Emperor."*  Pan- 
Slavism  attempts  to  destroy  national  individualities  in  order 
to  help  the  race.  No  wonder,  therefore,  that  even  the 
Tchechs,  in  contradiction  to  all  the  press  stories  about  revo- 
lutions in  Prague  faithfully  perform  the  duties  in  the  ranks 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies.  The  natural  instinct  of 
the  masses  cannot  be  deceived  as  easily  as  eccentrical  individ- 
uals which  are  not  lacking  in  any  nation.  The  actuality  of 
the  nations,  however,  is  manifested  by  the  attitude  of  the 
masses  and  not  by  the  attitude  of  such  eccentric  individuals. 
The  means  which  Russia  can  throw  on  the  scales  are 
enormous.  The  population  of  Russia  amounted  in  1912  to 
166,000,000.  During  the  years  1897  to  1912,  Russia's  popu- 
lation increased  47,000,000,  while  at  the  same  time  the  popu- 
lation of  Germany  increased  only  12,000,000.  Professor 
Masaryk,  a  noted  Tchechs  scientist,  has  figured  out  that  at 
the  end  of  the  current  century  the  population  of  European 
Russia  will  reach  the  400,000,000  mark  and,  together  with 
Asiatic  Russia,  the  500,000,000  mark.f  Growing  at  the  same 
rate  of  increase,  the  population  of  Russia  will  already  in 
1930  reach  the  figure  of  220,000,000.  These  are  calculations 
based  on  facts  as  they  were  before  the  war.  Let  us  suppose 
now  that  Russia  will  win  and  impose  upon  Europe  the  par- 
tition of  Austria-Hungary,  and  even  of  Turkey.  The  num- 
ber of  Slavs  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Austria-Hungary  amounts 


*  "Russian   Orthodox   American    Messenger,"    second   issue,   Vol. 
XVII,  page  29. 

t  Masaryk :  "Zur  russichen  Geschichte  und  Religions  Philosophie," 
I,  page  27s. 


—  67  — 

to  almost  30,000,000.  In  spite  of  the  losses  suffered  during 
the  present  war,  Russia  will  be  able  to  become,  within  fifteen 
years,  a  reservoir  of  250,000,000  of  people,  not  counting 
Constantinople  and  Armenia  as  far  as  Khilikia  and  the  Gulf 
of  Iskanderun.  Russia  was  and  is  a  military  country.  As 
far  as  armaments  are  concerned,  she  was  by  no  means  second 
to  Germany  and  in  certain  respect  has  even  outdone  the 
latter.  The  peace  footing  of  the  German  army,  according 
to  the  last  military  law  which  frightened  the  entire  world, 
amounted  to  about  800,000  officers  and  enlisted  men.  The 
peace  footing  of  the  Russian  army  in  the  summer  of  1914, 
that  means  at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
amounted  to  1,415,000  men.  In  the  winter  1915-1916  the 
peace  footing  was  expected  to  reach  the  enormous  figure  of 
1,900,000  rifles  and  sabres.  The  amount  of  reserves  in 
Russia  is,  of  course,  inexhaustible.  The  Russian  budget 
was  able  to  stand  such  enormous  burdens  only  owing  to 
French  loans,  because  the  financial  strength  of  Russia, 
particularly  after  the  Japanese  war,  was  infinitely  inferior 
to  the  financial  resources  of  the  western  powers.  France  has 
invested  in  Russia  something  like  $4,000,000,000.  Another 
advantage  of  the  Russian  treasury  consisted  of  two  years  of 
exceedingly  rich  crops.  In  the  future,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  will  loom  brightly  the  results  of  an  agragrian  reform 
and  of  the  colonization  of  Siberia.*  Since  the  times  of 
Stolypin  and  until  the  end  of  1912  almost  1,000,000  inde- 
pendent peasant  farms  were  established  in  Russia,  and  the 
municipal  ownership  of  ground  which  kept  Russian  agricul- 
ture back  and  made  of  the  Russian  peasant  an  illiterate  in- 
dividual was  abolished.  The  agrarian  productivity  was  in- 
creased. In  Siberia  almost  two  and  a  half  million  colonies 
were  settled  in  the  years  1907  to  1912.     Siberia,  according 

*  F.  Nansen  :     "Siberian  ein  Zukunftsland." 


—  68  — 

to  the  explorer  of  Polar  regions,  the  Norwegian  geographer, 
Nansen,  is  the  country  of  the  future.  The  colonization  of 
Siberia  increases  the  wealth  of  Russia  and  makes  of  Siberia 
a  reservoir  for  military  conscription,  which  eventually  will 
facilitate  the  Russian  offensive  in  Asia.  This  is,  however, 
only  the  beginning.  Let  us  suppose  now  that  Russia  should 
dictate  peace  to  Europe.  After  destroying  Turkey  and 
Austria-Hungary,  the  power  of  Russian  expansion  will 
become  the  ramrod  against  the  entire  west  of  Europe.  The 
opening  of  a  window  on  the  Atlantic  will  then  become  only 
a  question  of  time.  The  distance  from  the  Russian  frontier 
to  Narwik,  the  nearest  port  on  the  Atlantic  in  the  Gulf  of 
Vest-Fjord,  amounts  only  to  150  kilometers.  A  railroad 
line  for  purposes  of  Russian  offensive  is  all  ready  and  ter- 
minates in  Tornea.  A  second  line  going  through  the  Lakes 
of  Finland,  is  also  completed.  The  Russian  imperialism 
having  won  in  the  south  will  strike  northward,  in  order  to 
accomplish,  after  having  entered  the  Mediterranean,  the 
second  part  of  its  mission  and  gain  access  to  the  Atlantic 
Ocean.  The  second  part  "of  the  testament  of  Peter  the 
Great"  will  be  easy  to  execute.  Russia  will  base  herself 
on  her  250,000,000  population  and  economic  evolution  will 
permit  her  to  make  armaments  without  the  help  of  France. 
The  Russian  imperialism  will  dominate  its  military  needs 
and  will  confront  Europe  sure  of  its  strength  and  inexhaust- 
ible as  to  the  number  of  its  armies,  free  to  shift  its  armies 
from  place  to  place  as  well  as  its  ships  and  ammunition. 
Nobody  thinks  of  changing  a  victorious  policy.  Vic- 
torious Russia  will  not  change  also  her  imperialism.  Bryce 
anticipated  this  in  his  clever  saying  that  "the  doctrine  of  Pan- 
Slavism  under  an  imperial  head  of  the  Orthodox  Eastern 
Church  has  become  a  formidable  engine  of  aggression  in  the 
hands  of  mighty  despotism  and  a  growing  race,  naturally 


—  69  — 

drawn  to  expand  its  frontiers  toward  the  south."*  The 
power  of  Germany  of  to-day  shrinks  in  comparison  with 
the  power  which  a  victorious  Pan-Slavism  might  be  able  to 
develop  some  day.  Russia  will  certainly  not  hesitate  to  make 
sacrifices,  and  the  Czar  does  not  need  to  care  about  losses 
of  human  material.  Homer  Lea  figured  out  that  in  the 
eighteenth  century  Russia  had  sent  on  the  field  of  battle 
4,910,000  men.f  Only  1,380,000  returned  home  from  this 
orgy  of  blood.  In  the  nineteenth  century  another  4,900,000 
marched  out  and  only  1,410,000  came  back  to  their  homes. 
Russia  will  not  suffer  any  lack  of  new  millions  in  the  twen- 
tieth century.  Only  Pan-Germanism,  under  the  leadership 
of  Berlin,  would  then  be  able  to  combat  successfully  Russia's 
preponderance.  In  this  case  Europe  will  have  to  change, 
the  structure  of  its  power  in  contradiction  of  the  principle 
of  nationalism  and  on  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  the  race. 
The  Czar  of  the  Slavs  would  have  to  be  opposed  by  the  Czar 
of  Teutons.  The  example  of  Russia,  however,  is  liable  to 
become  contagious  and  the  tolerance  of  Pan-Slavism  gives 
right  pf  existence  to  Pan-Germanism.  In  such  a  case  Eu- 
rope would  have  to  take  a  step  backward.  Such  a  step 
backward,  however,  is  neither  of  interest  to  European  na- 
tions nor  to  the  interest  of  progress  and  peace.  The  world 
is  not  swept  to-day  by  the  hurricane  of  this  terrific  war  in 
order  to  pave  the  road  for  Pan-Slavism. 

Gladstone  mentioned  in  his  memoirs  that  after  the  defeat 
of  Napoleon  III  at  Sedan,  "Europe  has  lost  a  mistress  and 
got  a  master."!  After  a  ''Sedan"  of  William  II,  Europe  may 
get  back  "s.  mistress,"  but  no  more  France,  only  Russia, 
should  Russia  succeed  in  dictating  the  peace.    In  such  a  case, 

*  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  421. 

t  Homer  Lea:    "The  Day  of  the  Saxon,"  pages  130-131. 

X  John  Morley :    "The  Life  of  W.  E.  Gladstone,"  Book  VI,  page  357. 


—  70  — 

not  only  continental  Europe  but  also  England  shall  find  her 
"mistress." 

Victorious  Pan-Slavism  will  avenge  the  Germans. 

The  imperialism  of  Russia  is  the  continuation  of  the 
struggle  between  the  Orient  and  the  Occident,  between  the 
traditions  of  Rome  and  the  traditions  of  Constantinople. 
After  the  downfall  of  Poland,  Russia  aims  at  Turkey  and 
Austria-Hungary;  after  the  fall  of  Warsaw  she  "is  press- 
ing on  to  Vienna."*  Pan-Slavism  is  the  ideology  of  the 
Russian  attack  against  Austria-Hungary,  just  as  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Orthodox  religion  form  the  ideology  of  the 
attack  against  Turkey.  In  this  light,  the  question  of  Servia 
shines  brightly. 

Servia  belongs  to  the  Orthodox  Church  and  is  a  tool  in 
the  hands  of  Russia.  Russian  diplomacy  has  supported  the 
ambitions  of  Servia  in  order  to  use  them  against  Austria- 
Hungary;  the  agitation  of  the  press  and  the  promises  of 
Russia  arouse  the  passions.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  became 
the  trump  in  the  hands  of  Russia;  Servia  has  filed  her 
claims  to  this  territory  and  Russian  diplomacy  succeeded 
in  persuading  public  opinion  that  the  claims  of  Servia  are 
just. 

There  are  facts,  however,  that  contradict  this  contention. 

I.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  never  belonged  to  Servia, 
not  even  in  the  times  of  Czar  Dushan,  when  Servia  reached 
the  pinnacle  of  her  development.! 

H.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  formed  a  part  of  Hungary 
before  the  invasion  of  the  Turks,  and  at  all  times  were  in 
closer  relation  with  the  kingdom  of  Croatia  than  with 
Servia. 


*  The  "Century  Magazine,"  May,  1915. 

t  'The  southern  Slavs,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914. 


—  71  — 

III.  The  population  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is 
mixed.  The  Serbs  are  Orthodox,  while  the  Croatians  are 
Roman  Catholics  and  form  a  more  cultured  element.*  A 
considerable  portion  of  the  population  is  formed  by  the 
Moslems  of  Slav  origin.  The  Croatians  and  the  Moslems 
form  the  majority  of  the  population  in  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina to  the  disadvantage  of  Servian  imperialism. 

IV.  The  Servians  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  in 
Southern  Hungary,  are  immigrants.  They  were  driven  into 
these  countries  by  Turkish  oppression  from  which  they  tried 
to  escape  by  going  north.  This  is  rather  a  reason  for 
gratefulness  for  shelter  than  a  point  of  departure  for 
imperialism. 

V.  The  Servians  in  Austria-Hungary  have  full  national 
rights  on  the  same  level  as  the  Poles,  the  Tchechs,  the 
Croatians,  or  in  other  words,  freedom  of  speech,  of  religion 
and  autonomy.  In  the  Parliament  of  Bosnia  the  Serb 
language  has  the  same  rights  as  the  Croatian  language, 
although  the  Serbs  do  not  have  absolute  majority  in  the 
population  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Of  late.  Minister 
Bilinski  supported  the  Serbs  against  the  Croatians  and  the 
Moslems  in  order  to  satisfy  Servia  and  avoid  war. 

Ill-will  ignores  the  facts.  The  center  of  ill-will  was 
Petrograd  from  where  Servia  was  incited.  Servian  im- 
perialism was  a  reflection  of  the  imperialism  of  Russia 
and  the  idea  of  Greater  Servia  was  but  a  shadow  of  the 
idea  of  Greater  Russia.  The  question  of  rights  became  a 
question  of  secondary  nature.  ImperiaHsm  is  the  ideology 
of  conquest  and,  therefore,  ignores  both  the  facts  and  his- 
torical truths.  The  decisive  factor  is  selfishness,  which  is 
the  arm  swinging  the  sword.     Servia  fell  for  the  illusion 


*  "The  Southern  Slavs,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914. 


—  72  — 

that  with  the  help  of  Russia  she  would  be  able  to  conquer 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  she  formed  her  entire  policy 
to  suit  this  purpose.  In  order  to  further  this  policy  the 
arm  of  a  Serb  threw  the  bomb  in  Sarajevo.  For  the  sake 
of  this  idea,  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  had  to  give  his 
life,  although  he  was  an  opponent  of  the  Hungarians  and 
a  friend  of  the  southern  Slavs.  This  is  admitted  even  by 
the  war-Hke  and  inspired  English  press.*  It  is  also  pos- 
sible that  Francis  Ferdinand  was  killed  because  every  step 
that  Austria-Hungary  was  taking  in  the  interest  of  Slav 
nations  brought  them  nearer  to  Western  Europe  and  drew 
them  away  from  Russia. 

Somebody  in  England  said  after  the  outbreak  of  the  pres- 
ent war,  *'it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  Servia  is  the  cause  of 
the  war."t  It  is  sufficient  to  recall  the  revelations  published 
by  the  "Matin,"  of  Paris,  in  1913,  about  the  federation  of  the 
Balkan  states  in  order  to  become  convinced  of  the  fact 
that  this  war  was  planned  by  Russia  long  ago.  The  "Matin" 
is  a  friend  of  Russia  and  its  testimony,  therefore,  is 
much  more  important  for  the  interests  of  Austria-Hungary. 
The  federation  of  the  Balkan  states  was  directed  against 
Austria-Hungary  and  not  against  Turkey.  The  intrigue 
of  Russian  diplomacy  had  already  then  planned  an  attack 
upon  Vienna,  but  the  logic  of  the  internal  conditions  in 
the  Balkans  first  prompted  the  war  with  Turkey,  and  then 
a  fratricidal  war  against  each  other.  Nowadays,  when  Rus- 
sia has  finally  publicly  stated  that  Constantinople  is  her 
ultimate  goal,  one  must  be  naive  to  think  that  Russia 
was  prompted  by  the  desire  to  defend  Servia  and  that 
she  had  attacked  Austria-Hungary  from  sheer  Pan-Slavic 
sentiment.     The  question  of  Servia  was  only  a  clever  pre 

*  "The  Eastern  Question,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914,  page  18. 
t"The  Eastern  Question,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914,  page  5. 


—  73  — 

text  which  permitted  Russia  to  pose  as  a  protector  of  the 
oppressed.  At  the  bottom  of  the  thing,  however,  there 
were  deeper  reasons  in  the  background  of  the  scenes  for 
many  years.  A  proof  for  this  contention  was  the  attitude  of 
Russia  towards  Servia,  when  the  offensive  movement  of  the 
combined  Austria-Hungarian  and  German  armies  pushed 
back  the  Russians  from  Galicia.  In  order  to  draw  Italy  into 
the  conflict  against  Austria-Hungary,  Russia  has  agreed  to 
an  eventual  occupation  of  Dalmatia  and  Albania  by  Italy, 
which  dealt  a  painful  blow  to  the  aspirations  of  Servia 
to  get  an  estuary  on  the  Adriatic.  Servia  was  quick  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  this  movement.  A  Servian  dele- 
gation in  Petrograd  began  to  threaten  to  conclude  separate 
peace  with  Austria-Hungary.  At  the  same  time  a  Servian 
army  invaded  Albania  in  order  to  save  at  least  Durazzo 
from  the  imperialism  of  Italy.  It  is,  furthermore,  an  inter- 
esting fact  that  the  imperialism  of  Italy  began  to  be  con- 
sidered in  Petrograd  as  more  Slavic  than  Servian.  It  is, 
furthermore,  a  known  fact  that  at  the  Conference  at  Lon- 
don, in  1913,  Italy  was  chiefly  instrumental  in  throwing 
back  Servia  from  the  Adriatic  Sea,  more  so  than  Austria- 
Hungary.  Italy  has  also  prevented  Greece  from  getting 
the  southern  portion  of  the  Epirus.  Italy  is  stronger  than 
Servia  and,  therefore,  Russian  sympathies  move  toward 
Rome,  while  Servia  was  brutally  left  to  her  misery,  dis- 
ease, famine,  and  devastation  of  the  war  into  which  Servia 
was  driven  by  nobody  else  but  Russia. 

The  question  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  not  so  much 
united  with  the  question  of  Servia,  as  with  the  question  of 
the  reorganization  of  the  Kingdom  of  Croatia  within  the 
Hungarian  state.  In  the  covenant  between  Hungary  and 
Croatia,  of  1868,  there  is  a  provision  by  virtue  of  which 
"Hungary  recognizes  the  inviolability  of  the  territory  of 


—  74  — 

Croatia  and  promises  to  concentrate  her  endeavor  upon 
completing  this  territory."*  In  the  first  covenant  this  pro- 
vision related  to  Dalmatia,  which,  from  a  historical  point 
of  view,  is  a  part  of  the  Croatian  realm.  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina still  belonged  in  1868  to  Turkey;  at  present,  how- 
ever, they  can  be  included  in  Section  65  of  the  Croato- 
Hungarian  covenant  and  on  this  basis  enter,  together  with 
Dalmatia,  into  the  Kingdom  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  to 
be  reorganized  after  the  present  war.  Until  the  outbreak 
of  the  present  war,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  did  not  belong 
either  to  Austria  or  to  Hungary,  but  were  subordinate 
directly  to  the  common  Ministry  of  Finances  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  This  was  only  a  temporary  arrangement  which 
left  the  door  open  for  the  imperialism  of  Servia  because 
the  claims  of  Croatia  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were 
temporarily  suspended.  The  reorganization  of  the  kingdom 
of  Croatia-Slavonia  permits  the  solving  of  the  question,  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
alism, because: 

1.  The  Croatians  form  together  with  the  anti-Servian 
Moslems  the  majority  of  the  population  of  Bosnfa  and 
Herzegovina. 

2.  Bosnia  and  Herzogovina  were  situated  in  the  sphere 
of  Croatian  influence  at  the  time  of  Croatia's  independence. 

The  claims  of  Servia  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are 
contradicted  not  only  by  statistics  but  also  by  the  historical 
fact  that  these  territories  never  belonged  to  Servia.  Thus, 
the  claims  of  Servia  are  contradicted  by  statistics  and  his- 
tory which  are  the  two  criterions  of  nationalism.  The  im- 
migrant Servian  population  possess  in  Austria-Hungary 
the  recognition  of  their  national  rights  for  a  half  century, 

*  Dr.  Edmund  Bernatzik :  "Die  oesterreichischen  Verf assungs- 
gesetze,"  Leipzic,  1906,  page  586. 


—  75  — 

and  do  not  run  the  risk  of  losing  these  national  rights 
after  the  war.  In  Russia,  on  the  contrary,  even  the  Poles 
did  not  have  such  national  rights  as  do  the  Servians  in 
Austria-Hungary. 

As  far  as  constitutional  liberty  is  concerned,  the  auton- 
omy of  Croatia  is  greater  in  extent  than  the  autonomy  of 
other  provinces  in  Austria-Hungary.  After  Vienna  and 
Budapest  comes  the  Croatian  capital  of  Zagrab  (Agram) 
and  not  Prague  or  Lemberg.  The  Banus  (governor)  of 
Croatia  is  responsible  to  the  Croatian  parliament  which 
privilege  neither  GaHcia  nor  Bohemia  possess.  As  far  as 
the  legal  side  is  concerned,  there  is  a  former  point  of  attach- 
ment for  a  reorganization  of  the  kingdom  of  Croatia.  Dal- 
matia  does  not  as  yet  form  a  part  of  Croatia  "de  facto," 
although  she  forms  a  part  of  the  country  ''de  nomine."  The 
question  of  Dalmatia  forms  a  temporary  arrangement  which 
is  called  in  legal  parlance  of  Austria-Hungary  a  "provisor- 
ium"'^  The  renewing  of  the  question  of  Dalmatia  and  its 
regulation,  together  with  the  question  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina is,  from  the  legal  point  of  view,  perfectly  admis- 
sible and  bears  on  territories  which,  historically  speaking, 
are  closely  related  with  each  other.  This  would  mean  the 
solving  of  the  problem  of  southern  Slavdom,  Servian 
traditions  have  in  former  times  gone  farther  south,  towards 
Saloniki,  and  not  towards  the  Danube.  The  maintenance 
of  the  independence  of  Servia  and  the  regulation  of  the 
frontier  line  of  Albania  and  Macedonia  decide  the  ques- 
tion in  the  Balkans.  The  reorganization  of  the  kingdom 
of  Croatia  and  Slavonia  is  liable  to  create  a  new  and  vital 
political  unit  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  Sea.  The  lib- 
erty of  nations  would  find  a  just  reahzation  without  any 

*  Dr.  Edmund  Bernatzik :  "Die  oesterreichischen  Verf  assungs- 
gesetze,"  Leipzig,  1906,  page  218. 


—  re- 
injury to  Servia.  All  the  rumors  about  Austria-Hungary's 
pressing  towards  Saloniki  are  an  anachronism.  The  peace 
treaty  of  Bucharest  has  solved  the  question  of  the  Balkans 
for  the  benefit  of  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Servia  and 
Montenegro.  The  Balkan  question  in  its  old  anti-Turkish 
conception  disappears  and  at  the  same  time  Austria-Hun- 
gary is  losing  the  occasion  for  imperialistic  attempts. 
Rumors  are  current  that  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  con- 
templated a  "trialism,"  or  a  combination  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Croatia  on  an  equal  legal  basis.  It  was  a  very 
just  idea  but  still  it  did  not  protect  him  from  a  tragic 
death  in  Sarajevo  at  the  hands  of  a  Serb,  whose  mind 
had  been  poisoned  by  the  imperialistic  propaganda.  It  is 
not  Servia's  guilt,  but  the  guilt  of  the  party  that,  behind 
the  scenes,  continued  arousing  artificial  ambitions.  Ser- 
vian imperialism,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  directed  so 
much  against  Austria  or  against  Hungary,  as  against  the 
Slavic  kingdom  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  which  has  serious 
claims  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  while  Servia  has  none. 
To  destroy  these  claims  of  Croatia  would  be  a  downright 
injury;  it  is,  therefore,  nothing  strange  that  under  these 
conditions  the  Croatians  are  fighting  against  Russia  and 
Servia  with  so  much  enthusiasm  that  they  have  become 
the  heroes  of  the  Austria-Hungarian  armies. 

The  reorganization  of  the  kingdom  of  Croatia  permits 
at  the  same  time  the  solving  of  the  problem  of  the  shores 
of  the  Adriatic  Sea  in  Austria-Hungary.  Fiume,  Pola, 
and  Trieste  belong,  from  the  point  of  view  of  nationahsm, 
to  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  and  should  not  belong  either  to 
Servia  or  to  Italy.  Both  statistics  as  well  as  history  favor 
Croatia  and  Slavonia;  the  Slavs  form  the  majority  of  the 
people  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic.  This  is  admitted 
even  by  the  English  press  during  the  present  war,  although 


—  77  — 

this  fact  is  by  no  means  convenient  to  the  enemies  of 
Austria-Hungary.*  The  claims  of  Servia  to  Fiume  or 
Trieste  are  unjust,  and  the  same  time  is  the  case  with  the 
claims  of  Italy  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Italian  population 
forms  a  considerable  percentage  in  the  towns  on  this  shore. 
The  country  is  essentially  Slavic  and  the  village  popula- 
tion is  always  an  autochthon  population,  a  stratum  which 
is  historically  original,  while  the  population  of  the  cities 
is  mostly  an  immigrant  one.  Italians  know  this  and  that 
is  why  in  their  claims  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  they 
championed  the  idea  of  forming  a  miniature  state  from 
Trieste  and  its  surrounding  territory.  They  didn't  dare  to 
claim  Trieste  for  themselves  because  the  slogan  of  the 
present  war  is  nationalism  as  well  as  permanent  peace. 
They  felt  the  lack  of  a  legal  basis  as  well  as  a  statistical 
and  historical  basis.  They  disguised  their  imperialism  by 
pretext  of  nationalism — one  proclaiming  the  idea  of  inde- 
pendence for  Trieste  and  its  surrounding  territory.  The 
Italian  population  on  the  Austrian-Hungarian  shore  of  the 
Adriatic  Sea  has  perfect  freedom  of  national  Hfe,  which 
means  liberty  of  language,  religion,  municipal  home  rule 
and  a  full  share  in  the  constitutional  life  of  the  entire 
state.  The  only  limitations  are  the  equal  rights  of  the 
Slavic  nationalities  which  form  the  majority  of  the  popu- 
lation, which  is  autochthon  and  native  for  centuries  since 
those  days  when  there  was  an  independent  Croatia  on  the 
shores  of  the  Adriatic.  From  the  historical  point  of  view, 
the  domination  of  Italy  reached  as  far  as  the  shores  of 
Dalmatia  only  in  the  times  of  ancient  Rome  and  then 
in  the  time  of  the  Republic  of  Venice,  and  finally  once 
more  in  the  times  of  Napoleon.  The  frontier  lines  estab- 
lished by  Napoleon  were  the  frontier  lines  of  war,  and  of 
*  "Italian  Policy  since  1870,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914. 


—  78  — 

this  fact  England  is  perfectly  well  aware  because  no  other 
state  combated  Napoleon's  imperialism  as  ardently  and  as 
persistently  as  England  did.  The  frontier  lines  of  Venice 
were  frontier  lines  of  conquest  and  not  of  nationality.  Who- 
ever knows  the  secret  bridges  in  the  mysterious  palaces 
of  Venice  will  not  fail  to  understand  the  character  of  the 
government  exercised  once  upon  a  time  by  the  Carthago 
of  the  Adriatic  Sea.  Rome  after  all  owned  not  only  Trieste 
but  also  Paris,  and  the  Roman  legions  extended  their  tri- 
umphal march  even  as  far  as  the  banks  of  the  Thames. 
Does  this  fact  entitle  the  Italians  to  raise  any  claims  to 
France  or  to  England?  From  the  historical  point  of  view 
the  claims  of  Italy  to  Trieste  are  not  at  all  better  than 
the  claims  to  Tunis.  History  does  not  confirm  the  Italian 
claims,  and  statistics  decide  the  issue  in  favor  of  Croatia 
and  Slavonia.  Trieste  should  in  fact  be  the  natural  harbor 
of  Croatia  regenerated  both  as  far  as  her  boundaries  and 
autonomy  are  concerned.  The  Italian  attack  is  directed 
more  against  Croatia  than  against  Austria  or  Hungary  and 
therefore  Italy's  attitude  is  in  contradiction  with  the  pro- 
gram of  nationalism.  Italy  may  claim  at  the  most  some 
strategical  advantages  on  the  frontier  of  the  Tyrol  which 
advantages  necessarily  must  be  of  a  slight  significance,  but 
they  can  never  claim  with  any  right  either  Trieste  or 
Dalmatia  which  are  a  territory  of  Slavic  settlement  as  well 
as  a  sphere  of  Slavic  interest  for  over  a  thousand  years. 
Austria-Hungary  forms  a  sentinel  on  the  Adriatic;  they 
are  the  gate  through  which  the  thirst  of  several  central 
European  nations  for  an  estuary  on  the  sea  is  satisfied. 
These  are  mostly  Slavic  nations  protected  by  the  wall  of 
the  Alps,  the  Sudets  and  the  Carpathians  from  the  im- 
periahsm  of  Russia,  Germany  and  Italy.  None  of  these 
nations  could  independently  and  without  the  co-operation 


.    —79  — 

of  other  nations  preserve  or  defend  this  access  to  the  sea. 
Austria  could  not  do  it,  nor  could  Hungary,  nor  Bohemia, 
nor  Croatia,  not  speaking  even  of  the  Slovaks,  Mora- 
vians, Silesians,  and  even  Roumanians  in  Transylvania,  who 
are  cut  off  by  the  natural  barrier  of  the  Carpathians  from 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  mouth  of  the  Danube.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  Adriatic  Sea  is  a  question  of  first-class  impor- 
tance and  of  historical  necessity  for  all  these  nations.  A 
law  is  nothing  else  but  a  form  of  economic  Hfe,  and  the 
state  is  nothing  else  but  an  organization  of  the  law.  Nations 
are  formed  and  developed  through  their  own  political  exist- 
ence as  a  state,  or,  in  other  words,  through  the  organiza- 
tion of  their  legal  life  within  which  the  economical  life 
of  the  nation  has  the  possibihty  of  evolution.  The  Adriatic 
Sea  is  the  condition  of  economic  life  of  the  nations  form- 
ing Austria-Hungary,  and  as  such,  must  be  the  problem 
of  their  legal  and  poHtical  life,  or,  in  other  words,  a  ques- 
tion of  existence.  The  shore  of  the  Adriatic  is,  therefore, 
a  necessity  for  the  nations  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  is 
not  the  case  with  regard  to  Italy.  The  latter  can  conquer 
the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  by  force,  but  at  the  expense  of 
the  rights  and  existence  of  the  economical  life  of  the 
nationalities  of  which  Austria-Hungary  is  composed.  The 
annexation  of  Trieste  by  Italy  would  under  such  condi- 
tions mean  a  defeat  of  nationalism  and  a  victory  of  imperial- 
ism. It  can  hardly  be  assumed  that  Italy  should  go  to 
war  in  the  name  of  an  imperialistic  principle  while  the 
present  war  is  fought  for  the  sake  of  nationalism.  There 
is,  furthermore,  no  doubt  as  to  the  fact  that  the  attack 
of  Italy  is  an  attack  upon  the  natural  boundaries  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  Nothing  permanent  could  be  built  in  this  way; 
it  is  impossible  to  uphold  the  principle  of  nationalism  in  one 
place  for  the  price  of  betraying  it  somewhere  else,  because 


—  80  — 

thus  only  political  errors  and  historical  injustice  can  be 
committed. 

It  is  hard  to  find  a  greater  lack  of  logic  as  to  try  to  dis- 
member Austria-Hungary  because  of  the  war  with  Germany. 
Germany  nowadays  is  a  world  power.  Should  Austria- 
Hungary  be  dismembered,  the  German  provinces  of  the 
Hapsbourg  empire  would  naturally  fall  to  Germany,  which 
would  thus  gain  upper  and  lower  Austria,  Tyrol,  Styria, 
Carinthia.  From  the  point  of  view  of  national  evolution  it 
would  mean  a  triumph  for  Germany  and  national  unifica- 
tion would  be  a  balm  on  the  defeat,  because  Germany  as  a 
nation  is  more  numerous  than  Russia,  although  Russia  is  a 
giant  when  compared  with  Germany  as  a  state.  Ninety 
milHon  people  under  the  strong  hand  government  of  Berlin 
would  constitute  a  force  able  to  strike  soon  for  revenge. 
German  militarism  has  a  great  routine  which  would  enable  it 
to  produce  from  Greater  Germany  such  a  force  that  Pan- 
Germanism  could  easily  become  the  real  policy  of  Berlin. 
Is  the  present  war  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  creating 
Pan-Germanism  through  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary  ? 
The  road  from  Berlin  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  goes  through 
Vienna.  The  German  settlements  in  Carnia  and  Carniola  are 
not  far  from  the  Adriatic  shore.  Berlin  is  very  well  aware  of 
the  fact  that  it  would  naturally  become  the  heir  of  Vienna  in 
case  Austria-Hungary  be  dismembered.  On  this  basis  the 
government  of  Berlin  would  at  once  begin  to  seek  access  to 
the  sea.  Vienna  and  Budapest  have  better  claims  to  Trieste 
or  Fiume  than  Belgrade  and  Rome  have.  Germany  could 
go  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  over  the  body  of  Austria-Hungary, 
and,  upon  reaching  the  Adriatic,  would  float  her  flag  in  the 
Mediterranean.  This  would  again  constitute  a  grave  danger 
for  England,  because  Germany  could  then  evade  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar  and  transfer  the  point  of  gravitation  of  her 


—  81  — 

armaments  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  domination  of  Eng- 
land over  the  Suez  Canal  is  safe  as  long  as  Germany  is  cut 
off  from  this  route.  Germany's  crossing  the  Alps  would 
mean  the  evasion  of  Gibraltar,  and  the  Suez  Canal  is  the 
road  to  India  and  Australia.  This  fact  is  sufficient  to  make 
England  a  friend  of  Austria-Hungary  during  the  peace  ne- 
gotiations, because  Austria-Hungary  is  a  barrier  for  the 
imperialism  of  Germany  and  does  not  permit  the  latter  to 
evade  Gibraltar  by  the  way  of  the  Alps  and  Trieste.  Trieste, 
in  the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary,  does  not  constitute  any 
danger  for  England,  because  Austria-Hungary  does  not  have 
and  never  will  have  colonial  ambitions  on  the  Mediterranean. 
Austria-Hungary  does  not  have  any  interest  in  attacking  the 
Suez  Canal,  but  Germany  has.  Furthermore,  Austria- 
Hungary  is  not  a  toy  in  the  hands  of  Berlin  and  shall  never 
become  the  blind  weapon  in  the  hands  of  Germany.  Austria- 
Hungary  will  never  spend  her  money  for  excessive  naval 
armaments  for  the  sake  of  somebody  else's  interest.  Fur- 
thermore, Russia  and  not  England  is  the  enemy  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  the  monarchy  of  the  Hapsbourgs  armed  itself 
before  this  war  not  against  England  but  against  Russia ;  this' 
is  one  more  reason  why  Austria-Hungary  would  certainly 
not  arm  herself  against  England  after  this  war.  Austria- 
Hungary,  England  and  France  do  not  have  any  conflicting 
interests,  and  were  driven  into  this  war  only  by  the  logic  of 
alliances  and  by  the  force  of  military  considerations.  Any 
imperialism  which  Austria-Hungary  could  possibly  display 
on  the  Mediterranean  would  be  an  abortive  movement  and 
besides  a  very  costly  one.  Austria-Hungary's  state  reason 
coincides  with  that  of  England  and  France,  but  is  in  contra- 
diction with  the  state  reason  of  Russia,  or  better  to  say,  with 
Russia's  imperialism.  Austria-Hungary  in  this  war  is  allied 
with  Germany  against  Russia,  and  that  the  alliance  is  at  the 


—  82  — 

same  time  very  active  against  England  and  France  is  a  mere 
incident.  The  note  in  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  war 
against  Austria-Hungary  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain 
states  explicitly  that  England  was  "obliged"  to  declare  war ; 
the  note  in  question  does  not  contain  anything  else.  No 
mention  is  made  of  any  litigious  matter  at  all  and  only  the 
pure  logic  of  military  considerations  is  set  forth.  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  are  fighting  shoulder  to  shoulder 
because  the  parallelity  and  not  the  identity  of  the  interests 
compel  them  to  do  so.  England  and  France  are  fighting 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Russia  for  exactly  the  same  rea- 
son. Parallelity  is  not  identity  and  geometry  defines  paral- 
lelity as  a  condition  resulting  from  the  lack  of  points  of  con- 
tact. The  military  point  of  view  must  be  strictly  distin- 
guished from  the  political  one.  The  danger  from  the  part 
of  Russia  was  the  main  prompting  element  of  the  alliance 
between  Austria-Hungjary  and  Germany.  The  political 
genius  of  Bismarck  has  taken  advantage  of  the  situation, 
although  the  memories  of  the  battle  at  Sadowa  did  not  die 
out  completely  as  yet.  Precisely  for  the  same  reason  of 
the  danger  from  the  part  of  Russia,  Edward  VH  did  not 
succeed  in  drawing  Austria-Hungary  away  from  Germany. 
The  Cabinet  of  Vienna  realized  it  perfectly  well  that  in  case 
of  a  war  with  Russia,  Austria-Hungary  would  be  isolated 
and  deprived  of  Germany's  help,  and  London  was  too -far 
away  to  help  Austria-Hungary  in  her  frontier  conflicts  with 
Servia,  Italy  and  Roumania.  England,  as  a  rule,  always 
came  late  in  the  present  war  and  it  would  be  so  much  more 
late  in  coming  to  help  Austria-Hungary.  This  considera- 
tion decided  the  permanency  of  the  alHance  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  and  at  the  same  time  insured  Aus- 
tria-Hungary's safety  from  Russia's  attacks.  Any  support 
given  to  Russia  in  her  threats  of  a  partition  of  Austria- 


—  83  — 

Hungary  is  in  the  last  analysis  a  work  ''pour  le  roi  de 
Prusse." 

One  must  be  blinded  with  hatred  if  he  fails  to  see  through 
that. 

The  Hapsbourgs  did  not  forget  as  yet  that  the  crown  of 
the  Roman  Emperors  was  once  upon  a  time  resting  on  their 
heads.  Vienna  still  resounds  with  the  chimes  of  the  same 
bells  which  once  proclaimed  the  glory  of  Charles  V,  on  whose 
possessions  the  sun  was  never  setting.  It  was  a  very  just 
remark  that  was  made  once  that  the  Austrian  empire  al- 
though dating  only  as  far  back  as  1806,  "became  respected  as 
the  oldest  and  most  conservative."*  The  throne  of  the  Haps- 
bourgs is  still  overshadowed  by  the  imperial  purple,  by  the 
tradition  of  Rome.  The  force  of  these  rriemories  was  not 
extinguished  by  the  defeat  of  Austria  at  Sadowa,  nor  later 
on  by  the  brilliant  development  of  Berlin,  and  the  emperor 
of  Austria  did  not  cease  until  now  to  pass  as  a  legal  heir  of 
the  crown  of  the  Roman  Emperors.  The  Roman  empire 
became  closely  intertwined  with  the  Catholic  church;  the 
"World-State"  and  the  "World-Church"  were  elements 
which  completed  each  other  in  the  conception  of  the  "Holy- 
Empire."  The  Catholics  in  Germany  and  particularly  the 
Catholics  in  Austria-Hungary  understand  it  well  and  under 
the  penalty  of  treason  to  the  Church  they  'cannot  deviate 
from  this  conception.  On  the  basis  of  the  fact  that  the 
dynasty  of  the  Hapsbourgs  is  Catholic,  the  Catholic  party 
in  Germany  insisted  in  1866  upon  Austria  being  the  leader 
of  the  Germanic  World.  The  Roman  Emperor  as  a  universal 
monarch  cannot  be  a  Protestant;  this  is  a  dogma  of  an 
ideal  and  political  nature  at  the  same  time.  William  H  is 
a  Protestant,  and  this  prevents  him  from  filing  his  claim  to 
the  supremacy  of  the  world.     He  may  endeavor  to  impose 

*  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  pa*ge  420. 


—  84  — 

this  supremacy  by  sheer  force  but  he  has  no  title  to  it ;  the 
existence  itself  of  Austria-Hungary  is  in  this  respect  also  a 
hindrance  to  BerHn.  The  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  is  in 
existence  means  the  following: 

I — Division  of  the  German  nation  into  two  independent 
states  which,  however,  agrees  with  the  requirements  of  the 
principle  of  nationalism. 

n — Does  not  permit  Berlin  to  file  a  claim  of  Germany 
to  the  inheritance  of  Rome  and  to  the  supremacy  over  West- 
ern Europe. 

Bryce  perceived  with  a  keen  eye  of  the  historian  and 
statesman  of  great  calibre  that  ''it  was  the  tradition  of  a 
glorious  past  when  Germany  led  the  world  that  made  the 
Germans  again  a  united  people,  the  central  power  of  Con- 
tinental Europe."*  The  traditions  of  Rome  did  not  die  out 
as  yet  in  Central  Europe  although  they  died  out  in  France 
and  England,  without  speaking,  of  course,  of-  America.  The 
importance  of  this  question  was  well  understood  by  England 
when  the  latter  refused  to  recognize  the  abdication  of  Fran- 
cis H  from  the  dignity  of  a  Roman  Emperor.  During  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  England  attempted  to  "re-establish 
.  .  .  the  Empire,"  but  Prussia,  ''elated  at  the  glory  she 
had  won  in  the  war  of  independence,"t  refused  to  submit  to 
the  supremacy  of  Austria  and  succeeded  to  arouse  the  pro- 
test of  other  German  states.  It  is  an  almost  forgotten  fact 
that  England  to  this  day  refused  to  recognize  the  abdication 
of  the  Hapsbourgs  from  the  dignity  of  Roman  Emperors, 
and  the  possibility  of  re-establishing  of  this  dignity  did  not 
altogether  pass  away.  The  existence  of  the  throne  of  the 
Hapsbourgs  neutralizes  under  these  conditions  the  inheri- 
tance of  Rome  in  Western  and  in  Central  Europe.     The 

*  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  503. 

t  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  416.  * 


—  85  — 

throne  of  the  Hapsbourgs  preserves  a  greater  dignity  and 
does  not  gain  in  material  strength.  A  dynastical  gap  be- 
tween the  Hapsbourgs  and  the  Hohenzollerns  furthers  the 
interests  of  peace  and  equilibrium.  The  policy  of  Austria- 
Hungary  on  the  other  hand  is  and  shall  always  remain  the 
resulting  element  of  the  will  of  different  autonomous  nations, 
and,  therefore,  can  never  become  anti-nationalistic,  but  must 
always  co-operate  with  other  nations  for  the  welfare  of 
humanity  and  peace. 

The  Allies  try,  according  to  a  popular  version,  to  strike 
not  as  much  at  the  German  nation  as  at  Prussia,  which  is 
reported  to  have  directed  the  energy  of  Germany  into  a  path 
which  is  inconsistent  with  the  interests  of  peace.  At  the 
same  time,  this  tendency  drives  towards  the  dismemberment 
of  Austria-Hungary.  This  is  an  attempt  of  a  compromise 
between  the  sympathy  of  England  and  France  and  the  in- 
sinuations of  Russian  diplomacy  which  tries  to  force  upon 
the  world  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary.  Sound  reason- 
ing indicates  that  in  order  to  destroy  Prussia  and  spare  the 
German  nation,  the  partition  of  Austria-Hungary  would  be 
a  nonsense.  There  is  still  some  truth  in  the  contention  that 
''the  Southern  Germans  look  to  Vienna  rather  than  to  Ber- 
lin."* Prussia  could  be  destroyed  only  by  the  destruction  of 
the  German  Empire,  which  was  the  result  of  Prussia's  vic- 
tory over  Austria  in  1866  and  over  France  in  1871.  Should 
this  be  done,  what  could  the  organization  of  future  Germany 
be  based  upon  ?  After  eliminating  the  hegemony  of  Prussia, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  return  to  the  hegemony  which  Prus- 
sia eliminated  once  upon  a  time.  This  would  mean  the 
hegemony  of  Austria  which  was  crushed  on  the  battlefield 
of  Sadowa.  The  independence  and  the  development  of  the 
German  nation  can  do  without  the  supremacy  of  Prussia  but 

*  L.  C.  Jane :    "The  Nations  at  War,"  London,  1914,  page  192. 


—  86  — 

could  not  possibly  do  without  the  supremacy  of  somebody 
else.  Viewed  otherwise,  from  a  different  standpoint,  the 
entire  program  of  the  Allies  with  regard  to  Germany  is  either 
a  fiction  or  a  huge  lie.  The  idea  of  reorganizing  Germany 
at  the  expense  of  Prussia  must  naturally  go  hand  in  hand 
with  the  preserving  of  Austria-Hungary,  in  order  to  make 
the  throne  of  the  Hapsbourgs  once  more  the  throne  of  the 
German  nation.  Regardless  of  the  point  of  view,  however, 
it  remains  a  fact  that  a  strong  Austria-Hungary  is  the  guar- 
antee of  equilibrium  in  Europe.  Austria-Hungary  is  a  bar- 
rier for  the  imperialism  of  Russia  and  to  some  extent  also 
for  the  imperialism  of  Germany.  Austria-Hungary  protects 
the  Bosporus  from  Russia  and  the  Adriatic  Sea  from 
Germany,  and  by  this  fact  the  throne  of  the  Hapsbourgs 
goes  a  good  deal  towards  the  re-establishing  in  Europe  of 
the  Roman  peace,  of  the  permanent  peace  of  the  Caesars. 
It  is  impossible  any  more  for  the  Roman  imperialism  to  be 
renewed  in  Austria-Hungary,  nor  can  the  old  Roman  form 
of  domination  over  the  world  be  revived,  but  the  mission  of 
old  Rome  in  the  world  has  a  chance  of  being  regenerated. 

Some  day  the  gates  of  the  temple  of  Janus  will  be  closed ! 

It  was  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  England  that  she  did  not 
protect  Austria  in  1866  against  an  attack  by  Prussia.  It  was 
equally  a  mistake  of  England  not  to  protect  France  in  1870, 
and  Homer  Lea  reproaches  England  from  her  own  point  of 
view  for  having  failed  to  do  so.*  In  the  eyes  of  English 
public  opinion,  the  victory  of  Prussia  was  considered  even 
as  the.  "triumph  of  the  principle  of  nationality."t  England 
failed  to  see  that  on  the  battlefields  of  Sadowa  and  Sedan 
the  seed  of  the  present  war  was  sown.  Bismarck  was  not  a 
friend  of  the  sea  and  this  to  some  extent  appeased  the  fears 

*  Homer  Lea :  "The  Day  of  the  Saxon." 
t  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  505. 


—  87  — 

of  England,  inasmuch  as  on  land  England  does  not  have  to 
be  an  enemy  of  Germany.  It  was  a  mistake  of  Lord  Pal- 
merston  and  of  Lord  Beaconsfield  that  they  did  not  protect 
Austria  and  France  from  Prussia,  but  at  least  they  protected 
Constantinople  from  Russia's  appetite.  The  mistake  they 
made  did  not  lie  in  the  fact  that  they  protected  Constan- 
tinople but  in  their  failure  to  protect  Austria  and  France. 
A  purely  opportunistic  policy  has  prevented  England  from 
championing  the  cause  of  Austria  and  France  in  their  wars 
with  Prussia ;  the  same  opportunistic  policy  lowers  England 
still  more  nowadays  and  makes  Great  Britain  sell  to  Russia, 
Constantinople  and  the  Slavish  provinces  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary for  a  temporary  military  support  against  Germany. 
Lord  Beaconsfield  committed  the  first  mistake  and  his  critics 
nowadays  endeavor  to  commit  the  second  one.  All  this  must 
be  some  tragic  misunderstanding,  because  it  is  impossible 
to  conceive  that  England  should  go  in  such  a  broken  way 
against  all  of  her  former  traditions. 

The  considerations  which  support  the  argument  of  pre- 
serving Austria-Hungary  as  a  first-class  power  form  a  por- 
tion of  the  conditions  for: 

I — The  permanence  of  the  coming  peace; 

H — The  victory  of  the  just  principle  of  nationalism; 

HI — The  defeat  of  the  imperialism  of  Russia. 
In  spite  of  the  aroused  passions,  there  will  be  a  place  for 
the  following  principles  among  the  conditions  of  the  coming 
peace : 

I — The  strengthening  of  Austria-Hungary  as  a  first- 
class  power  against  the  imperialism  of  Russia,  be- 
cause Pan-Slavism  is  the  reactionary  program  of 
a  race  and  not  a  progressive  program  of  na- 
tionalism ; 


II — The  solving  of  the  question  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina through  the  reorganization  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Croatia  and  Slavonia  in  the  sense  of  triaHsm 
and  in  accordance  with  the  teachings  of  history 
and  statistics,  and  without  injuring  Servia,  whose 
claims  against  Austria-Hungary  are  dictated  by  an 
imperialistic  policy,  it  being  only  a  reflection  of 
Russian  Pan-Slavism  and  inconsistent  with  the 
requirements  of  a  just  nationalism. 

On  the  battlefields  of  the  present  war,  the  moral  achieve- 
ment of  nationalism  in  Austria-Hungary  won  a  victory. 
The  world  has  convinced  itself  that  a  structure  erected  by  a 
thousand  years  and  by  a  half  century  of  constitutional 
regime  is  not  a  house  of  cards  which  can  be  blown  to  pieces 
by  the  first  blow  of  the  hurricane  of  war. 


■  Chapter  IV 
THE  FUTURE  of  WARSAW 


—  91 


Chapter  IV. — The  Future  of  Warsaw 

The  map  of  Europe  contains  a  great  political  paradox. 
This  paradox  is  the  line  of  the  Vistula,  which  is  one 
of  the  main  rivers  of  central  Europe.  Its  upper  part 
is  in  the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary;  the  middle  part 
in  the  hands  of  Russia  and  the  lower  part  in  those 
of  Germany.  On  the  upper  part  of  the  Vistula  lies 
the  town  of  Cracow  where  the  old  Polish  Kings 
are  buried;  in  the  middle  part  of  the  Vistula  is  Warsaw, 
the  capital  of  Poland,  while  E)anzig,  the  old  Polish  harbor 
town,  lies  at  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula.  It  certainly  is  a 
paradox  which  shows  geographically  the  political  slavery  of 
Poland.  Cut  in  three  parts,  the  Vistula  is  a  river  of  slavery 
and  the  river  of  the  great  Polish  suffering. 

The  paradox  of  the  Vistula  is  the  strategical  and  eco- 
nomical expression  of  what  Clemenceau  has  called  "one  of 
the  biggest  crimes  in  history."* 

The  present  war  has  been  called  a  war  fought  for  the 
liberty  of  nations.  Ten  millions  of  troops  have  been  rushed 
into  the  valley  of  the  Vistula,  and  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the 
Carpathian  Mountains  there  is  one  vast  struggle  going  on,  a 
struggle  for  which  there  is  no  comparison  in  history.  The 
main  issue  in  this  enormous  struggle  is  the  fate  of  Warsaw, 
the  capital  of  Poland.  From  the  strategical  point  of  view  it 
is  a  question  of  the  Vistula — from  the  political  point  of  view 
it  is  a  question  of  Poland's  future.  On  the  banks  of  the 
Vistula,  justice  is  meted  out  for  the  partition  of  Poland  and 


*  "L'Homme  Libre,"  August  i6,  1914. 


—  92  — 

the  three  powers,  which  once  upon  a  time  dismembered 
Poland,  are  finally  facing  each  other  as  enemies,  arrayed 
for  a  final  settlement.  The  Polish  question  which  hitherto 
united  them  began  to  be  a  bone  of  contention;  under  the 
pressure  of  military  necessity,  both  sides  were  compelled  to 
approach  the  Polish  nation,  which  ages  ago  settled  on  the 
banks  of  the  Vistula  and  occupies  the  theatre  of  the  present 
war. 

The  time  came  for  making  promises. 

The  proclamation  which  a  year  ago  the  German  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  distributed  in  Russian-Poland 
stated  that  the  armies  of  these  countries  were  bringing 
"Liberty  and  Independence"*  to  Poland.  This  was  the  first 
ray  of  hope  for  the  Polish  nation.  A  few  days  later  an- 
other promise  came,  this  time  from  the  opposite  party.  On 
August  15,  1914,  the  late  Russian  Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nikolajevitch,  proclaimed  that  the 
intention  of  Russia  is  to  unite  Poland  under  the  sceptre  of 
the  Czar.  "Poland  shall  be  reborn  under  this  sceptre,  free 
in  faith,  in  language,  in  self-government."  The  armies  of 
the  western  nations  gave  the  hope  of  independence — the 
armies  of  the  eastern  power  have  limited  the  future  of 
Poland  to  autonomy.  The  aforesaid  proclamations,  how- 
ever, were  proclamations  issued  only  by  commanders-in- 
chief,  and  not  by  their  respective  governments. 

Poland  knew  long  ago  that  the  war  would  practically  draw 
closer,  and  she  prepared  herself  so  as  not  to  be  surprised  and 
to  have  a  plan  of  action.  During  the  war  in  the  Balkans, 
Poland  advanced  her  preparations  considerably.  Old  and  new 
organizations  began  secretly  or  openly  to  work  with  fewer  in 
order  to  be  able,  in  case  of  a  war  between  Austria  and 


*  "Nowa  Reforma,"  Cracow,  August,  1914. 


—  93  — 

Russia,  to  form  their  own  military  representation  and  throw 
it  in  the  game  and  fight  for  Poland's  independence.  Out- 
wardly, Poland  made  her  first  political  demonstration  in 
European  politics  in  the  summer  of  1913.  Polish  miHtary 
organizations  and  independence  parties  sent  a  delegation  to 
London,  where  at  that  time  a  conference  of  ambassadors  of 
European  nations  was  in  session,  and  it  deposited  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  all  the  ambassadors  assembled  in  con- 
ference a  memorandum  on  the  question  of  Poland.  This 
memorandum  was  nothing  else  but  a  program  of  Poland's 
attitude  in  the  war  which  at  that  time  was  already  antici- 
pated. This  memorandum  called  Europe's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  in  case  of  a  war,  Poland  would  throw  her  lot  with 
Austria-Hungary  against  Russia  because  under  present  po- 
litical conditions  such  an  action  means  the  only  real  road 
to  independence  for  Poland.  The  moment  when  the  antici- 
pated war  broke  out  Poland  did  not  need  to  make  her  action 
dependent  on  any  of  the  aforesaid  proclamations  which  the 
armies  of  Austria-Hungary,  Germany  and  Russia  distributed 
all  over  Poland's  territory. 

On  August  5,  1914,  the  first  Polish  patrol  composed  of 
members  of  Polish  military  organizations  left  Cracow  and 
crossed  Russia's  frontier,  headed  for  Kielce  in  Russian  Po- 
land. This  patrol  was  followed  by  other  detachments  num- 
bering several  thousand  of  men.  All  of  them  were  revolu- 
tionary troops  trained  in  a  miHtary  organization  which  for  a 
good  many  years  carried  on  the  work  openly  in  Galicia  and 
under  cover  in  Prussian  and  in  Russian-Poland  ;  in  these  or- 
ganizations young  men  were  trained  for  military  purposes  in 
order  to  be  able  to  form,  in  case  of  war  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  a  military  representation  of  Poland.  The  plan 
elaborated  long  ago  began  to  work.  The  frontier  posts 
which   for  over  a  hundred  years  separated  Cracow  from 


—  94  — 

Warsaw  were  pulled  down;  they  were  pulled  down  by  the 
Polish  revolutionary  soldiers  who  were  the  first  to  cross 
the  frontier  in  order  to  bring  liberty  to  Russian-Poland. 
This  happened  on  August  5th — precisely  fifty  years  after 
the  Russian  government  in  Warsaw,  through  the  hangman's 
noose,  executed  the  last  five  members  of  the  last  Polish 
National  Government.  This  date  of  August  5th  was  a  fes- 
tival and  the  day  of  the  beginning  of  a  new  fight  for  inde- 
pendence. At  the  head  of  the  movement  stood  Joseph 
Pilsudzki,  a  Russian  subject.  The  road  to  Kielce  was  open 
for  him  because  the  Russian  armies  retreated  for  strategical 
reasons  and  the  armies  of  Austria-Hungary  had  not  arrived. 
Neither  was  there  any  proclamation  from  any  of  the  warring 
powers.  The  action  of  the  Poles  outran  the  coming  events. 
In  Kielce,  where  for  a  while  no  other  armies  had  made  their 
appearance  and  which  was  occupied  only  by  the  Polish 
troops,  the  independence  of  Poland  was  proclaimed.  The 
churches  resounded  with  Polish  national  anthems  for  which 
hitherto  Russian  government  deported  the  people  to  Siberia. 
Polish  flags  showing  the  historical  White  Eagle  were  once 
more  floating  over  the  city  showing  their  white  and  crim- 
son colors  to  the  eyes  of  the  enthusiastic  people.  The  ranks 
of  the  Polish  revolutionary  army  began  to  swell  by  a  large 
number  of  volunteers  who  were  able  to  escape  the  Russian 
orders  of  mobilization. 

One  must  have  gone  through  slavery  himself  in  order  to 
understand  and  appreciate  the  feehngs  of  a  nation  throwing 
off  the  shackles  of  its  slavery. 

On  August  3,  1914,  proclamations  of  a  secret  National 
Government  were  posted  in  Warsaw  which  summoned  the 
nation  to  rise  against  Russia  and  join  hands  with  the  de- 
tachments of  the  Polish  revolutionary  army  which  was  com- 
ing up  from  the  Galician  frontier.    A  young  Pole,  a  member 


—  95  — 

of  the  Polish  conspiracy,  was  caught  by  a  Russian  poHce 
while  posting  the  aforesaid  bills,  and  on  the  next  day  a  volley 
shot  from  the  rifles  of  an  executionary  squad  ended  his  life 
in  the  citadel  of  Warsaw.  He  was  the  first  victim  of  the 
war.  About  two  weeks  later  the  proclamation  of  the  Rus- 
sian commander-in-chief  was  issued;  in  this  proclamation, 
from  fear  of  the  awakening  revolutionary  spirit,  a  promise 
of  autonomy  was  made  to  Poland.  It  was  not  enough  for 
a  nation  that  had  older  political  traditions  than  Russia  but, 
above  everything  else,  the  promise  came  too  late.  The  action 
of  the  Poles  not  only  came  ahead  of  the  armies  of  both 
sides  but  also  of  their  promises.  In  Galicia  all  the  political 
parties  succeeded  in  uniting  and  in  getting  into  communica- 
tion with  the  secret  National  Government  in  Warsaw.  Be- 
cause of  the  freedom  of  action  in  Galicia  the  center  of  grav- 
ity of  the  entire  movement  was  shifted  from  Warsaw  to 
Cracow  from  where  the  first  signal  for  the  war  of  inde- 
pendence was  issued.  On  the  basis  of  an  agreement  between 
the  secret  and  open  political  parties  in  Galicia  and  Russian- 
Poland,  which  form  together  two-thirds  of  the  organized 
parties  in  Poland,  the  Supreme  National  Committee  was 
organized  in  Cracow  on  August  16,  1914;  this  committee 
until  now  has  the  supreme  sway  over  the  destinies  of  the 
nation.  It  is  a  political  representation  of  Poland  in  the 
present  war  and  it  is  a  nucleus  of  the  Polish  state,  should 
the  conscience  of  the  world  awake  and  should  Poland  gain 
her  independence.  All  the  detachments  of  the  Polish  revolu- 
tionary forces  which  were  in  garrison  in  Kielce,  received  the 
name  of  "Polish  Legions"  from  the  Supreme  National  Com- 
mittee. Thus  the  actual  force  of  the  nation,  elements 
organized  openly  or  secretly,  and  based  on  an  entirely  demo- 
cratic principle,  declared  themselves  against  Russia  and 
formed  an  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary.     The  Russian 


—  96  — 

promises  did  not  succeed  in  halting  them  nor  did  so  the 
memories  of  the  ill-treatment  suffered  by  the  Poles  to  a 
great  extent  at  the  hands  of  Prussia. 

The  policy  of  every  nation  must  be  a  real  one,  that  means 
it  must  be  based  on  facts,  on  real  conditions  of  work  and 
not  on  fantastic  dreams.  Nobody  has  any  right  to  condemn 
republican  France  for  allying  herself  with  despotic  Russia, 
although  French  money  subsidized  the  struggle  of  Russian 
reaction  against  the  progressive  movement.  Nobody  has 
the  right  to  blame  England  for  going  hand  in  hand  with 
Russia,  although  ten  years  ago  England  perfectly  consciously 
defeated  Russia  by  the  Japanese  in  Eastern  Asia.  Nobody 
has  the  right  to  condemn  Servia  for  allying  herself  with 
Turkey  against  Bulgaria  in  the  second  Balkan  war,  although 
grass  has  not  grown  as  yet  on  the  graves  at  Kumanowo  and 
Lule  Burgas.  In  the  same  way,  nobody  can  condemn  Poland 
for  allying  herself  with  Austria-Hungary  and  throwing  her 
forces  against  Russia.  Every  nation  has  a  "ratio  status" 
of  its  own,  which  determines  the  direction  of  its  policy. 
This  "ratio  status"  is  the  result  of  historical  traditions  and 
of  material  conditions  for  action.  Positive  results  can  be 
reached  only  through  positive  means.  The  road  to  Berlin  does 
not  lead  through  the  moon  but  along  the  strategical  line  of 
the  Rhine  or  the  Vistula.  The  road  from  Italy  to  Trentino 
leads  through  the  Alps  but  not  across  the  ocean.  It  is  useless 
to  vociferate  against  the  Germans  when  the  ammunition 
gives  out  on  the  road  to  Berlin.  A  certain  purpose  requires 
positive  means  and  the  reality  of  the  means  is  determined 
by  the  facts  and  the  conditions  on  the  theatre  of  a  war  or  of 
politics.  The  alliance  of  Poland  with  Austria-Hungary  was 
the  result  of  the  Polish  "ratio  status"  and  of  real  conditions 
which  already  beforehand  decided  that  only  by  an  alliance 
with  Austria-Hungary  and  by  a  war  against  Russia,  Poland 


—  97  — 

can  become  free  and  independent.  Whoever  thinks  that  the 
decision  of  Poland  was  influenced  by  feelings,  sympathies, 
promises  or  fantastic  hope,  is  mistaken.  Poland  did  not  stop 
to  compare  the  injuries  she  suffered  from  Prussia  with 
those  she  suffered  at  Russia's  hands.  This  would  have  been 
a  childish  policy  or  a  policy  of  nervous  artists.  Not  feelings 
but  interest  decided  the  issue.  Poland  does  not  fight  nowa- 
days because  of  a  desire  of  revenge  against  Russia  nor  be- 
cause of  a  desire  of  showing  her  gratitude  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary. The  anti-Polish  policy  of  Russia  was  real  and  sincere, 
but  the  Polish  anti-Russian  policy  was  in  no  degree  less  sin- 
cere and  less  real.  Poland  understands  and  respects  the 
"ratio  status"  of  other  states  and  other  nations,  even  that  of 
Russia,  but  Poland  puts  on  the  same  basis  before  the  world 
her  own  "ratio  status"  and  fights  for  its  realization. 

Arms  do  not  terminate  war  although,  they  decide  battles. 
An  army  with  its  blood  establishes  facts  but  the  conclusions 
from  these  premises  are  drawn  by  the  diplomats  when  the 
peace  treaties  are  negotiated.  The  Polish  question  is  not 
going  to  be  decided  on  the  battlefield,  although  battles  are 
decided  on  Polish  grounds.  The  Polish  question  shall  come 
up  together  with  the  whole  mass  of  political  questions  during 
the  coming  peace  congress  regardless  of  the  form  which  the 
latter  shall  have.  This  is  the  goal  for  which  the  Polish 
hopes  are  aimed,  and  the  work  done  by  the  Polish  Legions 
paves  the  way  to  this  goal. 

One  hundred  years  ago  the  Congress  of  Vienna  was  in 
session.  The  Napoleonic  hurricane  came  to  an  end  and  then 
diplomacy  started  bargaining.  The  Polish  question  was  one 
of  the  foremost  among  the  issues  confronting  the  Congress. 
Who  did  revive  the  Polish  question  in  Europe?  Pohsh 
troops  followed  the  eagles  of  Napoleon  in  his  expedition 
against  Russia  in  1812.    The  Polish  army  was  headed  by 


—  98  — 

Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski.  The  PoHsh  army  commanded 
by  him  was  the  army  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  es- 
tablished by  Napoleon  in  1807  at  the  peace  treaty  of  Tilsit. 
Poland  has  established  right  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Napoleonic  era  a  military  representation  on  the  side  of 
France.  Then  appeared  for  the  first  time  the  idea  of  Polish 
Legions.  By  way  of  Italy,  Egypt  and  even  Santo  Domingo 
in  America  the  Polish  legions  began  their  march  to  Warsaw. 
The  road  was  a  long  one  and  cost  a  heavy  toll  of  blood,  but 
finally  it  led  the  legions  to  their  intended  goal.  The  Polish 
legions  were  not  animated  only  by  hatred  when  combating 
Russia  nor  did  they  help  France  only  because  of  any  feeling 
of  sympathy.  There  were  feelings  even  very  keen,  strong 
and  sacred  feehngs,  but  they  were  far  from  deciding  the 
Polish  policy.  The  decisive  factor  was  the  desire  of  creating 
a  Polish  military  representation  on  the  background  of  Na- 
poleonic wars  in  order  thus  to  create  a  representation  for 
the  Polish  aspirations  for  freedom  and  in  order  to  confront 
Europe  with  the  Polish  question.  Liberty  can  be  gained  only 
by  blood  and  iron  and  therefore  the  flag  carried  by  the  Polish 
legions  of  a  hundred  years  ago  was  such  a  flag  of  blood  and 
iron.  The  glory  which  fell  upon  this  flag  of  the  legions 
became  the  glory  of  the  Polish  nation,  and  it  was  because  of 
the  merit  of  these  legions  that  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
was  established  at  the  peace  treaty  of  Tilsit. 

Napoleon  was  defeated,  and  his  defeat  meant  at  the  same 
time  the  military  defeat  of  the  Polish  cause.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Polish  army.  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski,  a 
hero  known  very  well  to-day  all  over  Europe  and  a  field- 
marshal  of  Napoleon's  army,  was  drowned  in  the  River 
Elster  while  covering  the  retreat  of  Napoleon  from  Leipzig. 
The  Polish  cause,  however,  did  not  perish.  In  spite  of  the 
military  defeat  the  Polish  legions  of  the  Napoleonic  army 


—  99  — 

h 

caused  the  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  with  a 
separate  parliament  and  a  Polish  army  in  Warsaw.  The  fact 
,  that  the  Polish  army  helped  Napoleon  against  Russia  and 
^  thus  against  England  did  not  obscure  the  view  of  the  Cabinet 
[  of  London.  England  did  not  hesitate  to  support  the  Polish 
cause  against  Russia  although  Russia  was  an  ally  of  England 
in  the  latter's  life  and  death  struggle  against  Napoleon.  The 
attack  which  in  the  battle  of  Leipzig  Prince  Joseph  Ponia- 
towski  led  against  the  village  of  Probstheida  occupied  by 
Russian  troops  commanded  by  Emperor  Alexander  I  him- 
self, was  therefore  something  more  than  a  mere  incident  of 
this  "battle  of  nations."  By  conquering  Probstheida,  Prince 
Joseph  Poniatowski  "was  conquering  the  capital  of  the 
future  Kingdom  of  Poland  under  the  eyes  of  this  Kingdom's 
future  monarch."*  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski  perished 
and  only  remnants  of  the  Polish  regiments  were  left  when 
the  Napoleonic  epopee  came  to  an  end.  The  blood  and  iron, 
however,  have  done  their  work :  Polish  regiments  have  com- 
pelled Europe  to  look  at  them  as  the  representatives  of  the 
Polish  state.  Czar  Alexander  I  had  to  yield  to  the  opinion 
of  Europe ;  and  the  Poles,  although  they  lost  militarily,  they 
won,  however,  a  political  victory.  They  won  the  Kingdom 
of  Poland  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  nucleus  for  the 
future  full  reconstruction  of  Poland.  Unfortunately,  several 
years  later  Russia  has  broken  the  treaty  of  Vienna  and 
abolished  the  constitution  of  the  young  state. 

The  example  set  by  the  PoHsh  legions  of  a  hundred  years 
ago  serves  to-day  as  a  guide  for  the  Polish  legions  in  the 
present  war.  The  example  of  Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski 
is  nowadays  the  guide  of  Pilsudzki  in  the  present  war. 
Regardless  of  the  military  result  the  fact  will  remain  on 
the   records   of   history  that   in   the  great   European   war 

*  S.  Askenazy :    "Ksi^e  Jozef  Poniatowski,"  1913,  page  292. 


—  100  — 

Poland  created  her  own  military  representation  to  remind 
the  world  of  the  fact  of  her  bloody  and  heroic  existence 
to  force  the  world  to  face  the  question  of  Polish  inde- 
pendence. The  future  Congress  will  decide  the  issue,  but 
the  blood  of  the  PoHsh  legions  will  be  the  seed  of  liberty 
when  finally  the  conscience  of  the  world  will  awake  and  "one 
of  the  biggest  crimes  in  history  will  have  an  end."*  This  is 
the  basis  of  the  Polish  "ratio  status"  in  the  period  of 
Poland's  subjugation.  Nobody  had  the  right  to  demand  that 
Poland  should  act  against  this  "ratio  status"  of  hers  nor  that 
it  should  follow  the  inspiration  of  the  moment  or  believe  in 
and  wait  for  the  fulfilment  of  somebody's  promises.  Poland 
exists  between  the  hammer  and  the  anvil,  and  every  other  na- 
tion would  take  the  same  course  that  Poland  did,  and  the  same 
course  that  the  Polish  legions  took  in  the  present  war.  This 
road  agrees  with  the  Polish  traditions  against  Russia  and 
with  the  Polish  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary.  The  rea- 
son for  this  is  a  very  simple  and  a  very  real  one :  the  creat- 
ing of  a  military  representation  was  impossible  in  any  other 
way.  The  first  year  of  the  European  war  has  proved  this 
contention  by  the  force  of  facts.  The  attempt  of  Russia 
to  organize  a  PoHsh  legion  in  Warsaw  against  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  failed  sadly  and  there  is  no  Polish 
legion  siding  with  Russia.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Polish 
legions  against  Russia  and  in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary 
are  developing  fast  and  have  reached  already  the  figure  of 
many  thousands  of  men.  The  evacuation  of  Warsaw  in- 
creased the  numerical  strength  of  the  Polish  legions  con- 
siderably. So  the  actual  facts  proved  which  side  showed 
more  possibility  and  actual  opportunity :  the  decision  proved 
to  be  a  practical  one  against  Russia  and  for  an  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary. 

*  Clemenceau,  1.  c. 


I  Poland   is  not  a   free  country.     Every  male  citizen   in 

Poland  is  compelled  to  serve  in  either  the  Russian  or  the 
German  or  the  Austro-Hungarian  army.  The  outbreak  of 
the  war  came  as  suddenly  as  a  thunder-bolt  from  a  clear 
sky.  The  mobilization  in  Russia,  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  took  about  a  million  men  away  from  Poland  within 
twenty-four  hours.  The  rest  of  able-bodied  Polish  men 
were  confronted  by  the  possibility  of  being  called  to  the 
colors  as  the  war  continued.  To-day  we  can  safely  say 
that  after  the  first  year  of  the  war  is  over  there  remained 
in  Poland  only  women,  children  and  old  people.  How  could 
an  army  be  formed  under  such  conditions?  The  best  judg- 
ment and  the  greatest  sympathies  cannot  possibly  raise  an 
army  when  men  are  lacking.  Recruiting  cannot  be  done  on 
the  moon  nor  can  officers  be  made  over  night  and  the 
question  of  an  army  is  not  a  question  of  improvising  one. 
The  mobilization  of  the  Polish  Legions  therefore  on  the 
background  of  the  mobilization  in  Russia,  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  could  only  be  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
the  logic  of  actual  conditions  and  not  on  the  basis  of 
feelings,  of  sympathies  or  dispositions.  The  territory  in 
which  the  recruiting  for  Polish  Legions  was  possible  was 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  in  the  Kingdom  of  Poland. 
Galicia  and  Posen  could  not  furnish  an  adequate  supply  of 
recruits  because  they  form  together  only  20  per  cent,  of 
the  historical  territory  of  Poland,  and  besides  the  mobili- 
zation of  Austria-Hungary  and  of  Germany  goes  quicker 
than  the  mobilization  of  Russia.  This  is  the  first  fact  of 
great  importance,  because  owing  to  this  fact  the  Russian 
mobilization  was  compelled  to  leave  against  its  very  inten- 
tions a  large  material  of  men  for  purpose  of  Polish  policy. 
It  was  of  no  less  importance  that  the  Russian  mobilization 
is    less    exact,    that    it    proceeds    more    slowly,    and    that 


—  102  — 

Russia  possesses  80  per  cent,  of  the  Polish  historical  terri- 
tory and  the  old  Polish  capital  of  Warsaw.  Those  were  the 
real  conditions  which  regardless  of  the  sympathies  or  the 
antipathies  decided  beforehand  that  by  waging  war  against 
Russia  only  on  the  territory  of  Russian-Poland  could  the 
recruiting  for  the  Polish  Legions  have  any  chance  of  suc- 
cess. 

The  map  will  show  that  the  frontiers  of  Russian-Poland 
are  flanked  on  the  north  by  the  Prussian  frontier  and  on 
the  south  by  the  frontier  of  Galicia.  In  case  of  war  there 
was  a  danger  for  the  Russian  armies  in  Russian-Poland  that 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  which  have  a  speedier 
mobilization,  would  by  a  flank  attack  from  the  north  and 
from  the  south,  cut  them  off  on  the  Vistula  and  destroy 
them  before  the  reserves  from  the  interior  of  Russia  would 
be  able  to  reach  the  theatre  of  war.  Russia  was  made 
aware  of  this  danger  long  ago  by  «:ome  of  her  best  generals 
such  as  Dragomirow,  Hurko  and  even  Kuropatkin.  Accord- 
ing to  their  judgment  Russia  had  to  evacuate  in  the  first 
few  weeks  of  the  war  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  for 
strategical  reasons  so  that  the  reserves  coming  up  from  the 
interior  of  Russia  would  have  a  shorter  road  for  getting 
to  the  battle  line  and  thus  be  able  to  reach  the  seat  of  war 
before  the  armies  of  the  enemy  would  be  able  to  move  for- 
ward from  the  north  and  from  the  south.  This  was  known 
both  in  Poland  and  in  Western  Europe.  France  was  afraid 
of  this  possibility  as  France  was  compelled  to  depend  on 
a  speedy  offensive  movement  of  Russia  in  the  direction  of 
Berlin  and  on  this  plan  were  based  the  hopes  of  France 
to  protect  Paris  from  a  violent  onrush  of  the  German  armies. 
This  was  a  decisive  fact  for  Poland.  The  evacuation  of  the 
western  provinces  of  Russian-Poland  by  the  Russians  meant 
in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  stopping  of  the 


—  103  — 

Russian  mobilization  in  these  districts.  The  western  dis- 
tricts of  Russian-Poland  are  chiefly  industrial.  Here  are 
to  be  found  large  coal  mines  in  the  valley  of  D^browa  and 
of  Sosnowiec,  and  besides  there  is  a  number  of  industrial 
centres  such  as  Cz^stochowa  or  Nowo-Radomsk.  The  out- 
break of  the  war  closed  the  factories  and  the  mines :  the 
masses  of  laboring  men  were  thrown  out  of  employment, 
and  as  Russia  had  to  retreat  there  was  left  for  the  Polish 
legions  ready  and  very  useful  material  of  men.  Thus  the 
Polish  legions  recruited  the  majority  of  their  soldiers  from 
these  sections  of  the  country.  Eighty  per  cent,  of  the 
soldiers  in  the  Polish  Legions  were  recruited  in  Russian- 
Poland  and  the  majority  among  them  came  from  the  indus- 
trial districts  which  Russia  had  to  evacuate  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  temporarily  for  strategical  reasons.  This 
was  an  anticipated  fact  but  still  it  played  a  decisive  part 
in  the  Polish  policy.  The  mobilization  of  Poland  had  to  be 
necessarily  directed  against  Russia  if  it  was  to  be  of  any 
use  and  if  it  was  to  give  results. 

The  rest  of  the  task  of  organization  rested  with  Galicia 
which  for  over  half  a  century  enjoyed  the  benefits  of 
autonomy  within  the  general  constitution  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. "Galicia  has  not  been  unhappy."*  In  Posen  there 
are  no  Polish  schools  nor  Polish  university:  in  Russian- 
Poland  there  was  a  university,  but  a  Russian  one,  and  all 
schools  were  Russian  too  while  private  schools  suffered  from 
exceedingly  heavy  restrictions  on  the  part  of  the  Russian 
Government.  In  Posen,  the  Commission  of  Colonization 
originated  by  Bismarck  bought  up  Polish  land  and  settled 
it  with  Germans.  In  Russian-Poland  the  "Bank  wloscianski" 
has  .done  the  same  for  over  fifty  years  and  colonizes  Polish 


*  "The  Germans,"  Oxford  Pamphlets,  1914,  page  12. 


—  104  — 

land  with  Orthodox  Russian  peasants.  In  Lithuania  and 
Little  Russia  the  Poles  are  absolutely  forbidden  to  buy  land 
nor  to  sell  to  anyone  except  a  Russian.  Thus  a  Pole  can- 
not acquire  land  which  actually  belongs  to  the  Poles,  neither 
in  Lithuania  or  in  Little  Russia.  Czar  Nicholas  I  invented 
the  system  of  destroying  the  Polish  nation  and  Bismarck 
became  his  apt  pupil.  This  was  done  very  much  to  the 
disadvantage  of  Russia  and  of  Germany  and  brought  great 
harm  to  Poland.  The  development  of  the  Polish  nation  thus 
remained  under  th^  most  trying  conditions,  whereby  great 
mistakes  were  committed  in  Petrograd  with  regard  to 
the  Polish  question  and  still  greater  ones  were  committed 
by  Berlin.  The  friendship  between  Germany  and  Russia 
was  the  basis  for  oppressing  Poland.  The  celebration  of 
the  500th  anniversary  of  the  victory  of  Grunwald,  where 
the  combined  forces  of  Poland  and  Lithuania  annihilated 
the  power  of  the  Teutonic  Knights,  could  not  be  celebrated 
in  Warsaw  but  only  in  Cracow  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
not  Russia  but  Austria-Hungary  was  in  alliance  with  Ger- 
many. The  monument  of  the  victory  over  the  Germans 
could  be  erected,  and  in  fact  still  stands  in  Cracow  but 
could  not  possibly  stand  in  Warsaw.  This  is  enough  said 
to  the  initiated.  It  is  a  basis  for  understanding  the  policy 
of  Poland  in  the  present  war.  Owing  to  her  autonomical 
freedom  Galicia  was  able  to  become  the  territory  on  which 
the  preparations  for  the  future  war  of  independence  could 
be  carried  on.  The  best  material  of  men  from  Russian- 
Poland  took  refuge  in  Galicia  where  these  elements  could 
be  instructed  militarily  in  special  Polish  military  organiza- 
tions. Thus  Galicia  educated  the  officers  for  the  present 
Polish  legions  and  only  Galicia  was  able  to  do  it.  The 
first  detachments  of  the  Polish  Legions  which  crossed  the 
Russian  frontier  north  of  Cracow  were  skeleton  detach- 


— 105  — 

nients  composed  only  of  officers  and  under-officers.  On  the 
left  bank  of  the  Vistula  there  were  waiting  for  them  the 
Polish  recruits  who  were  spared  by  the  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion and  only  too  anxious  to  fight  for  their  own  sacred 
cause  of  independence. 

This,  however,  was  an  old  program  and  not  a  new  one 
by  any-  means. 

In  the  years  1876-1878  when  there  was  a  danger  of  a 
war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  on  account  of 
the  Balkan  situation  all  the  political  parties  of  Poland  united 
in  order  to  prepare  a  new  revolution  against  Russia  in  alH- 
ance  with  Austria-PIungary.  For  this  purpose  a  "Con- 
federation of  the  PoHsh  Nation"  was  formed  which  played 
the  part  of  a  political  representation  of  the  nation.  The 
movement  was  headed  by  Prince  Sapieha  who  was  assisted 
by  Rev.  Albin  Dunajewski  who  subsequently  was  Bishop 
of  Cracow  and  Cardinal  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
In  those  times  England  was  on  terms  of  friendship  with 
Germany  and  protected  Constantinople  from  the  appetite 
of  Russia.  Thus  England  worked  behind  the  stage  in  organ- 
izing a  Polish  revolution  against  Russia.  The  plan  of  the 
revolution  consisted  of  marching  armed  and  well  organ- 
ized detachments  of  revolutionary  armies  into  Russian- 
Poland  from  Galicia:  these  detachments  were  intended  to 
be  the  nucleus  of  the  future  PoHsh  army.  Russian-Poland 
was  expected  to  furnish  the  men  and  Galicia  the  officers. 
The  English  Government  was  well  informed  of  the  entire 
plan  and  even  promised  to  help  quietly  by  furnishing  arms 
and  money.  Cardinal  Manning,  who  was  famous  all  over 
England  took  part  in  a  secret  meeting  of  Polish  politicians 
in  Vienna:  at  this  meeting  important  decisions  were  taken 
in  case  the  war  should  really  break  out.  There  was  no  war, 
however,  but  the  Congress  of  Berlin  completed  the  diplo- 


—  106  — 

matic  defeat  of  Russia.  A  tradition  was  left  behind  in 
Poland,  however,  to  that  effect  that  England  has  under- 
stood the  Polish  "ratio  status"  which  prompted  the  Poles 
to  avail  themselves  of  their  liberties  in  Galicia  in  order 
to  prepare  a  revolution  in  Russian-Poland.  For  forty  years 
ever  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Poland  did  not  discon- 
tinue her  policy  and  constantly  instructed  young  men  in 
secret  and  in  open  organizations  of  military  nature.  Poland's 
policy  was  not  altered  by  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  Germany  which  has  lasted 
for  over  thirty  years  and  furnished  ample  time  to  recon- 
sider the  matter:  Poland's  policy  was  not  altered  even 
when  Prussia  began  a  systematic  oppression  in  Posen  and 
England  failed  to  protest  against  such  treatment  of  the 
Poles.  Just  at  this  particular  time  England  ceded  Heligo- 
land which  became  the  basis  for  Germany's  naval  power. 
Several  years  later  England  preferred  to  threaten  France 
with  war  on  account  of  the  Fashoda  incident  than  to  inter- 
vene at  Berlin  for  the  protection  of  the  Poles  although 
the  oppression  of  the  Poles  in  Posen  by  Prussia  violated  the 
treaty  of  Vienna  of  1815.  Bismarck  was  not  fond  of  the 
sea  and  Poland  is  not  Belgium  and  Warsaw  does  not  face 
London.  Poland  felt  bitterly  over  being  abandoned  to  her 
fate  by  Western  Europe,  but  she  did  not  deter  her  from  fol- 
lowing her  anti-Russian  policy. 

When  after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
in  1908  by  Austria-Hungary,  the  danger  of  war  became 
imminent  to  Poland,  new  organizations  were  added  to  those 
which  existed  since  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  and 
preparations  were  going  on  feverishly.  The  Polish  "ratio 
status"  did  not  change  at  all  since  the  time  when  Cardinal 
Manning  conferred  in  Vienna  with  representatives  of  Poland 
on  the  details  of  a  revolution  against  Russia.   To-day  Eng- 


— 107  — 

land  is  militarily  allied  with  Russia:  the  English  tactics 
changed,  but  the  conditions  in  Poland  did  not.  Cardinal 
Dunajewski  is  also  dead,  but  another  dignitary  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  Bishop  Bandurski,  is  a  member  of  the 
Supreme  National  Committee.  The  only  change  that  has 
occurred  is  that  Poland's  sufferings  became  greater  and 
deeper.  Should  this  be  the  reason  why  England  no  longer 
understands  the  Polish  "ratio  status,"  although  England  has 
understood  it  and  recognized  it  forty  years  ago  under 
analogous  conditions  for  Poland? 

Poland  has  been  and  is  still  in  a  most  precarious  position. 
She  could  not  do  anything  else  but  fight  against  Russia, 
and  in  order  to  do  this  she  had  to  draw  her  recruits  from 
Russian-Poland  and  her  supply  of  officers  from  Galicia. 
This  was  not  prompted  by  feelings  but  by  actual  conditions 
of  things.  Not  because  of  blind  hatred  but  because  of  absolute 
necessity  was  Poland  compelled  to  direct  her  main  attacks 
against  Russia.  Warsaw  the  Capital  of  Poland  and  besides 
eighty  per  cent,  of  Poland's  territory  was  in  Russia's  hands 
or  in  other  words,  Russia  held  the  trunk  of  Poland's  body. 
It  is  therefore  quite  natural  that  the  Polish  attack  had  to 
be  directed  against  Russia. 

On  October  2,  1914,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
drafted  a  diplomatic  note  addressed  to  all  neutral  coun- 
tries in  which  the  said  government  officially  recognized  the 
Polish  Legions  as  combatants.  This  important  document 
ended  as  follows : 

"Any  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  which  would  imply  a 
refusal  to  recognize  the  Polish  Legions  as  a  combatant 
party  would  constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Convention  of  The  Hague  and  against  which  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Austria-Hungary  already  now  files  a  most  cate- 
gorical protest." 


— 108  — 

This  note  was  published  by  the  "Fremdenblatt"  of  Vienna, 
which  is  the  official  organ  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Thus  the  Polish  military  representation  obtained  an  official 
sanction.  The  Polish  soldier  became  a  political  factor  in 
Europe  because  the  note  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment secured  for  him  the  protection  of  international  law. 
The  future  peace  congress  has  therefore  a  perfect  freedom 
of  action  with  regard  to  the  PoHsh  question.  When  some 
time  in  the  future  the  hostilities  will  be  suspended  this 
moment  will  find  the  Polish  Legions  in  the  field.  Regard- 
less of  the  military  result  of  the  war  this  is  going  to  be  a 
fact  which  from  the  former  point  of  view  will  greatly  facili- 
tate the  reviving  of  the  Polish  question  at  the  time  of  the 
coming  peace  congress.  According  to  international  law 
Poland  is  only  a  combatant  party  but  is  not  a  belligerent 
one  because  there  is  only  a  PoHsh  nation  and  no  PoHsh 
state.  Hitherto  only  a  Polish  military  representation  is  rec- 
ognized in  the  world-war;  nevertheless,  the  Polish  Legions 
can  constitute  a  material  as  well  as  a  formal  point  of 
departure  for  the  initiative  in  the  Polish  question  when  the 
future  peace  congress  will  meet.  Poland  hopes  that  the 
conscience  of  the  world  will  awake  and  that  historical  jus- 
tice is  going  to  be  done.  Poland  did  everything  on  her 
part  to  organize  a  military  representation  of  her  own,  and 
it  is  now  Europe's  turn  to  bring  about  the  happiness  of 
humanity  and  the  freedom  of  nations  when  this  awful  war 
will  come  to  an  end. 

The  note  of  Austria-Hungary  with  regard  to  the  Polish 
Legions  has  greatly  alarmed  Russia.  Petrograd  decided 
therefore  at  once  upon  an  attempt  of  organizing  in  .Warsaw 
of  Polish  Legions  for  the  purpose  of  combating  against  the 
Germans.  It  was  an  intrigue  intended  for  provoking. a  vol- 
untary fight  between  the  Poles  themselves  and  thus  killing 


—  109  — 

the  Polish  question  from  the  international  point  of  view. 
Organizing  two  military  representations  is  absurd.  The 
danger  for  Poland  was  great  and  because  of  unemployment, 
famine  and  particularly  because  of  the  mistakes  made  by 
the  policy  of  Prussia  with  regard  to  Poland  in  the  times 
preceding  the  war  it  was  comparatively  easy  for  Russia  to 
mislead  individuals.  Poland  is  an  oppressed  country,  with- 
out a  government  after  all,  and  therefore  every  individual 
has  a  free  hand  to  act  as  he  pleases.  Oppression  has  accus- 
tomed the  nation  to  the  principle  of  "liberum  censeo/'  which 
principle  permits  every  individual  to  consider  himself  as  his 
own  governor.  The  level  of  political  enlightenment  of  the 
masses  is  not  equal  in  all  parts  of  Poland,  where,  by  the  way, 
the  schools  are  in  other  hands  than  those  of  the  Poles 
and  where  a  general  oppression  prevails.  Russia  therefore 
determined  to  destroy  what  the  legions  of  Cracow  have 
accomplished  politically.  In  November,  1914,  that  means 
about  four  months  after  the  Polish  Legions  have  crossed 
the  Russian  frontier.  Czar  Nicholas  II  has  commissioned 
his  Chamberlain,  Count  Wielopolski,  to  organize  in  Warsaw 
a  Polish  National  Committee  as  a  competition  to  the  Supreme 
National  Committee  of  Cracow.  The  right  hand  and  in 
fact  the  brain  of  Count  Wielopolski's  action  was  a  confi- 
dential man  of  the  Russian  Government,  a  former  member 
of  the  Duma,  Roman  Dmowski.  A  portion  of  the  Polish 
nobility  and  of  the  moneyed  bourgeoisie  supported  this 
movement. 

During  all  revolutions  there  were  loyal  parties,  which  dis- 
trusted the  sword  and  were  apt  to  believe  in  deceitful  prom- 
ises. The  French  Revolution  had  its  loyalists  and  so  had  it 
American  revolution  in  times  of  Washington. 

The  first  utterance  of  the  Committee  of  Warsaw  was  the 
proclamation  of  November  25,  1914,  in  which  a  protest  was 


—  110  — 

made  against  the  Supreme  National  Committee :  the  authors 
of  this  proclamation,  however,  did  not  have  the  courage  of 
denying  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  was  "the  only  state 
in  which  our  national  rights  had  met  with  a  measure  of 
recognition."*  The  autonomy  of  Galicia  has  been  in  force 
-for  over  half  a  century,  while  the  autonomy  under  Russian 
sovereignty  was  hitherto  only  a  promise  of  the  commander- 
in-chief.  Under  such  conditions  and  because  of  a  number 
of  other  practical  considerations  which  were  explained  above, 
the  Committee  of  Warsaw  was  necessarily  without  real 
backing  among  the  Poles.  All  democratic  parties  refused 
to  support  the  Committee  in  question:  the  latter  tried  to 
gain  in  importance  by  co-operating  with  the  Committee  of 
the  Polish  members  of  the  Russian  Duma  in  Petro^rad. 
Russian-Poland  used  to  elect  to  the  Russian  Duma 
only  fourteen  deputies  out  of  a  population  of  12,000,000. 
Besides,  the  election  law  was  of  the  most  reactionary  nature 
and  deprived  the  masses  of  the  people  of  any  influence  what- 
soever. For  these  reasons  the  Poles  boycotted  the  Russian 
Duma  since  the  reactionary  times  of  Stolypin  and  only  the 
nobility  and  certain  elements  of  the  moneyed  bourgeoisie 
took  part  in  the  election.  This  condition  of  things  was  cor- 
rectly estimated  by  the  London  "Times,"  which,  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  and  after  the  declaration  of  loyalty 
on  the  part  of  the  Polish  members  of  the  Duma,  has  ques- 
tioned the  political  value  of  their  move  because  "chosen  on 
the  franchise  and  in  the  conditions  which  exist,"  they  cannot 
"speak  for  the  whole  people."t  The  London  ''Times"  is  a 
newspaper  of  high  standing  and  therefore  had  its  doubts, 
which  by  the  way  were  quite  justified,  whether  the  Polish 

*  "Poland,  Russia  and  the  War,"  by  Alma  Tadema,  London,  1914, 
page  21, 
t  The  'Times,"  London,  August  17, 1914. 


—  lu- 
nation will  be  able  *'to  forget  1830  and  1863?"  Reality  has 
soon  manifested  itself  in  spite  of  the  artificial  propaganda 
made  by  the  press.  The  Committee  of  Warsaw  supported 
the  Russian  plan  of  organizing  a  Polish  Legion  on  Russia's 
side.  A  most  spirited  propaganda  was  carried  on  for  three 
months  and  failed  completely.  The  nation  did  not  back  up 
the  action,  and  no  army  can  be  raised  on  paper  nor  by  spiUing 
streams  of  ink  and  making  a  propaganda.  Several  hundred 
of  misled  volunteers  were  quietly  incorporated  into  the 
Russian  army :  thus  the  entire  undertaking  failed  politically. 
The  Russian  intrigue  came  to  a  naught  and  the  moral  stand- 
ing as  well  as  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Polish  Legions 
organized  in  Cracow  was  increased  considerably. 

The  reasons  for  Russia's  failure  in  Warsaw  were  very 
grave  ones.  Russia  promised  autonomy  to  Poland  but  she 
did  not  promise  independence.  While  the  war  that  is  waged 
at  the  present  time  is  conducted  for  the  sake  of  the  liberty 
of  nations  Russia  only  offered  autonomy  which  by  the  way 
was  only  administrative  and  not  legislative.  To  the  Poles 
it  meant  only  uniting  under  one  yoke  instead  of  under  three 
which  was  far  from  being  a  program  of  independence.  All 
illusions  were  swept  away  by  the  Corriere  della  Sera  of 
Milano  which  stated  that  the  Czar  has  purposely  failed  to 
sign  the  proclamation  with  regard  to  the  Polish  cause.*  The 
"GoJos  Moskwy"  confirmed  this  by  betraying  the  fact  that 
the  manifesto  of  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was  not  backed  up 
at  all  by  the  Russian  Government  and  that  this  was  merely 
a  tactical  move  which  was  required  from  Russia  by  Gen- 
eral Jofifre.  The  attitude  of  the  Russian  Government  dur- 
ing the  war  gave  conclusively  justified  the  suspicions  of 
Poland  since  Russia  did  not  cease  for  one  moment  to  ex- 
terminate  all   aspirations    for   Polish   independence.     The 

*  "For  a  Lasting  Peace,"  Paris,  191 5,  page  23. 


—  112  — 

Russian  Government  has  forbidden  to  put  the  White  Eagle, 
which  is  the  national  emblem  of  Poland,  on  the  flags  of  the 
Legion  that  Russia  attempted  to  organize  in  Warsaw,  and 
even  Polish  national  anthems  were  sternly  prohibited  by 
the  police.*  While  this  was  going  on  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment abolished  autonomy  in  Eastern  Galicia  which  was 
then  occupied  by  the  Russian  armies  and  began  to  proceed 
with  the  russification  of  this  province. 

Eastern  Galicia  never  formed  a  part  of  Russia  and 
belonged  to  Poland  ever  since  1340.  From  the  ethnograph- 
ical point  of  view  it  has  a  mixed  population  the  majority 
of  which  is  Ruthenian  in  the  eastern  district  of  the  said 
province.  This,  however,  does  not  justify  at  all  Russian 
imperialism.  The  Ruthenians  and  the  Russians  have  just 
as  much  in  common  as  the  Belgian  Walons  have  with  France 
or  the  Belgian  Flamands  with  Holland.  Does  this  entitle 
France  or  Holland  to  annex  Belgium?  The  imperialism 
of  Russia,  however,  did  not  possess  any  nationalistic  scru- 
ples in  spite  of  the  fact  that  international  law  does  not 
permit  a  legal  annexation  of  an  occupied  territory.  Count 
Bobrinski,  the  Russian  Governor  of  Eastern  Galicia,  de- 
clared right  upon  his  arrival  in  Lemberg  that  he  "shall 
introduce  here  the  Russian  language,  Russian  law,  the  Rus- 
sian state  administration,"  and  that  "the  Polish  Diet  shall 
not  be  convoked."t  In  consequence  thereof  the  Polish 
university  as  well  as  all  educational  institutions,  both  Polish 
and  Ruthenian,  were  closed  at  once.  Every  possible  auton- 
omy has  been  abolished  at  once  and  instead  the  Russian 
despotic  and  anti-democratic  system  of  government  was 
introduced.  Tshichatshef,  who  advocated  the  separation  of 
the  province  of  Kholm  from  Russian-Poland,  in  the  Russian 

*  "Nowa  Gazeta,"  Warsaw,  November  ii,  1914. 
t  "For  a  Lasting  Peace,"  page  23. 


—  113  — 

Duma  has  with  a  knowledge  of  the  Russian  Government 
outlined  a  plan  for  colonizing  Galicia  with  Russian  Orth- 
odox peasants.*  Only  the  defeat  of  the  Russian  armies 
and  the  liberation  of  Lemberg  has  saved  Galicia  from  the 
activity  of  the  Russian  "Bank  wtoscianski"  which  distin- 
guishes itself  from  the  Prussian  Commission  of  Coloniza- 
tion only  by  the  fact  of  being  older.  -  Besides  religious  tol- 
erance was  abolished  and  the  Greek  Orthodox  religion  was 
introduced  forcibly.  The  Greek  Catholic  Church  which  for 
centuries  was  united  with  the  Roman  Church  was  slated  as 
a  victim.  And  Russia  attempted  to  introduce  religious  per- 
secution into  Eastern  Galicia  after  having  already  made  a 
bloody  debut  of  a  similar  action  in  the  province  of  Kholm, 
in  Lithuania  and  in  the  Ukraina.  History,  however,  has 
already  passed  a  sentence  on  this  action  of  Russia  by  say- 
ing as  follows:  "In  Poland's  ancient  provinces,  inhabited 
by  the  united  Greeks,  the  government  obliged  the  people  to 
sign  addresses  to  the  Czar,  asking  him  for  the  restoration 
of  the  Orthodox  religion.  Those  who  refused  to  sign  were 
put  into  prison  or  deported.f  The  culminating  point  of 
the  Russian  method  of  converting  to  the  Orthodox  religion, 
was  the  year  1875.  In  Kroze  few  volleys  had  been  fired 
into  praying  crowds  of  Greek  Catholic  worshipers,  and  in 
other  parts  of  Russian- Poland  thousands  of  people  were 
deported  to  Siberia,  and  thus  the  Greek  Catholic  Church 
has  been  destroyed  in  Eastern  Poland.  At  once  after  the 
temporary  occupation  of  Lemberg  by  the  Russian  armies  the 
Russian  Bishop  Eulogius  came  on  a  similar  mission  to  East- 
ern Galicia.  His  action  has  soon  manifested  itself.  The 
"Russkij  InwaHd"  published  in  January,  1915,  the  news  that 
Bishop  Eulogius  had  submitted  to  the  Holy  Synod  in  Petro- 

*  "Nowoje  Wremia,"  Petrograd,  April  15, 1915. 

t  M.  Seignobos :    "Contemporary  History,"  1910,  page  422, 


—  114  — 

grad  a  report  in  which  he  insisted  upon  "abolishing  in 
Gahcia  of  the  spiritual  Greek  CathoHc  hierarchy  because 
the  Russian  law  does  not  recognize  the  Greek  Catholic 
Church."* 

Sapienti  sat. 

"Slavic  brotherhood  and  Hberating  the  Poles  from  Prus- 
sian oppression"  proved  in  practice  to  be  nothing  else  but 
introducing  of  Russian  oppression  into  autonomous  Gahcia 
which  was  the  last  refuge  of  free  Polish  thought.  The  zeal 
of  Russia  in  this  direction  unfortunately  proved  to  be  a 
universal  one.  No  voice  of  protest  was  raised  by  anybody 
in  Russia  and  once  more  voices  became  loud  suggesting  the 
exclusion  of  the  Polish  question  from  the' questions  to  be 
decided  by  the  future  peace  congress.  The  Russian  reac- 
tionary party  as  well  as  the  progressive  party  joined 
hands  in  order  to  prevent  the  Polish  question  to  become 
something  else  than  "an  internal  problem  of  Slavdom," 
which  in  practice  meant  nothing  else  but  an  internal  problem 
of  the  Russian  Government.  It  is  useless  to  speak  about  the 
reactionary  party  because  its  feelings  toward  Poland  were 
only  too  well  known.  It  was  more  painful  that  even  Briant- 
shaninov,  a  truly  liberal  Russian  politician  agreed  with  the 
reactionary  party  that  "Europe  should  under  no  circum- 
stances take  any  part  in  the  settlement  of  the  mutual 
relations  between  Russia  and  Poland. "f  The  progressive 
"Utro  Rossi ji"  went  still  further,  and  considered  the  sug- 
gestions of  turning  over  the  Polish  question  for  settlement 
to  England,  France  and  Russia,  even  with  exclusion  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Germany,  as  "illegal  and  criminal,"  be- 
cause the  organization  of  future  Poland  "does  not  of  right 


*  "Goniec,"  Warsaw,  January  17,  1915. 

t  "Kurjer  poranny,"  Warsaw,  March  11, 1915. 


—  115  — 

rest  with  any  congresses  at  all."*  Anybody,  however,  who 
would  suggest  that  the  fate  of  Poland  should  not  depend 
upon  the  mercy  of  the  victor  was  threatened  with  deporta- 
tion to  Siberia. 

Independence  can  either  be  an  absolute  one  or  can  ac- 
quire the  form  of  a  state  within  a  state,  as  such  is  the  case 
with  Hungary  or  with  Bavaria.  Russia  is  opposed  to  such 
either  form  of  independence  as  far  as  Poland  is  concerned. 
Russia  is  afraid  of  an  absolute  independence  of  Poland  be- 
cause such  an  independence  of  Poland  would  keep  Russia 
away  from  Central  Europe  and  would  stop  Russia's  pressure 
on  the  road  leading  through  Vienna  to  Constantinople. 
Russia  is  furthermore  afraid  of  Poland  as  a  state  within  the 
state  under  the  domination  of  Russia  because  the  freedom 
of  Poland  could  turn  out  to  be  contagious  for  Russia  herself 
and  particularly  for  Finland  and  the  Caucasus.  The  free- 
dom of  Poland  is  a  danger  to  reactionary  government  and  to 
despotism.  The  fear  of  progress  prompted  Russia  to  prom- 
ise Poland  in  the  present  war  nothing  else  but  autonomy, 
administrative  and  not  legislative  at  that. 

The  Russian  plan  with  regard  to  Poland  created  an 
impression  in  Western  Europe  and  particularly  in  America, 
because  it  has  promised  the  uniting  of  the  entire  Poland 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar.  The  Russian  plan  has  thus 
promised  one  yoke  instead  of  three  and  has  thus  apparently 
simplified  matters.  All  these  beautiful  phrases,  however, 
concealed  a  truly  Byzantinic  perfidy.  Poland  has  ethno- 
graphical as  well  as  political  boundaries:  the  first  ones  are 
boundaries  of  actual  settlement  while  the  other  ones  are 
boundaries  of  the  Polish  State  which  has  ceased  to  exist. 
Russia  decided  to  apply  to  the  eastern  portion  of  Poland 
the  ethnographical  principle  and  to  the  western  portion  of 

*  "Goniec  wieczorny,"  Warsaw,  January  7,  191 5. 


— 116  — 

Poland  the  historical  principle.  Acting  on  this  basis  Russia 
has  separated  before  the  war  the  province  of  Kholm  from 
Russian-Poland,  and  during  the  war,  Eastern  Galicia  from 
Austrian-Poland,  whereby  she  assumed  the  point  of  view 
that  the  territory  settled  by  the  Ruthenians  in  Galicia 
reaches  as  far  as  the  upper  course  of  the  Dunajec.  In  con- 
tradiction with  the  historical  fact  that  neither  the  province 
of  Kholm  nor  Eastern  Galicia  have  ever  formed  a  part  of 
the  Russian  State,  and  in  contradiction  with  the  ethno- 
graphical fact  that  the  Ruthenians  are  not  Russians,  Russia 
considered  the  province  of  Kholm  and  Galicia  as  far  as  the 
course  of  the  upper  Dunajec  as  Russian  territory  and  en- 
deavored to  eliminate  them  from  Polish  influence.  This 
meant  nothing  else  but  cutting  slices  away  from  Poland 
in  the  east  promising  at  the  same  time  to  extend  the  boun- 
daries in  the  west.  For  Kholm,  Lemberg,  Przemysl,  and 
Nowy  S%cz  Russia  promised  to  Poland,  Cracow,  Silesia, 
Posen,  Danzig,  and  Koenigsburg.  Cracow  used  to  be  the 
crowning  place  of  the  Polish  Kings,  Posen  was  the  cradle  of 
Poland,  Danzig  was  Poland's  harbor  on  the  Baltic  Sea, 
Silesia  fell  apart  from  Poland  even  before  the  end  of  the 
Middle  Ages  and  was  not  a  part  of  Poland  at  the  time  of 
Poland's  partitions,  while  Koenigsburg  was  the  capital  of  a 
feudal  principality  of  Poland  and  not  the  capital  of  a  Polish 
province.  Koenigsburg  was  the  capital  of  East  Prussia 
which  was  built  up  in  the  Middle  Ages  by  the  Teutonic 
Knights  during  their  wars  against  Slav  tribes.  The  program 
of  Russia  in  the  west  agreed,  therefore,  with  the  historical 
traditions  of  Poland  and  not  with  the  ethnographical  con- 
siderations. This  program  apparently  flattered  the  Polish 
national  pride  but  in  outlining  this  program  Russia  was 
prompted  by  different  and  very  selfish  reasons.  The  boun- 
daries of  historical  Poland  agree  with  the  boundaries  needed 


—  117  — 

by  Russian  strategical  considerations  on  Russia's  western 
frontier.  These  considerations  form  the  question  of  the 
Vistula  line  of  defence.  The  uniting  of  Polish  territories 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar  would  solve  very  advantage- 
ously for  Russia  the  paradox  of  the  Vistula,  which  before 
the  war  passed  through  three  different  states.  By  uniting 
Poland  the  Vistula  would  become  an  internal  river  of  the 
Russian  Empire  and  the  frontier  would  move  west  as  far 
as  the  upper  Oder.  In  the  first  year  of  this  war  the  Russian 
press  has  on  different  occasions  stated  quite  plainly  that 
strategical  considerations  are  pushing  Russia  as  far  west  as 
Frankfort  on  the  Oder. 

The  forcible  pushing  of  the  frontier  of  future  Poland 
in  the  westerly  direction,  and  at  the  same  time  cutting  off  the 
genuine  Polish  soil  in  its  eastern  part,  raises  the  relative  per 
cent,  of  the  German  element  in  Poland  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  native  element.  Eastern  Prussia  is  inhabited  by 
2,064,175  people,  but  there  are  only  16  per  cent,  of  Poles. 
Eastern  Prussia  never  was  a  Polish  province,  but  only  a 
principality  held  in  feudal  tenure.  In  Western  Prussia  the 
population  numbers  1,703,477,  but  the  per  cent,  of  Poles  is 
35,  especially  so  on  both  banks  of  the  Vistula  River  which 
used  to  be  a  road  to  the  sea  at  the  time  of  the  Polish  kingdom. 
The  Province  of  Posen,  the  cradle  of  the  Polish  state,  has 
2,099,831  people,  and  in  this  number  there  are  only  765,000 
Germans.  The  lower,  middle  and  upper  Silesias  are  in- 
habited by  5,225,962  people.  Poles  inhabit  mostly  upper 
Silesia,  their  number  being  1,158,789.  All  of  these  provinces 
constitute  the  so-called  Prussian  part  of  former  Poland, 
lost  by  Poland  at  the  time  of  her  partition,  or  before  it,  as 
it  was  the  case  with  Silesia  and  Eastern  Prussia.  The  Polish 
population  on  this  entire  area  numbers  3,646,446.  The 
German  population  in  both  Eastern  and  Western  Prussia  -s 


—  118  — 

2,922,699;  in  the  Province  of  Posen,  765,000;  in  Silesia 
4,067,173,  totaling  7,754,822.  Consequently  there  are  here 
twice  as  many  Germans  as  Poles.*  The  cause  of  this  pre- 
ponderance of  German  element  is  the  fact  that  Silesia  and 
Eastern  Prussia  were  undergoing  a  process  of  Germaniza- 
tion  still  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  they  did  not  belong  to 
Poland  at  the  time  of  her  partition.  The  Russian  plans  to 
make  the  Vistula  an  internal  river  of  the  Russian  empire  en- 
dangerji  the  Polish  ethnographical  interests,  since  they  in- 
troduce too  large  a  percentage  of  Germans  into  the  Polish 
organism. 

When  the  ethnographical  data  of  Russian- Poland,  West- 
ern Galicia  and  of  Prussian-Poland,  which  provinces  Russia 
promised  to  reunite,  are  compared,  the  danger  becomes  very 
evident.  The  population  of  Russian-Poland  is  12,467,300, 
of  which  Poles  number  9,115,220;  Germans,  618,590;  Jews, 
1,660,490.  The  population  of  Galicia  is  8,025,675,  Poles 
claim  4,000,000,  Ruthenians  3,674,000  and  Germans  212,000. 
Russia  intends  to  annex  Eastern  Galicia  up  to  the  line  of 
the  lower  San,  lower  Wislock,  and  upper  Dunajec.  In  other 
words,  for  the  "United  Poland"  there  would  be  left  only  two 
"governments,"  that  of  Cracow  and  that  of  Tarnow.  In 
doing  this  Russia  separates  ethnographically  about  2,500,000 
Poles  in  the  middle,  and  Eastern  Galicia  and  leaves  them  a 
prey  to  russification.  This  plan  allows  "United  Poland" 
only  1,500,000  Poles  out  of  Galicia.  The  ethnographical 
aspect  of  Poland  thus  "United"  would  be  as  follows : 

Russian-Poland 9,115,220  Poles 

Western  Galicia 1,500,000       " 

Polish    provinces    retaken    from 

Prussia 3,646,446       " 

Total 14,261,666  Poles 

♦According  to  "The  New  International  Yearbook,"  New  York, 
1914,  and  according  to  Polish  statistics. 


—  119  — 

The  number  of  Germans  on  the  same  area  would  be : 

(1)  In  the  parts  retaken  from  Prussia,  7,754,822  people 
if  Silesia  and  Eastern  Prussia  would  also  be  united  with 
Poland. 

(2)  In  Russian-Poland,  together  with  the  Jews,  2,279,080. 

(3)  In  Western  Galicia  212,000,  and  together  with  those 
Jews  who  do  not  claim  to  be  Poles,  about  500,000. 

The  total  number  of  Germans  and  Jews  in  Poland  "Re- 
united," according  to  the  Russian  prescription,  would  be 
10,533,902. 

It  is  plain  now  that  such  a  plan  only  furthers  German 
interests  if  the  historical  frontiers  of  Poland  are  extended 
in  the  westerly  direction,  while  at  the  same  time  its  eastern 
possessions  are  separated  from  it.  The  Jewish  jargon  is 
only  a  corrupted  German,  and  the  Jews  were  always  in 
middle  Europe,  and  especially  in  Poland,  the  vanguard  of 
Teutonism.  In  defining  the  boundaries  of  Poland,  and  using 
the  ethnographical  key  in  the  east,  and  the  historical  key  in 
the  west,  Russia  would  create  an  ethnographical  paradox,  a 
state  with  a  mixed  population,  where  sooner  or  later  a  serious 
internal  strife  would  be  bound  to  arise.  That  is  what  Russia 
is  aiming  at,  since  then  the  Russian  government  would  play 
the  part  of  a  peacemaker.  The  national  strifes  would  render 
the  normal  development  of  the  autonomy  impossible,  and 
would  soon  enable  Russia  to  retake  the  power  to  Petrograd. 
The  life*  of  the  promised  autonomy  would  be  a  short  one  and 
the  triumph  of  despotism  early. 

It  is  hard  to  assume  that  Europe  would  permit  of  the 
strategical  occupation  by  Russia  of  the  upper  Oder  River. 
Practically  this  is  the  only  plan  of  occupation  of  the  upper 
Silesia  and  perhaps  of  small  parts  of  the  middle  and  lower 
Silesia.  Under  these  circumstances  the  number  of  Germans 
within   the   boundaries  of   Poland   "United"   by   Russians 


— 120  — 

would  be  lower,  but  the  ratio  would  be  at  any  rate  that 
of  eight  Germans  and  Jews,  to  fourteen  Poles.  This 
is  entirely  too  large  a  ratio  to  reflect  favorably  on  the  in- 
ternal conditions  of  the  future  state.  The  Germans  consti- 
tute a  rich,  capable  and  aggressive  element.  The  Jews  are 
by  no  means  inferior  to  them  as  far  as  aggressiveness  is 
concerned,  and  they  represented  always,  with  their  culture 
and  language,  the  vanguard  of  Germanism  in  middle  Europe. 
Both  of  them  possess  enormous  financial  resources,  which 
they  would  throw  upon  Poland,  devastated  by  war,  in  order 
to  buy  out  the  land  and  seize  the  industry  with  the  help  of 
foreign  money.  Russia  never  hesitated  in  her  internal  af- 
fairs to  employ  the  Germans  against  the  Poles,  and  still  less 
would  she  hesitate  to  use  them  for  the  annihilation  of  auton- 
omy of  Poland  "United,"  under  the  Czar's  sceptre.  A  terri- 
fying picture  for  Poland!  It  is  by  no  means  an  empty 
phrase  that  the  Jewish  jargon  is  only  corrupted  German, 
and  that  the  Jews  were  and  still  are,  in  middle  Europe,  the 
vanguard  of  Germanism.  Jewish  journalists  frequently 
stated  that  the  Jewish  jargon  "belongs  to  the  great  family 
of  German  languages,  and  that  the  Jews,  despite  the  500 
years  spent  in  the  Slavic  environment,  preserved  the  German 
language,  and  even  to-day  belong  to  the  German  cultural 
stock."*  As  a  consequence  many  of  the  Jewish  leaders,  who, 
up  to  the  time  of  expulsion  of  Russians  from  Galicia,  wooed 
Russia,  now  look  up  to  the  favors  of  victorious  Berlin  that 
it  may  support  Jews  against  Poles,  since  the  Jews  form  in 
Poland  a  "German  cultural  island." 

There  was  a  sly  reservation  in  the  manifesto  in  which 
Nicolai  Nikolayevitsh  promised  Poland  reunion  and  auton- 
omy under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar — "There  is  but  one  thing 

*  Sonntagsblatt  der  "New  Yorker  Staatszeitung,"  i8,  7,  1915.   "Die 
osteuropaeische  Judenfrage  und  der  Krieg,"  by  Dr.  Malamed. 


— 121  — 

that  Russia  expects  from  you,  that  you  respect  the  rights 
of  those  nationalities  with  which  history  has  bound  you/' 
This  was  an  attempt  to  check-mate  the  future  of  Poland 
with  the  Jewish  question.  The  Jewish  press  of  the  whole 
world,  basing  itself  on  the  above  manifesto,  started  to  de- 
mand equal  national  rights  for  Jews  in*  Poland.  Russia  is 
known  all  over  for  her  antisemitic  feelings.  Up  to  the  latter 
days  of  this  war,  the  Jews  were  not  permitted  to  settle  in 
Russia  proper.  The  area  permitted  for  Jewish  settlement  is 
more  or  less  coincident  with  the  area  of  the  former  Kingdom 
of  Poland.  The  center  of  gravity  of  the  Jewish  question  was 
by  means  of  terrorism  and  pogroms  transferred  toward  the 
Vistula.  As  the  result  of  this  partial  policy  of  Petrograd, 
the  percentage  of  Jews  on  Polish  soil  rose  to  a  higher  degree 
than  anywhere  else.  In  Russian- Poland  the  Jews  constitute 
13.71  per  cent,  of  the  12,464,300  total  population.  In 
Lithuania  and  Polish-Ruthenia  the  percentage  is  somewhat 
higher.  It  is  an  artificial  result  of  the  antisemitic  policy  of 
the  Russian  government  which  routs  the  Jews  from  Russia 
proper  and  takes  "fatherly"  care  of  them  in  Poland.  The 
manifesto  of  Prince  Nikolai  struck  the  same  note,  although 
it  enveloped  it  discreetly  with  an  appeal  to  justice. 

The  public  opinion  in  Russia  saw  through  it  at  once. 
Prince  E.  Trubeckoi,  a  recognized  authority  in  Russian 
political  life,  published  an  address  in  which  he  expressed  his 
satisfaction  and  hope  that  Russia,  after  the  victory,  will  be 
able  to  solve  two  of  her  most  vexing  problems,  namely,  the 
Polish  and  Jewish  question.*  And  Milukoff,  the  leader  of 
the  Liberals  in  Russia,  pointed  out  very  clearly  the  parallel- 
ism of  both  questions  in  his  daring  statement  that  "the  coun- 
try across  the  Vistula  is  not  exclusively  inhabited  by  Poles, 
but  that  there  exists  another  nationality,  the  Jews,  who  have 

*  "Russkoje  Wiedomosti,"  lo,  31,  1914. 


—  122  — 

a  right  to  be  considered  as  a  separate  people,  though  being 
in  the  minority."*  The  same  Russia  which  could  not  afford 
to  grant  equal  civic  rights  to  the  Jews  wants  future  Poland 
to  grant  them  more,  namely,  the  recognition  of  separate  na- 
tional rights,  which  Jews  do  not  possess  anywhere  else  in 
Western  Europe,  and  in  America.  Both  the  philosemitic 
progressive  party  and  the  antisemitic  reactionary  party  joined 
hands  in  order  to  sustain  the  former  Russian  policy  toward 
the  Jews,  the  policy  which  can  only  bring  detriment  to  Po- 
land. Instead  of  abolishing  the  boundary  of  Jewish  settle- 
ment in  the  east,  and  granting  the  Jews  equal  civic  rights, 
Russia  wants  to  expand  the  area  of  their  settlement  to  the 
west  in  order  to  create  artificially  with  the  aid  of  Jews  and 
Germans  national  strife  on  the  Vistula,  and  be  able  to  abolish 
under  this  pretext  the  promised  autonomy.  Russia  wants  to 
create  Judeo-Poland  and  thus  facilitate  the  final  russification 
and  destruction  of  Poland. 

In  their  attitude  toward  the  Polish  question,  the  Jews 
joined  hands  with  Russia.  "The  Jewish  press  in  the  Polish 
provinces  welcomed  the  Polish  manifesto  with  almost  hys- 
terical enthusiasm."  The  Jewish  dailies  in  Warsaw  said 
editorially  that  the  Jews  "are  deeply  grateful  to  the  Russian 
commander-in-chief  because  in  his  manifesto  to  the  Poles 
he  did  not  forget  to  mention  the  other  nationalities  whose 
fate  is  bound  up  with  that  of  the  Poles,"  and  it  is  to  be  ex- 
pected "that,  in  accordance  with  the  manifesto,  the  Poles  will 
respect  the  rights  of  the  other  nationalities  within  their  pro- 
vinces."t  Even  in  America,  which  was  the  centre  of  the 
anti-Russian-Jewish  activity,  a  definite  change  can  be  ob- 
served. The  same  Jewish  press,  which  a  few  years  ago  tried 
to  influence  the  government  to  break  off  the  commercial 

*  'The  Globe,"  New  York,  March  i,  1915. 
t  "The  Day,"  February  18,  1915. 


— 133  — 

treaties  with  Russia,  is  now  elated  by  "Purishkewitsh,  the 
Black  Hundred  Leader  in  the  Duma,  having  kissed  the  scroll 
of  Torah."*  They  started  in  this  war  a  general  white- 
washing of  Russia  and  a  simultaneous  slandering  of  Poland, 
intimating  that  "the  pogrom  policy  abandoned  by  the  Russian 
government  was  taken  up  in  another  form  by  the  Poles  !"t 
A  whole  machinery  of  slander  and  impudent  lies  was  set  in 
motion  so  as  to  finish  up  the  unfortunate  nation  visited  by 
all  the  calamities  of  the  present  war. 

With  lies,  however,  one  cannot  go  far. 

The  note  of  the  Jewish  Bund  proved  beyond  doubt  that 
there  were  never  any  pogroms  in  Poland  arranged  by  Poles. 
In  December,  1914,  Mr.  Herman  Bernstein  publicly  an- 
nounced that  "the  Poles  resolved  to  methods  of  barbarism 
in  their  policy  of  Jew-hatred — their  hands  are  smeared  with 
the  blood  of  the  Jews  in  Poland ;  a  nation  of  pogrom-makers 
is  unworthy  of  independence."J  About  a  year  afterward, 
when  the  same  Mr.  Bernstein  returned  from  Europe,  he 
ceased  to  speak  about  the  ''Polish  pogroms,"  and  at  the  first 
interview  when  landing  on  the  continent  attested  that  "for 
their  military  defeat  on  the  battlefield,  the  Russian  authori- 
ties made  military  pogroms  against  their  own  peaceful  Jew- 
ish population. "§  The  main  argument  that  Poles  instigated 
Russian  soldiers  to  the  pogroms  is  puerile  and  ludicrous. 
Russia  having  in  her  record  Kishenieff,  Siedlce  and  Bialy- 
stok  does  not  need  any  instigation.  In  spite  of  that,  the 
Jewish  press  does  not  stop  flirting  with  Puriskewitsh,  al- 
though the  latter  is  a  deputy  from  Kishenieff,  and  endeavors 
to  direct  public  opinion  against  the  independence  of  Poland. 


*  "New  York  Sun,"  and  "The  Day,"  2,  i8, 1915. 

1 1.  c,  Bernstein  Herman. 

X  "The  Day,"  December  13, 1914. 

§  "The  New  York  Times,"  October  18, 191 5. 


— 124  — 

These  are  the  facts  which  show  plainly  that  the  Jews  aid  the 
Russian  project  of  solving  the  Polish  question  and  try  to 
subdue  the  independence  of  Poland.  The  Jews  themselves 
do  not  believe  in  any  change  in  Russia,  and  that  is  the  reason 
why  they  would  gladly  welcome  the  expansion  of  their  settle- 
ment in  the  westerly  direction  in  Poland,  remaining  at  the 
same  time  in  connection  with  Russia.  In  the  internal  politics 
they  would  be  certain  of  the  German  aid,  because  in  Poland 
the  Jews  are  always  the  vanguard  of  Germanism.  As  far  as 
commerce  is  concerned,  they  calculate  on  the  capture  of  the 
eastern  markets  in  Asia.  In  the  wake  of  the  Russian  sword, 
if  the  latter  were  capable  of  opening  the  gates  of  Constan- 
tinople, Jewish  money  would  pour  into  China  and  India 
where  it  would  displace  the  capital  of  the  Western  European 
nations  and  pave  the  way  for  the  Russian  army.  Thus  the 
Russian  imperialism  and  the  Jewish  commercial  expansion 
were  brought  close  together  in  the  present  war. 

Poland  was  always  friendly  to  Jews,  especially  the  demo- 
cratic, aspiring  Poland.  In  the  insurrection  of  1863  the 
Jew,  Wohl,  was  the  treasurer  of  the  national  government, 
and  the  banker,  Kronenberg,  was  one  of  the  important  per- 
sonages. Before  the  very  outbreak  of  the  uprising,  when 
the  Russian  soldiers  were  shooting  at  the  Polish  church 
procession  on  the  streets  of  Warsaw  as  it  emerged  from  the 
cathedral  of  St.  John,  the  cross  which  fell  from  the  hands 
of  a  Pole  shot  dead  by  a  Russian  soldier  was  picked  up  by 
a  Jew  and  the  demonstration  was  led  by  a  Jew.  It  was  only 
due  to  Russian  influence  that  the  friendly  relations  between 
Poles  and  Jews  were  brought  to  an  end.  Russophilism  and 
antisemitism  in  Poland  are  but  two  aspects  of  the  same  thing. 
Roman  Dmowski,  who  in  the  present  war  was  the  main- 
spring of  the  Russophilic  committee,  was,  before  the  war, 
the  leader  of  the  antisemitic  movement.    The  attitude  of  the 


—  125  — 

Jews  toward  the  Polish  cause  proved  to  be  identical  with 
that  of  the  Russophilic  antisemites  in  Warsaw.  Democratic 
Poland  fighting  for  her  liberty  is  just  as  Anti-Russian 
as  it  is  not,  and  never  was,  antisemitic.  This  question  has 
been  sifted  during  the  present  war  by  Prof.  Dr.  W.  L. 
Jaworski,  the  president  of  the  Polish  Supreme  National 
Committee : 

"Antisemitism,  no  matter  in  what  form  it  would  appear, 
might  bring  only  an  injury  to  our  national  interests.  The 
shortcomings  of  the  Polish  commerce  and  industry  can 
neither  be  removed  by  antisemitism  nor  by  national  dem- 
agogism;  they  could  be  removed  only  by  wide  reforms  that 
would  enable  them  to  establish  better  hygiene  of  the  inner 
social  and  economic  relations  in  general ;  that  would  raise 
the  standard  of  culture  among  the  wide  masses,  and  that 
would  offer  new  openings  for  new  fields  in  industry  and  for 
general  development. 

"Only  frank  and  decided  declaration  that  regenerated 
Poland  would  not  maintain  the  policy  of  antisemitism,  the 
policy  of  chicanery  and  persecution,  might  help  to  make 
Jews  better  citizens  on  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  it 
would  check  the  wide  anti- Polish  crusade  carried  on  now  by 
Jews  abroad.  Leaving  Russia  and  turning  to  Western 
Europe,  Poland  must  follow  the  example  given  by  the  coun- 
tries of  Western  Europe  in  solving  the  Jewish  question, 
namely,  Poland  must  gain  sympathy  of  Jews  by  granting 
them  equal  rights  of  citizens.  At  the  same  time,  we  must 
emphatically  demand  of  Jews  that  they  become  the  true 
citizens  of  the  country — that  they  act  for  the  interest  of  the 
country,  and  work  for  her  development.  This  end  could  be 
secured  only  by  giving  the  Jews  in  Poland  access  to  the 
sources  of  welfare  and  culture.  As  in  Western  Europe, 
Jews   have  become  either  good    Frenchmen,    Englishmen, 


— 126  — 

Italians  or  Germans,  so  we  have  the  right,  too,  to  demand  of 
our  Polish  Jews  to  become  good  Poles  and  be  real  good 
citizens  of  Poland." 

Poland  cannot  and  will  not  recognize  any  hyphenated 
Poles ! 

For  the  sake  of  historical  accuracy,  I  take  the  liberty  to 
assert  that  the  attack  of  the  Jewish  press  on  Poland,  not  only 
here  in  America,  but  also  all  over  the  world,  was  made  sud- 
denly and  without  any  endeavor  on  the  part  of  the  Jews  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Polish  Supreme  Na- 
tional Committee  regarding  the  policy  of  future  Poland  on 
the  Jewish  question.  The  enmity  of  the  Jews  against  the 
Poles  plainly  manifested  itself  in  this  country  of  free  speech 
and  free  press,  by  the  failure  to  insert  vindications  of  the 
Poles  against  a  wave  of  calumnies  thrown  at  the  Polish  na- 
tion, the  first  step  being  made  by  George  Brandes,  who  wrote 
an  open  and  most  unjust  letter.  Jewish  nationalists  were 
very  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  Poland,  not  being  anti- 
semitic  in  general  as  a  nation,  must,  however,  be  anti- 
zionistic  when  the  zionism  or  Jewish  nationalism  endeavors 
with  Russian  or  German  aid  to  create  the  Judeo-Poland. 

Those  who  think  that  the  Jewish  question  in  Poland  means 
an  antagonism  against  the  Jews  are  grossly  mistaken.  It  is 
something  entirely  different,  inasmuch  as  the  war  made  on 
the  Polish  nation  by  the  Jewish  nationalistic  party  all  over 
the  world  tends  to  obtain  for  the  Jews  in  Poland  not  the 
rights  of  equal  citizenship,  but  a  recognition  of  a  distinct  na- 
tional franchise  in  order  to  make  of  Poland  a  country  of 
mixed  nationality  and  thus  to  create,  with  the  help  of  Russia, 
a  precedent  for  the  revision  of  the  entire  Jewish  question  in 
Europe  and  possibly  also  in  America  in  the  near  future.  The 
following  quotation  may  serve  as  an  illustration :  "In  order 
that  Jews  may  be  assured  of  equality  in  civil  and  political 


—  127  — 

life  it  is  essential  that  they  be  accorded  recognition  as  a  na- 
tional group  in  Poland,"  and  "it  is  hardly  probable  that  any 
sensible  Jew  will  object  to  the  Jewish  demand  for  equal 
recognition  with  the  Ruthenians,  the  Czechs,  the  Slavs  of 
the  Austrian  Empire."* 

The  attitude  of  the  whole  world  toward  the  Jewish  ques- 
tion can  be  expressed  by  the  formula  of  the  French  revolu- 
tion: *'The  Jews  as  a  nation  should  be  deprived  of  every- 
thing, but  the  Jews  as  men  should  be  assured  of  every- 
thing."f  This  is  the  principle  of  equal  civic  rights  for  Jews 
without  granting  them  separate  national  rights.  Contrary  to 
this,  the  Jews  demand  in  future  Poland  equal  recognition  for 
their  jargon  as  a  national  tongue.  Even  Western  Europe 
has  not  as  yet  grown  up  to  the  national  concubinage,  and 
Poland  is  still  less  ready  to  outdo  the  whole  world  in  the 
Jewish  question.  Jewish  nationalism  does  not  lie  within  the 
practical  political  demands.  Natura  non  facit  saltus.  The 
development  of  democracy  in  Europe  must  at  first  separate 
the  idea  of  national  consciousness  from  the  idea  of  owning 
the  soil.  Only  then  will  it  be  possible  for  a  nation  to  exist 
within  a  nation.  At  present  the  whole  world  stands  on  the 
basis  of  the  principle  of  the  French  revolution,  and  Poland, 
being  in  the  throes  of  this  terrible  war,  cannot  indulge  in 
risky  experiments. 

Russia  understands  that  in  case  of  her  eventual  victory 
over  the  Germans,  there  will  come  a  time  when  the  Germans 
will  start  the  war  of  retaliation — no  matter  what  key  Russia  is 
going  to  use  in  making  the  frontiers  of  the  "United  Poland." 
Both  the  ethnographical  and  the  historical  keys  bring  Russia 
closer  to  Berlin.  The  victory  of  Russia  would  not  weaken 
Germany  as  much  as  it  would  weaken  Prussia  within  the 

*  "Dos  Yidische  Folk,"  New  York,  November  12, 1915. 
t  Clermon  Tonners,  21, 12, 1789,  in  the  National  Assembly. 


—  128  — 

German  empire.  Prussia  cannot  submit  to  this  weakening 
for  any  length  of  time  and  she  will  not  lack  means  and 
cleverness  to  draw  the  German  empire  into  her  plans  of 
revenge.  Russia  must  take  into  account  that  the  German  war 
of  revenge  in  the  east  will  have  the  support  of  England, 
since  England  is  the  enemy  of  German  ambitions  on  the  sea 
and  in  colonial  enterprises,  but  she  is  not  Germany's  rival  on 
land,  and  especially  not  in  Eastern  Europe.  England,  after 
having  defeated  Germany  on  the  sea,  and  having  ousted  the 
Germans  from  Belgium,  will  gladly  attack  the  victorious 
Russia  with  German  hands  on  the  first  occasion,  so  as  not 
to  permit  the  excessive  overgrowth  of  Russia.  These  are 
the  factors  which  guide  Russia's  policy  in  Poland  in  the 
present  war.  Russia  must,  due  to  her  aggressive  traditions, 
gravitate  toward  the  Oder,  and  the  road  to  the  Oder  leads 
over  the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  Carpathian  Mountains.  This 
tendency  is  couched  in  Russian  diplomatic  language  in  the 
phrase — "Uniting  Poland  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Czar." 
In  reality  it  means  the  securing  of  her  eventual  western 
frontiers,  in  order  to  make  the  best  use  of  her  numerical 
superiority  in  the  future  inevitable  retaliatory  war  with 
Germany  and  Austria.  Politically  the  Russian  plan  tries  to 
poison  Poland  with  an  excess  of  Germans  and  Jews,  which 
process  would  facilitate  the  digestion  of  the  occupied  terri- 
tories and  absolute  conquest  of  the  Vistula. 

The  game  has  been  going  on  for  a  year. 

There  was  no  greater  strategical  mistake  on  the  part  of 
Russia  than  her  victory  over  Hindenburg  at  Warsaw.  Hin- 
denburg's  offensive  was  merely  a  strategical  provocation  to 
draw  the  centrum  of  the  Russian  army  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Vistula,  and  then  to  threaten  with  flank  attacks  both 
Russian  wings,  and  not  permitting  any  movement  westward 
for  fear  of  losing  the  lines  of  communication.    The  defence 


— 129  — 

of  Warsaw  was  the  beginning  of  the  defeat  of  Russia  on  the 
Vistula.  The  paradox  of  the  Vistula,  Austria  holding  the 
upper  course,  Russia  the  middle,  and  Germany  the  lower, 
proved  its  inherent  danger.  The  strategical  road  toward  the 
west  does  not  run  through  Warsaw  so  long  as  Cracow  and 
Panzig  do  not  belong  to  the  aggressor.  Dragomirow,  Hurko 
and  Kuropatkin  were  right  in  advising  Russia  to  follow 
Kutuzow's  plan  which  originated  in  his  combat  with  Napo- 
leon. With  the  Mazurian  Lakes  in  the  north  and  the  Car- 
pathian passes  in  the  south,  endangering  both  wings  of  the 
Russian  army,  Russia  cannot  attack  successfully  either 
Vienna  or  Berlin.  The  Russian  offensive  movement  through 
Warsaw  forces  the  Russian  army  to  assume  an  arched  posi- 
tion, with  the  center  directed  toward  the  west  and  both 
flanks  running  backwards,  one  along  the  Mazurian  Lakes 
and  the  other  along  the  Carpathian  Mountains.  Such  a 
strategical  position  is  synonymous  with  defeat.  With  Poland 
divided  into  three  parts  and  the  strategical  difficulty  of  the 
Vistula  created  thereby,  the  only  way  for  Russia  to  victory 
is  to  follow  Kutuzow's  method  and  retire  beyond  the  Niemen 
and  Bug  rivers.  Strategically  it  means  the  evacuation  of 
Russian-Poland  in  the  first  period  of  the  war.  Politically  it 
signifies  the  superfluity  of  Russian-Poland  for  Russia.  The 
Russian  rule  over  Poland  has  no  political,  no  historical,  no 
moral  basis,  not  even  a  strategical  one.  For  Poland  it  means 
injury,  for  Russia  it  means  an  unnecessary  burden  of  false 
imperialism.  History  administered  justice  to  Russia  by  her 
terrible  defeat,  and  gave  her  warning  for  the  future.  Only 
an  independent  Poland  can  solve  easily  the  strategical  diffi- 
culty of  the  Vistula. 

The  independence  of  Poland  has  not  only  a  historical 
foundation,  but  also  a  strategical  one.'  The  partition  of 
Poland  renders  the  Russian  offensive  westward  impossible. 


— 130  — 

In  the  present  condition  of  Poland,  the  road  to  Vienna  or 
Berlin  does  not  lead  through  Warsaw;  on  the  contrary, 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  dominate  the  Russian  line  of 
fortresses  of  Warsaw,  Deblin*  and  Modlin,t  as  long  as  they 
possess  the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  the  Carpathian  Mountains, 
while  the  road  toward  the  east  is  open  for  them.  This  is  the 
fundamental  contrast  in  the  strategical  interests  of  Germany 
and  Austria  on  one  side,  and  Russia  on  the  other.  This 
contrast  can  only  be  removed  by  the  independence  of  Poland. 
Let  us  assume  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  Poland  will  be 
restored  after  the  present  war.  In  the  future  war  of  retalia- 
tion, Poland  by  the  power  of  her  existence  only  will  defend 
Russia  against  an  out-flanking  movement  from  the  side  of 
the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  Carpathian  Mountains.  Poland 
remaining  neutral,  the  territory  about  the  middle  of  the 
Vistula  cannot  be  made  the  field  of  military  operations.  It 
is  hardly  conceivable,  however,  that  Poland  could  stay  neu- 
tral in  such  a  war.  It  will  be  the  war  for  the  possession  of 
the  Vistula  line!  If  we  assume  that  Poland  would  turn 
against  Russia,  then  the  line  of  conflict  will  be  formed  by 
the  rivers  Niemen,  Bug  and  Dniester.  In  other  words,  Rus- 
sia will  be  free  from  danger  of  flank  attacks  upon  her  wings 
and  will  have  the  possibility  of  the  frontal  attack  in  the 
westerly  direction.  In  case  Poland  would  turn  against 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  Warsaw  would  be  in  danger 
of  a  flanking  attack  from  the  side  of  the  Mazurian  Lakes 
and  Carpathian  Mountains,  which  fact  equalizes  in  favor  of 
Germany  and  Austria  the  numerical  superiority  of  Russia. 
The  new  partition  of  Poland  between  Austria  and  Germany 
will  deprive  them  of  the  possibility  of  the  flanking  move- 
ment, since  it  will  not  restore  Poland  but  only  remove  Russia 

*  Ivangorod. 

t  Novo-Georgievsk. 


— 131  — 

from  Warsaw.  This  will  only  be  favorable  for  Russia, 
since  it  will  facilitate  her  eventual  frontal  attack  on  the 
whole  line,  leaving  her  flanks  secure  in  a  good  strategical 
position.  Only  the  neutrality  of  independent  Poland  may 
be  a  factor  for  insuring  a  permanent  peace,  since  it  will 
render  difficult  the  Russian  offensive  toward  the  west,  as 
well  as  that  of  Austria  and  Germany  toward  the  east.  Be- 
sides this,  a  line  of  Polish  fortresses  on  the  Niemen,  Bug 
and  Dniester  would  also  materially  assist  in  guaranteeing 
peace. 

There  is  a  difference  in  power  a  free  nation  can  display 
from  that  of  an  enslaved  nation.  The  free  and  independent 
Poland  will  soon  become  the  center  of  Slavic  creative  power 
in  harmony  with  the  interests  of  Western  Europe,  and  with- 
out political  Russophilism.  Poland  even  now  neutralizes 
the  Russian  influence  in  the  Slavic  world,  since  she  is  an 
older  historical  unit  than  Russia.  The  Balkan  states  are 
free,  but  their  civilization  is  inferior  to  that  of  Russia  and 
that  is  why  the  Balkans  are  such  favorable  soil  for  Russian 
political  propaganda.  The  equilibrium  of  Europe  can  only 
be  maintained  by  the  division  of  the  Slavic  world.  In  War- 
saw, the  Roman  cross  and  the  traditions  of  Rome ;  in  Mos- 
cow, and  on  the  Dnieper,  the  cross  and  the  traditions  of 
Constantinople.  This  does  not  mean  the  separation  of  two 
religious  systems  only.  Two  different  cultures,  sympathies, 
arts,  and  finally,  two  different  forms  of  political  law  should 
be  separated  from  each  other.  Constantinople  was  the 
breeding  place  of  the  Caesarian  despotism;  Rome,  on  the 
other  side,  due  to  the  strife  between  the  Papacy  and  the 
Roman  emperors,  was  the  source  of  the  emancipation  of 
states  and  nations  and  in  the  last  instance  of  the  citizen.  All 
these  factors  constitute  the  boundary  line  between  the  civil- 
ization of  Western  Europe  and  that  of  Russia.     Poland  al- 


—  132  — 

ways  was  the  vanguard  of  the  west.  Poland  was  the  father- 
land of  Copernicus,  "who  stopped  the  sun  in  its  course." 
The  investigation  of  Birkenmajer  in  the  archives  of  Stock- 
holm settled  finally  the  nationality  of  Copernicus  in  favor 
of  Poland.*  The  system  of  Copernicus  forms  the  basis  of 
the  modern  conception  of  the  universe.  If  it  had  not  been 
for  Copernicus,  Newton  could  not  have  accomplished  his 
work  or  he  would  have  to  be  Copernicus  first.  The  physics 
of  Gallileo  is  also  the  echo  of  the  work  of  Copernicus.  Po- 
land had  no  freedom  for  the  last  hundred  years.  Oppres- 
sion restrained  the  Polish  schools  and  made  it  very  difficult 
for  the  Polish  nation  to  participate  in  the  great  work  of 
civilization.  Illiteracy  and  misery  are  set  loose  in  Poland 
and  have  all  the  prospects  of  unlimited  development  which 
is  denied  to  science  and  enterprise.  Poland  is  not  permitted 
to  study  and  work.  Such  is  the  curse  of  life  in  slavery! 
The  Polish  creative  genius  could  not,  however,  be  sup- 
pressed. Chopin's  music  and  Mickiewicz's  poetry  already 
after  the  downfall  of  Poland  became  the  common  spiritual 
good  of  the  whole  world.  Sienkiewicz  and  Curie- Sklodowski 
won  Nobel  prizes.  In  the  scientific  circles  of  the  world 
are  known  the  names  of  Smoluchowski,  Raciborski,  March- 
lewski,  Godlewski,  Morozewicz,  Romer,  Abramowski,  Roz- 
wadowski,  Zaremba,  Olszewski,  Kostanecki,  Ochorowicz, 
and  numerous  others.  That  is  the  achievement  of  a  nation 
of  20,000,000  people  and  possessing  but  two  universities, 
one  in  Cracow  and  one  in  Lemberg.  As  soon  as  the  Russian 
army  occupied  Lemberg,  one  of  the  first  steps  taken  was  the 
closing  of  the  Polish  University.  Warsaw,  a  Western  Euro- 
pean city  in  the  real  sense  of  the  word,  in  tradition  and  cul- 
ture, a  city  numbering  about  1,000,000  inhabitants,  the 
capital  city  of  20,000,000  people,  having  a  glorious  and  great 

*  Expedition  of  Cracow's  Academy  of  Sciences. 


—  133  — 

history,  did  not  possess  a  university !  This  was  a  fact  which 
humiliated  western  civilization,  and  for  this  civilization  in 
general  has  to  be  thankful  to  Russia,  which  proclaimed  in 
this  way  the  "Slavic  Brotherhood"  on  the  Vistula.  Liberty 
will  stimulate  the  Polish  genius  and  this  will  enrich  the  world 
with  new  elements,  and  the  Polish  nation  will  regain  the 
power  to  "play  the  part  in  Europe  to  which  it  is  entitled  by 
its  numbers,  its  culture,  and  its  genius."* 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  recognized  and  based  its  work 
upon  the  principle  of  legitimism.  It  was  the  conservative  idea 
contrary  to  all  the  achievements  of  the  Napoleonic  era. 
Legitimism  did  not  recognize  the  will  of  the  nation;  it  sup- 
ported legitimate  authority,  especially  monarchy,  on  the 
grounds  of  hereditary  rights.  Belgium  was  returned  to  the 
Netherlands,  the  principality  of  Warsaw  was  annihilated, 
and  Italy  redivided.  This  cast  the  seeds  for  the  revolution 
in  Belgium,  and  the  still  more  sanguine  uprising  in  Poland. 
Italy  had  to  have  her  Garibaldi.  May  the  future  peace  con- 
gress not  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  Congress  in  Vienna! 
Russia  still  to-day  does  not  recognize  the  rights  of  nations 
in  practice,  placing  the  race  above  the  rights  of  a  nation,  a 
principle  very  much  inferior  to  the  principle  of  legitimism. 
To  Poland  Russia  promises  autonomy  in  internal  adminis- 
tration. This  is  less  than  the  Congress  of  Vienna  did,  and 
which  transformed  the  principality  of  Warsaw  into  a  state 
within  a  state  and  did  not  only  make  an  autonomic  province 
of  it.  Poland  hopes  that  if  ever  a  future  congress  should 
not  make  it  a  sovereign  state,  it  will  at  least  deal  with  her 
according  to  the  Vienna  treaties,  and  will  not  allow  ap- 
proaching the  Polish  problem  on  the  basis  of  the  manifesto 
1^      of  Duke  Nikolas.    The  Congress  of  Vienna,  although  taking 

*"The  Manchester  Guardian,"  19,  12,  1915.— "The  New  Poland," 
by  Bruce  Boswell,  of  Liverpool  University. 


—  134  — 

the  principle  of  legitimism  as  the  point  of  issue,  granted 
Poland  the  character  of  a  state  within  a  state;  a  separate 
diet,  an  army,  it  obliged  the  Russian  Czar  to  crown  himself 
Polish  King  in  Warsaw.  Will  the  future  congress,  which 
will  assemble  under  the  banner  of  freedom  for  nations,  have 
the  courage  to  step  below  this  principle  when  dealing  with 
the  Polish  question? 

The  attitude  of  Poles  as  a  nation  devoid  of  political  liberty 
was  determined  by  real  facts  and  not  by  sympathies : 

I. — Administrative  and  legislative  autonomy  existed  in 
Galicia  while  Russian  and  German  Poland  did  not 
enjoy  these  advantages. 
11. — Private  military  schools  could  only  be  established 
in  Galicia.  Consequently,  Polish  youths  from 
Russian  and  Prussian-Poland  went  to  Galicia 
since  in  the  former  two  provinces  any  military 
work  had  to  be  secretly  carried  on,  and,  conse- 
quently, not  very  effectively.  The  beginning  of 
this  political  system  dates  back  to  the  years  1876-8, 
when  with  the  unofficial  aid  of  England  an  up- 
rising against  Russia,  in  alliance  with  Austro- 
Hungary,  was  organized. 
III. — Only  in  Russian-Poland,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Vistula,  were  there  enough  recruits  for  the  Polish 
military  representation  in  the  case  of  European 
war,  since  Russia  had,  for  strategical  reasons,  to 
evacuate  the  western  governments  of  Russian 
Poland  with  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  this 
prevented  the  Russian  authorities  to  mobilize  in 
the  mining  and  industrial  districts  of  Russian- 
Poland. 
IV. — During  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  one  hundred 
years  ago,  England  entered  into  a  secret  treaty 


—  135  — 

with  France  and  Austria  against  Russia,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  Russia  was  a  faithful  ally  of  Eng- 
land in  her  war  against  Napoleon. 
V. — At  the  Congress  in  Vienna,  England  supported  the 
Polish  interests  against  Russia,  although  the  Pol- 
ish regiments  were  fighting  with  Napoleon  against 
England. 
VI. — Poland  wanted  and  could  form  a  military  repre- 
sentation only  against  Russia  and  in  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary.     That  it  was  practicable  was 
proven  by  the  development  of  the  Polish  legions 
in  Cracow  and  an  absolute  failure  of  Russian  en- 
deavors in  Warsaw  to  form  a  competitory  legion. 
VII. — Russia  occupies  80  per  cent,  of  the  historical 
Polish  territory,  and  Warsaw  is  the  capital  city 
of  Poland.     Under  these  conditions  the  war  of 
Austria  with  Prussia  in  1866  could  not,  and  did 
not  revive  the  Polish  question,  but  the  possibility 
of  war  between  Austria  and  Russia  was  always 
and  must  always  be  associated  with  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  Polish  uprising  against  Russia  and 
in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary. 
VIII. — The  military  interests  in  the  present  war  do  not 
coincide  with  the  political  interests,  consequently 
the  formation  of  the  Polish  legions  against  Rus- 
sia, and  in  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary,  does 
not  free  any  one  from  the  obligation  of  supporting 
the  Polish  independence. 
Poland  went  along  the  way  of  her  ratio  status  and  of 
practical  possibilities.     She  could  not  forget  for  a  moment 
that  Warsaw  is  not  Antwerp,  and  that  Warsaw  is  not  located 
in  front  of  London  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel.    Eng- 
land must  fight  in  order  to  support  Belgium,  but  England 


—  136  — 

may  limit  the  support  of  the  Polish  question  to  the  war  on 
paper.  The  Polish  uprising  in  1830  broke  out  when  Czar 
Nikolas  I,  in  the  name  of  the  reactionary  principle  of  legit- 
imism, wanted  to  send  the  Polish  army  to  Belgium  in  order 
to  crush  her  struggle  for  independence.  That  did  not  in- 
fluence England  in  the  following  year  to  save  Warsaw  from 
the  Russian  superior  forces,  although  it  was  Warsaw  which 
saved  Belgium.  The  blood  of  the  Polish  heroes  of  the  upris- 
ing of  1863  created  nothing  more  than  sympathy  in  Western 
Europe.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  obliged  not  only  Russia 
but  also  Prussia  to  respect  the  rights  of  the  Polish  nation. 
Prussia  at  the  time  of  Bismarck  adopted  the  anti-Polish 
policy  in  the  Province  of  Posen.  Bismarck  did  not  like  the 
sea,  so  England  preferred  to  keep  quiet  and  to  forget  diplo- 
matically the  treaty  of  Vienna.  On  November  9,  1896,  a 
Prussian  order  was  issued,  changing  the  Polish  flag  cf  the 
Province  of  Posen  and  substituting  it  with  the  Prussian 
colors.  On  February  10,  1897,  Minister  Von  der  Recke 
made  a  brutal  speech  in  the  Prussian  diet  defending  the 
above  order.  England  remained  silent;  still  worse,  she 
preferred  to  terrorize  France  in  her  Fashoda  dispute,  instead 
of  claiming  of  Berlin  the  observance  of  the  treaties  of 
Vienna  concerning  the  Polish  rights.  England  did  not  for- 
get her  treaties  with  Belgium,  but  alas,  how  soon  she  did 
forget  those  concerning  the  Polish  cause.  Nobody  enters 
war  for  someone  else's  pleasure;  nobody  sheds  the  blood  of 
his.  nation  for  the  other  people's  interests  only.  Such  is  the 
logic  and  truth  of  history.  Poland  understands  it,  but  she 
wants  also  other  nations  to  understand  her  position.  If 
those,  who  in  the  present  war  proclaimed  the  watchword  of 
the  independence  of  nations,  are  sincere,  Poland  hopes  that 
the  future  peace  congress  will  adopt  one  of  two  alternatives : 


—  137  — 

I. — Either  absolute  independence  of  Poland,  or 
II. — Restoration  of  Poland  as  a  state  within  another 
state. 

Both  alternatives  prohibit  the  submittance  of  Polish  ter- 
ritory to  another  dismemberment. 

The  union  of  the  Polish  provinces  under  the  sceptre  of 
the  Czar,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  manifesto  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Nikolas,  will  be,  in  spite  of  all  appearances,  only  an 
injustice  to  Poland.  A  Polish  state  within  a  federation  of 
German  states  would  be  an  anomaly.  A  Polish  state  in 
union  with  Austria-Hungary  on  the  basis  of  a  triple  union 
would  be  a  favorable  solution  of  the  problem.  But  happi- 
ness and  full  justice  can  only  be  brought  about  by  absolute 
independence,  since  this  form  of  political  existence  was  lost 
by  Poland  due  to  the  "crime"  of  the  partition.* 

The  hurricane  of  war  which  at  present  envelops  Warsaw 
with  the  cloud  of  smoke  rising  from  the  battlefields,  and 
with  rivers  of  blood  spilled  in  the  greatest  war  of  the  ages 
will  give  birth  to  Poland's  future.  And  above  this  blood- 
soaked  soil  of  Poland  the  Polish  legions  unfurled  their  ban- 
ner of  Red  and  White,  and  await  the  help  of  all  nations 
having  the  good  will  to  help. 


*  Clemenceau, 


Chapter  V 
THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


141  — 


Chapter  V. — The  Causes  of  the  War 

The  war  which  is  waged  now  is  the  war  of  giants :  it  is  a 
struggle  in  which  both  sides  do  not  shrink  from  anything  in 
order  to  win.  No  such  recklessness  was  seen  since  Napo- 
leon's time  when  the  English  fleet  bombarded  Copenhagen 
in  order  to  force  Denmark  to  break  her  neutrality. 

No  feelings  of  sympathy  nor  any  diplomatical  sophisms 
can  possibly  conceal  the  fact  that  through  Belgium  leads 
a  road  as  well  to  Paris  as  to  Essen,  of  Krupp  fame,  or  in 
other  words,  to  Berlin.  Essen  is  situated  about  fifty  miles 
from  the  Belgian  frontier.  Dire  necessity  is  the  law  of  the 
war  of  giants :  the  determination  to  win  is  nothing  else  but 
the  desire  to  avoid  death.  It  is  the  hurricane  which  destroys, 
annihilates  and  undermines  every  law  and  has  no  respect 
for  anything  else  but  for  force  guiding  toward  victory. 
Such  a  hurricane  threatened  Belgium  from  two  sides.  What 
choice  did  Belgium  have?  To  ally  herself  with  Germany 
and  to  open  a  road  to  Paris  meant  a  war  with  France  and 
England,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  to  ally  herself  with 
France  and  England  necessarily  meant  a  war  with  Germany ; 
in  both  cases  devastation  of  the  country  and  forfeiting  of 
liberty  was  to  be  expected. 

Belgium  therefore  had  to  choose  between  the  two  evils. 
Under  such  conditions  only  the  calculation  of  probability, 
who  is  going  to  be  the  victor,  can  serve  as  a  guide.  Such 
calculation  is  the  method  of  the  materialistic  policy.  Lon- 
don has  always  excelled  in  this  method  and  has  calculated 
with  perfect  calm,  long  before  the  outbreak  of  this  war,  that 


—  142  — 

in  order  to  subdue  Germany  it  was  necessary  to  combine  a 
huge  superiority  of  forces.  Diplomatic  mines  were  ex- 
ploded quietly  and  under  ground.  Russia,  with  her  elemen- 
tary power  of  half  of  Asia  and  Europe,  the  rich  and  heroic 
France,  the  distant  Japan  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
and  finally  Servia,  Montenegro  and  Italy,  and  possibly  other 
allies  and  brothers  in  arms  became  the  war  apparatus  of 
England,  and  that  was  intended  for  replacing  the  army  that 
England  was  lacking  on  large  scale.  The  war  between  Eng- 
land and  Germany  was  brewing  in  Europe  ever  since  1900, 
in  which  year  Germany  had  amazed  the  world  by  her  power- 
ful naval  program.  There  cannot  be  two  masters  of  the  seas, 
and  there  is  only  room  for  one,  for  master  of  all,  or  none  if 
there  are  but  equal  rights  for  all.  Therefore  London  pre- 
pared for  this  war  everything,  because  even  the  English 
child  was  perfectly  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  war  that  was 
to  come  would  be  a  war  for  life  or  death. 

Finally  the  hour  of  the  struggle  came. 

Nobody  entertained  any  doubt  in  the  first  few  months  of 
the  war  as  to  the  fact  that  Germany  is  bound  to  lose.  In- 
spired telegrams  made  this  propaganda  quite  successful. 
Newspapers  exaggerated  small  encounters  and  insignificant 
battles  were  given  the  importance  of  another  .  .  .  Waterloo. 
The  world  read  this  news  and  became  convinced  that  the 
end  of  the  war  will  come  soon  and  that  victory  will  be  with 
England.  The  same  news  were  also  read  by  the  English  who 
expected  to  join  the  fray  with  full  force  in  the  spring  of 
1915  in  order  to  throw  their  army  into  the  balance  for  the 
benefit  of  France.  The  Enghsh  press  campaign,  however, 
proved  to  be  a  complete  strategical  failure,  because  the  Eng- 
lish were  thus  taught  to  underestimate  the  danger:  reading 
continuously  about  the  crushing  of  Germany  and  the  victori- 
ous march  (of  the  press)  on  Berlin,  Vienna  or  Budapest, 


—  143  — 

they  began  to  think  that  there  is  no  need  for  them  on  the 
battlefields  of  Europe.  Why  to  go  there  when  Germany 
is  already  crushed  by  the  Russian  "steam-roller,"  and 
may  at  any  time  ask  for  mercy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  ?  The 
still  worse  feature  of  the  thing  was  that  this  boasting  of 
England  was  read  by  the  Germans.  The  haughty  answer 
given  in  the  fall  of  1914  by  Lord  Kitchener,  to  the  question 
as  to  the  probable  end  of  the  war:  "I  do  not  know  when 
the  war  is  going  to  end  but  all  I  know  is  that  it  is  only  going 
to  start  in  May  of  the  next  year,"  was  a  great  victory  for  .  .  . 
Germany.  Berlin  hstened,  kept  silent  and  worked  full  blast. 
Factories  were  running  day  and  night,  and  reserves  were 
drilHng  without  undue  haste  of  being  sent  to  the  front. 
Every  German  was  becoming  more  and  more  convinced  of 
the  necessity  of  sacrificing  his  life  for  the  cause  of  his  coun- 
try, while  every  Englishman  at  the  same  time  was  taught  by 
degrees  to  underestimate  the  danger.  Finally  the  much 
heralded  month  of  May  came  around :  it  was  the  month  of 
an  enormous  triumph  for  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and 
Turkey.  The  Russian  armies  were  smashed  to  pieces  in 
Galicia,  and  on  the  western  front  came  a  shortage  of  . . .  am- 
munition. In  the  Dardanelles  the  Turkish  military  glory 
became  once  more  firmly  established  after  the  defeats  sus- 
tained in  the  Balkan  war.  The  war,  in  fact,  began  in  May 
but  it  took  a  turn  which  was  entirely  different  from  the  one 
predicted  by  the  press. 

The  world  continues,  however,  to  believe  that  the  defeat 
of  Germany  is  a  foregone  conclusion.  This  fact  explains 
the  situation  of  Belgium  before  the  war.  Belgium  knew  that 
there  was  a  hurricane  coming  from  two  sides  and,  therefore, 
the  Belgian  Government  calculated  the  probability  of  vic- 
tory. The  calculation  showed  that  Germany  cannot  win,  and 
even  to-day,  after  the  war  has  lasted  a  year,  and  in  spite  of 


— 144  — 

the  immense  victory  of  Germany,  the  calculation  of  material 
forces  rather  justifies  the  expectations  of  England  than  those 
of  BerHn.  Belgium  has  decided  not  to  permit  the  Germans 
to  go  across  the  Belgian  territories  and  has  thus  sided  with 
those  who  had  expectations  to  win.  There  is  no  doubt  and 
could  not  have  been  at  any  moment  that  the  war  shall  violate 
the  frontiers  of  Belgium,  either  in  the  direction  of  Paris 
or  in  the  direction  of  Essen.  The  line  of  the  Meuse  was  too 
strongly  fortified  for  Germany  to  venture  a  crossing,  but  the 
German  line  of  the  Rhine  is  not  any  easier  to  break  for  a 
French  offensive  movement. 

English  war  publications  frankly  admit  that  the  German 
offer  to  Belgium  was  advantageous  for  the  latter  even  in  case 
Belgium  had  to  be  incorporated  into  the  German  Federation 
on  the  same  basis  as  Bavaria  or  Saxony.*  These  were 
"alluring  prospects,"  because  they  could  have  put  Belgium 
into  the  world  market  and  double  her  national  wealth.  In 
spite  of  that  Belgium  refused  the  Germans  the  privilege  of 
passing  through  her  territory  but  admitted  the  English  to 
Antwerp.  The  "world"  has  passed  the  sentence  of  death 
upon  Germany,  and  Belgium  could  not  therefore  accept  any 
offer  from  an  outlaw.  The  war  began  and  an  ocean  of 
blood  has  separated  the  nations.  Great  deeds  of  heroism 
became  the  monuments  of  mutual  hatred :  Belgium  by  her 
gallantry  gained  the  sympathy  and  the  respect  of  the  entire 
world  and  not  only  of  the  "world"  of  the  "condottieri"  of 
the  press.  This,  however,  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the 
road  to  success  led  through  Belgium,  both  for  Germany  and 
for  France  as  well.  It  was  a  dire  necessity  which  nothing 
could  avert. 

The  attitude  of  England  in  the  case  of  Belgium  is  quite 


*"What   Europe   Owes    to    Belgium,"    Oxford    Pamphlets,    1914, 
page  13. 


— 145  — 

clear.  Antwerp  in  the  hands  of  Germany  means  another 
London,  but  a  German  London  within  a  few  decades.  Ant- 
werp lies  nearer  to  the  great  seas  than  Hamburg,  and  once 
more  there  is  no  room  for  two  capitals  like  London,  particu- 
larly not  enough  room  on  the  Channel.  It  doesn't  injure  Eng- 
land's reputation  at  all  that  her  "ratio  status"  compels  Eng- 
land to  defend  Belgium,  because  by  doing  so  she  defends 
London  at  the  same  time.  The  fact  that  England  has  an 
interest  in  defending  Belgium  does  not  interfere  with  the 
principle  of  nationalism  for  which  Belgium  is  fighting  nowa- 
days and  gallantly  spilling  her  blood.  In  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo England,  in  alliance  with  Prussia,  defended  Belgium 
from  France,  and  in  the  battle  of  the  Marne  she  defended 
Belgium,  in  alliance  with  France,  against  Germany.  It  has 
been  since  the  times  of  Pitt  a  doctrine  of  the  E^nglish  policy 
not  to  permit  any  of  the  European  great  nations  to  get  a 
hold  of  Antwerp.  It  isn't,  therefore,  sufficient  nowadays 
to  say  that  the  struggle  in  Western  Europe  is  conducted 
simply  for  the  protection  of  "weak"  Belgium.  This  is  true 
to  a  certain  extent,  at  least  apparently,  but  going  to  the 
roots  of  the  matter  it  can  be  seen  quite  easily  that  the 
defence  of  Belgium  is  the  result  of  other  reasons.  The 
actual  causes  of  the  war  in  the  west  of  Europe  are  entirely 
different  and  are  just  as  deep  and  just  as  far  reaching  as  in 
the  east:  these  causes  are  older  and  deeper  than  the  mere 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  Germany  or  the 
attack  of  Austria-Hungary  on  Servia. 

Generally  speaking  the  colonial  imperialism  of  Germany 
is  passing  as  the  main  cause  of  the  war.  There  is  a  great 
amount  of  truth  in  this  statement,  because  Germany  is  in  her 
evolution  which  can  inspire  fear.  Germany  as  a  nation 
counts  about  70,000,000  of  people  in  the  German  Empire 
alone,  whereby  the  Germans  of  Austria-Hungary  are  not 


— 146  — 

cotinted  at  all.  The  German  emigration  dropped  to  a 
paltry  figure  of  15,000  of  emigrants  per  year  while  the  yearly 
increase  in  population  amounts  to  800,000.  Commerce  and 
industry  are  developing  with  unprecedented  rapidity.  In 
the  years  1902-1907  or,  in  other  words,  within  five  years 
the  exportation  and  importation  increased  more  than  from 
1881  to  1902,  or,  in  other  words,  during  twenty  years.  The 
amount  of  German  traffic  in  1902  amounted  to  two  and 
three-quarter  billions  of  dollars,  while  in  1907  it  increased  to 
four  and  one-quarter  billions.  The  annual  increase  ex- 
ceeded one-quarter  of  a  billion.  In  1912  the  total  of  the 
export  trade  of  Germany  exceeded  the  huge  sum  of  five 
billion  dollars.  Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  proper^ 
tion  of  German  trade  and  the  English  trade  was  21 :27,  while 
as  late  as  1890  the  entire  commerce  of  Germany  amounted 
to  less  than  the  importation  to  England.*  The  country  is 
half  agricultural  and  half  industrial,  or  in  other  words  it  is  a 
world  in  itself,  and  is  able  to  provide  alone  for  its  needs^ 
Besides  the  spirit  of  the  nation  is  highly  developed  and  the 
Germans  can  work  like  ants  and  fight  like  lions  when  their 
God,  that  means  Germany,  requires  the  sacrifices  of  the 
individual.  All  these  characteristic  features  form  the  mate- 
rial and  moral  basis  for  an  expansion  on  a  large  scale.  The 
more  intensive  the  life  of  a  nation  is,  the  more  territory  it 
requires ;  this  is  an  old  biological  law  applying  both  to  indi- 
viduals and  to  nations.  The  instinct  of  the  German  na- 
tion could  not  possibly  help  to  be  influenced  by  this  law,  and 
expressed  this  by  making  huge  naval  armaments  intended 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  by  them  the  colonial  im- 
perialism of  Germany. 

Germany,  which  thus  far  has  kept  aloof  from  the  sea,  soon 
entered  into  a  keen  competition  with  England ;  in  this  respect 

^-*P.  Rohfbach:    "Germany's  Isolation,"  Chicago,  1915. 


—  147  — 

Germany  has  made  great  strides  forward  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  she  lacked  the  great  traditions  of  a  sea-faring  people. 
In  1890  German  diplomacy  succeeded  in  getting  Heligoland 
from  England.  London  did  not  anticipate  that  this  small 
island  in  the  North  Sea  shall  some  day  become  the  operating 
basis  for  the  German  Navy.  Ten  years  after  acquiring  Heli- 
goland the  first  German  Naval  program  was  made  public 
and  astonished  the  world  by  its  extent,  its  accuracy  and  its 
ambitions.  Then  England,  getting  nervous,  made  another 
mistake  which  was  worse  than  the  selling  of  Heligoland 
to  Germany,  and  this  mistake  consisted  of  devising  a  riew 
type  of  battleships  which  were  the  pinnacle  of  engineering 
skill.  These  were  the  dreadnoughts  which  are  nothing  else 
but  floating  fortresses.  Apparently  this  step  meant  h  prog- 
ress for  England  but  in  reality  it  was  not  progress  but  retro- 
gression. German  engineering  proved  to  be  equal  to  that  of 
England.  At  the  London  Exposition  of  1851,  Alfred  Krupp 
made  a  successful  debut  by  exhibiting  a  steel  block  weighing 
2,000  kilgorams  alongside  of  an  English  steel  block  weigh-r, 
ing  1,000  pounds.  Every  year  thereafter  increased  tlie  tech- 
nical capacity  of  Germany  as  far  as  steel  industry  is  con- 
cerned, which  permitted  Germany  to  outdistance  everybody 
else  in  land  armaments  and  partly  in  naval  armaments  also. 
German  dreadnoughts  were  soon  ploughing  the  seas  just 
as  the  English  did.  Thus  Germany  has  acquired  the  chance 
of  being  a  cornpetitor  of  England  because  the  type  of  older 
ships  of  which  England  had  a  large  supply  could  not  possibly 
come  into  account  against  the  modern  dreadnoughts.  As 
far  as  the  number  of  ships  is  concerned  England  is  still  the 
leading  power ;  as  far  as  the  quality  is  concerned  the  dread- 
nought types  gave  Germany  a  chance  of  entering  into  com- 
petition with  England.  Germany  had  very  few  ships  of  the 
old  times,  but  the  dreadnoughts  have  helped  them  materially, 


—  148  — 

inasmuch  as  the  older  types  of  ships  had  to  be  put  back  into 
the  second  battle  line.  When  the  war  broke  out  the  propor- 
tion of  the  English  navy  to  the  German  navy  was  ten  to 
sixteen  as  far  as  the  first-class  fighting  units  were  concerned. 
This  is  the  arithmetical  way  of  expressing  a  mistake  made 
by  England  in  building  dreadnoughts.  Germany  has  thus 
come  closer  to  the  shores  of  England  because  she  changed 
in  their  own  favor  the  proportion  of  the  respective  naval 
forces  of  England  and  Germany.  ;With  regard  to  sub- 
marines Germany  has  outdistanced  the  entire  world  and  has 
even  created  a  menace  for  England,  the  danger  of  a  block- 
ade. 

A  blockade  of  England  ? 

The  history  of  many  centuries  is  shown  in  this  question. 
A  new  competitor  began  to  knock  at  the  gates  to  all  seas 
which  gates  were  in  times  gone  by  hermetically  closed  by 
England.  The  Germans  began  to  look  for  new  territories  for 
their  commerce  and  their  industry.  Their  economical  pros- 
perity became  the  basis  for  their  colonial  imperialism  which 
was  nothing  else  but  a  form  of  this  economical  prosperity. 
Statistics  showed  every  year  that  as  far  as  commercial  and 
industrial  expans.k)n  as  well  as  the  expansion  of  naval  arma- 
ments is  concerned  Germany  was  speedily  catching  up  with 
England.  The  British  supremacy  on  the  seas  began  to  feel 
the  German  competition  and  there  can  be  no  two  masters  of 
the  seas,  but  only  one  or  none,  or  all  should  have  the  equal 
rights  which  in  turn  means  nothing  else  but  freedom  of  the 
seas.  Thus  the  war  became  imminent  because  Germany 
could  not  stop  her  economical  evolution  and  England  could 
not  without  struggle  give  up  the  inheritance  of  a  long  series 
of  generations  and  could  not  yield  the  supremacy  on  the  seas 
for  which  they  spilled  streams  of  blood.  Germany  could  not 
stop  her  progress  nor  could  England  betray  her  historical 


—  149  — 

tradition.  This  is  nobody's  fault,  but  there  are  reasons 
which  are  far  stronger  than  the  desire  for  peace,  and  the 
fault  for  these  conditions  should  be  equally  charged  to  all 
humanity  because  the  latter's  war  technique  is  so  much 
superior  to  the  technique  of  the  peace. 

The  English  supremacy  on  the  seas  was  based  on  the 
inaccessibihty  of  the  British  shores  and  the  superiority  in 
war  vessels.  The  first  pillar  of  British  supremacy  was  great 
Britain's  "splendid  isolation,"  the  second  one  her  naval 
power.  The  present  war  already  has,  in  the  first  year, 
shaken  the  first  of  both  pillars.  Above  the  seas  the  air  fleet 
made  its  appearance,  while  under  the  sea  the  submarines 
began  their  deadly  work  of  destruction.  The  system  of  naval 
warfare  has  been  considerably  changed,  and  the  inaccessi- 
bihty of  the  British  shores  is  a  thing  of  the  past.  The 
dreadnoughts  are  peacefully  moored  in  various  bays  while 
the  war  service  is  done  by  submarines  and  scouting  aero- 
planes :  the  air  fleet  on  the  one  hand  and  the  submarines  on 
the  other  hand  made  the  men-of-war  an  anachronism.  The 
aeroplane,  the  dirigible  balloon  and  the  submarine  accom- 
plished a  thing  which  a  year  ago  still  seemed  to  be  a  fantastic 
dream:  they  made  England  a  part  of  the  European  conti- 
nent. Since  February  18,  1915,  the  date  on  which  Germany 
began  a  blockade  of  the  English  coasts,  by  means  of  sub- 
marines, England  forms  part  of  the  European  Continent. 
The  importance  of  this  date  was  still  increased  by  the  fact 
that  on  June  1,  1915,  a  dirigible  balloon  appeared  above 
London  for  the  first  time  and  dared  to  throw  ninety  bombs 
on  the  metropolis  of  one-half  of  the  world.  The  "splendid 
isolation"  of  Great  Britain  became  an  empty  phrase.  This 
fact  is  a  marking  stone  of  a  new  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  Even  the  greatest  defeat  of  Germany  cannot  in  any 
way  alter  this  fact:  a  new  epoch  was  thus  started  on  the 


^€as,  but  it  is  still  an  open  question  who  is  going  to  be  the 
atjthor  of  the  first  chapter  of  the  new  book  of  the  future. 

The  submarine  in  the  hands  of  Gennany  became  the  same 
thing  that:  the  boats  of  the  Norman  Vikings  used  to  be  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  Since  the  time  of  the  Norman  Conquest 
th^  British  shores  did  not  see  any  pther  conqueror.^  Does 
not  history  show  at  times  a  tendency  to  repeat  itself  ? 
<>  England  became  so  used  to  her  supremacy  on  the  seas  that 
fshe  cannot  give  this  supremacy  up  without  any  struggle. 
The  opportunistic  policy  shall  continue  to  uphold  this  con- 
servative attitude  of  England  but  England  must  hencefprth 
take  the  two  following  facts  into  account :  -  -  r  \  ' 
IxT-^The  change  in  the  technique  of  naval  warfare  exposes 
"England  to  the  danger  of  a  compulsory  loss  of  the  supremacy 
^n  the  seas.  ^    ,:  r 

i  II— The  principal  colonies  of  England  became:  already 
poHtically  ripe,  and  the  abolishing  of  English  supremaciy 
on  the  seas  does  not  necessarily  involve.,  as  it  could  h^veb^en 
in  former  times,  the  loss  of  these  colonies.  ..    ■  o  -i; 

r  Canada,  Egypt,  South  Africa,  India  and  Australia  are 
istat^s  within  a  state  and  not  ordinary  colonies.  In  the  pres- 
eiit:  war  they  demonstrated  so  much  conscious  loyalty ^itd 
jspirit  of  sacrifice  for  the  mother-country  that  EngUnd  may 
'i^emain  calm  and  can  look  with  pride  upon  the  fruits  of  her 
Jroloriial  policy.  Not  England  defending  her  colonies  but  the 
J  colonies  are  defending  England  in  the  present  war.  This 
rmay  be  a  paradox  but  it  permits  us  to  see  more  clearly  ah- 
other  real  and  new  fact  and  that  is  that  the  English  colonies 
lean  and  undoubtedly  will  protect  themselves  at  any  time. 
^This  is  a  fact  which  did  not  exist  actually  in  international 
^^6litics  although  it  has  existed  potentially.  The  present  war 
is  a.  powerful  incentive  for  a  political  evolution  of  the  Etig- 
oHsh.  colonial  dominions  and  .creates  at  the  same  time  guarai?- 


—  151  — 

tees  for  the  safety  of  England  in  the  future.  The  supremacy 
on  the  seas  ceases  to  be  for  England  a  question  of  life  or 
death.  The  historical  mission  of  England,  based  on  the 
supremacy  on  the  seas  is,  practically  speaking,  ended  with 
glory  and  with  honor.  The  colonies  ceased  to  be  for  Eng- 
land a  dead  block,  a  market  of  slaves,  and  they  became 
conscious  political  organisms ;  these  colonies  are  states  within 
a  state,  well  prepared  for  purposes  of  self-defence,  and  very 
well  able  to  increase  the  armaments  should  such  emergency 
arise.  The  sacrifice  of  the  supremacy  on  the  seas  for  the 
prize  of  strengthening  of  the  English  colonial  dominions 
would  solve  the  question  of  the  seas  without  injury  to  Eng- 
land and  for  the  benefit  of  the  world  and  of  permanent 
peace. 

No  phrase  nor  any  sentimental  feeling  can  possibly  dis- 
guise the  fact  that  the  seas  are  under  the  control  of  England, 
nor  can  the  fact  be  concealed  that  neutral  countries  and  par- 
ticularly the  United  States  are  thus  exposed  to  a  great  loss. 
The  English  supremacy  grew  out  of  force  and  was  based  on 
force  and  it  is  lawful  in  so  far  as  law  is  a  form  of  power. 
The  formula  of  Bismarck  is  the  formula  of  English  su- 
premacy of  the  seas.  The  German  submarines,  however, 
are  directing  their  attacks  on  this  condition  of  things  and 
the  German  system  of  blockading  England  is  an  answer 
to  the  English  blockade  of  Germany.  Tooth  for  tooth  and 
eye  for  eye,  and  while  this  goes  on  the  losses  of  the  neutral 
countries  are  increasing  every  day.  All  sympathies  and  all 
grievances  should  be  left  aside  because  the  interests  of  the 
future  generations  require  that  this  war  should  put  an  end 
not  only  to  the  supremacy  on  land  but  also  to  the  supremacy 
on  the  seas.  The  close  follower  of  every  privilege,  and 
particularly  of  a  privilege  based  on  power,  is  jealousy.  The 
German  submarines  which  were  specially  trained  for  pur- 


—  152  — 

poses  of  blockading  England  originated  on  account  of  the 
British  supremacy  on  the  seas.  Improvement  of  the  sub- 
marines will  bring  about  the  liquidation  of  the  English 
supremacy  on  the  seas  sooner  or  later,  and  even  a  victory  of 
England  over  Germany  in  the  present  war  cannot  possibly 
avert  this  future  from  England.  A  naval  blockade  in  the 
old  sense  of  the  word  begins  to  be  too  expensive  since  the 
German  submarines  have  attacked  the  English  privileges 
on  the  seas.  England,  with  her  great  political  talent,  begins 
to  feel  it  already  and  shall  not  fail  to  comply  with  the 
changed  condition  of  things.  Germany  also  understands 
the  new  conditions  and  advocates  the  freedom  of  the  seas : 
Germany  feels  very  well  that  it  can  defeat  England  on  the 
seas  only  at  the  price  of  an  expedient  which  at  the  same 
time  jeopardizes  German  ambitions  for  a  supremacy  on  the 
seas.  The  question  of  a  blockade  ceases  to  be  what  it  was 
in  the  time  of  Napoleon  and  during  all  the  wars  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Nowadays,  the  question  of  the  blockade 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  English  supremacy  on  the 
seas  brings  about  disastrous  consequences  owing  to  the 
counter-blockade  by  the  submarines.  This  is  a  reducing  of 
the  question  to  an  absurdum,  but  a  bloody  absurdum  after 
all.  The  tragedy  of  the  Lusitania  is  not  only  a  monument  to 
German  inconsiderateness  but  also  a  tombstone  to  the  Eng- 
lish system  of  English  blockading.  For  England  it  was  a 
political  Trafalgar,  although  from  a  military  point  of  view 
it  was  nothing  but  a  mere  trifle.  The  question  of  feeling 
towards  Germany  should  in  no  way  obscure  the  issue  and 
hatred,  or  sympathy  shall  under  no  circumstances  serve  as 
the  only  guide  for  shaping  the  fate  or  the  happiness  of  na- 
tions. Regardless  of  sympathy  for  England  or  for  Germany 
the  program  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  should  become  the 


—  153  — 

program  of  neutral  countries.  The  idea  of  the  freedom  of 
the  seas  is  the  idea  of  the  progress  of  the  world. 

The  system  of  blockading  which  intends  to  starve  out  the 
civilian  population  of  a  country  is  incompatible  with  the 
requirements  of  rnodern  progress.  Germany  replied  with 
the  tragedy  of  the  Lusitania.  This  is  the  curse  of  every 
evil  that  it  generates  still  greater  evils  and  the  good  name  of 
humanity  has  to  pay  the  bill  for  these  extravagant  acts.  It 
is  high  time  to  finish  these  atrocities  for  the  sake  of  dignity 
of  humanity  and  of  permanent  peace.  The  idea  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  with  the  exception  of  artificial  canals  such 
as  the  Suez  Canal,  the  Panama  Canal  or  the  Kiel  Canal,  is 
becoming  a  historical  necessity  and  it  should  not  be  tolerated 
that  this  great  idea  be  reduced  to  an  empty  phrase.  It  is, 
furthermore,  contrary  to  the  interests  of  neutral  countries, 
and  particularly  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  that 
the  idea  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  should  become  a  political 
monopoly  of  Germany.  The  freedom  of  the  seas  should 
become  a  real  program  of  neutral  countries  and  not  a 
temporary  expedient  of  diplomatic  intrigues.  The  appear- 
ing of  submarines  increases  the  actuahty  of  the  question. 
Because  of  a  new  fact  coming  into  existence,  a  new  legal 
formula  must  be  found.  The  old  formulas  are  not  sufficient 
for  the  new  situation. 

Let  us  hope  that  the  coming  peace  congress  shall  not  be 
as  late  on  the  question  of  the  seas  as  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  hundred  years  ago  was  late  on  the  question  of  land. 

According  to  a  well-established  version  German  mili- 
tarism is  together  with  Germany's  colonial  imperialism, 
another  cause  of  the  war.  This  statement  is  half  true  and 
half  false.  Militarism  as  a  system  of  universal  military 
service  must  in  the  first  place  be  distinguished  from  the 
question  of  military  preparedness.     As  far  as  militarism 


^154  — 

is  concerned  France  \yas  and  is  the  leader  because  her  rate 
of  growth  ol  the  population  is  constantly  on  the  decrease. 
.The  return  to: the  three  years'  term  of  military  service  in 
^France  was  tfee  top  notch  of  miHtarism  in  Europe  because 
it  has  increas^ed  in  an  unprecedented  way  the  accuracy  of 
Tecruiting.  The  German  system  was  less  accurate  because 
■the  increase  of  the  population  in  Germany  shows  an  up- 
tvvard  movement.  Russia  is  a  giant  both  as  to  her  territory 
•and  her  population,  and  owing  to  these  two  factors  the 
militarism  in  Russia  can  be  less  intense  than  in  Germany 
which  is  smaller  than  Russia,  or  than  in  France  which  is 
losing  constantly  in  population.  These  few  facts  already 
iare  sufficient  to  show  that  the  question  of  militarism  should 
not  be  confused  with  the  question  of  military  preparedness. 
,::From  the  statistical  point  of  view  the  conditions  were 
i^ighly  interesting  before  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  peace 
ifobting  of  the  French. army  was  increased  owing  to  the 
ithree  years'  term  of  military  service  to  768,300  men  while 
-th^  peace  footing  of  the  German  army  showed  a  total  of 
-619,000  officers  and  men.  Germany  replied  by  a  new  mili- 
tary law  and  increased  the  numerical  strength  of  her  army 
'On:  jpeace  footing  to  751,000  in  total.  Russia  has  at  the 
-same  time  increased  her  fighting  strength  from  year  to  year 
and  maintained  all  the  time  an  army  superior  in  strength 
to  ,the  armies  of  France  and  Germany  combined.  In  the 
^iWirtteYiqf  1913-1914  the  peace  footing  of  the  Russian  army  in 
i^sia  and  in  Europe  numbered  1,870,000  men.  In  the  win- 
te  .19rl:5-iai6  the  peace  footing  of  the  Russian  army  was 
.expected  to  reach  the  huge  figure  of  1,900,000  men  in  total. 
JAll  these  figures  apply  to  the  peace  footing  of  the  army 
Itnd  do  not  include  the  reserves  to  be  drafted  into  service 
inicase  of  a  general  mobilization  or  of  war. 
tnlFrbm  the  economical  point  of  yiew  the  three  years'  term 


—  155  — 

of  service  meant  a  great  burden  for  France  because  it 
deprived  the  industry  of  too  much  labor.  The  keeping;  of 
the  huge  army  in  times  of  peace  and  equipping  thisarrxry 
with  dip-to-date  war  material  meant  a  financial  burden  for 
Russia  far  above  -the  country's  financial  streiigth.;  Russia 
has  for  many  years  already  contracted  enornrous  loans  in 
Paris  in  order  to  save  herself  from  bankruptcy.  Franc^e  has 
invested  in  Russia  four  biljiolis  of  dollars;  the  ^yar  was  there- 
fore  for  Russia  the  only  way  of  saving  the  fina,nce$  of  the 
country  from  disaster  by  winning  a  victory  over  Germany. 
Without  a  war  i^ussia  was  confronted  by  the  phantom  of 
jt)ankf uptcy  while  a  victorious  j war  opened  up  prospects  of 
living  st,b^^ '  country  from  financial  di  sasten  Germany  did 
not  have  to  fear  bankruptcy  because  she  had  enough  money 
0  f  her  own  and  bedsides  her  system  p  f  armaments  did  not 
undermine  Germany's:,  econornical  possibilities  inasmuch  as 
the  increase  of  population  perrnitted  an  expansion^ of  pro- 
duction a^  well  as  an  expansion  pi  armaments.  France  had 
money  and  a  high  political  culture,  but  she  did  not  have 
enough  men.  Russia  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  have 
either  money  or  culture  equal  to  the  culture  of  the  western 
European  nations  but  she  had  a  surplus  of  men.  Germany 
alorie  combined  all  the  elements,  such  as  the  sufficient  sup- 
ply of  jnoney,  of  men  and  of  political  cujture.  These  fea- 
tures show  why  the  danger  .pf  .  German,  armaments  was 
greater  than  the  danger  of  armaments  of  ^France  or  Rust 
5^ia,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  armaments  of, Germany 
were  on  a  smaller  scale  than  the  armaments  of  the.  two 
other  countries.  France  was  the  most  militaristic  coun- 
try of  Europe  and  Russia  had  the  largest  arm^  \yhile  Ger- 
many stuck  to  the  middle  gold^  rqad  and  consequently, J^H^ 
greatest  military  efficiency.  This  is  the  secret  of  Gerrnan 
successes. 


—  156  — 

Since  the  times  of  Sedan  and  particularly  since  the 
alliance  between  Russia  and  France  was  formed,  the  ques- 
tion of  armaments  became  the  question  of  Hfe  and  death 
of  Germany.  The  alliance  between  France  and  Russia  pro- 
voked already  in  the  first  year  of  its  existence  the  Fashoda 
incident  and  the  danger  of  a  war  between  France  and 
England,  but  Germany  which  was  just  engaged  in  building 
her  fleet  had  to  expect  necessarily  that  the  traditional  friend- 
ship between  England  and  Germany  will  soon  change  into 
a  traditional  hostility.  Bryce  has  estimated  justly  the  situ- 
ation of  Germany  in  the  centre  of  Europe  with  her  frontiers 
open  to  the  west  and  to  the  east  and  explained  the  unity  of 
Germany  by  the  "external  pressure  which  the  presence  of 
two  neighboring  powers,  France  and  Russia  has  applied.  An 
immense  and  highly  disciplined  army  has  been  deemed  a 
necessity."*  It  isn't  the  fault  of  France  that  she  re-estab- 
lished the  three  years'  term  of  military  service  in  order  to 
have  an  army  on  peace  footing  exceeding  the  one  of  Ger- 
many. Nor  is  it  the  fault  of  Russia  that  for  French  money 
she  kept  in  times  of  peace  an  army  stronger  than  that  of 
France  and  Germany  combined.  It  isn't  the  fault  of  Ger- 
many, either,  that  she  has  brought  her  army  on  peace  foot- 
ing to  the  same  strength  as  France  and  that  Germany  had 
more  money  than  Russia  at  her  disposal.  The  method  of 
mutual  accusations  and  vilifications  only  leads  astray  and 
does  not  bring  anybody  nearer  to  the  truth. 

The  signal  for  starting  the  war  came  from  Vienna  where 
the  war  against  Servia  had  been  decided  upon.  The  logical 
consequences  of  alliances  and  military  considerations  have 
at  once  started  a  general  conflagration.  This  does  not 
mian  by  any  means  that  the  entire  guilt  for  starting  the 


*  J.  Bryce,  1.  c,  page  493- 


—  157  — 

war  stiould  be  charged  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Central  European  powers  have  selected  the  moment  of 
the  explosion  as  well  as  the  place  of  starting  the  hostility, 
but  the  question  of  peace  or  war  was  not  entirely  depending 
on  their  decision.  The  superiority  of  material  forces  was 
from  the  beginning  on  the  side  of  England,  France,  Russia, 
Japan,  Italy,  Belgium,  Servia  and  Montenegro.  The  cal- 
culation pointed  to  a  disadvantage  on  the  side  of  Berlin 
and  Vienna,  and  the  weaker  side  therefore  selected  the  time 
and  the  place  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  order  to  counter- 
balance thus  the  inferiority  of  their  material  forces. 

In  the  fall  of  1913  France  called  the  recruits  of  two 
consecutive  years  to  the  colors.  This  move  was  dictated  by 
requirements  of  military  nature  resulting  from  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  three  years'  term  of  military  service. 
Only  one  year  of  older  soldiers  has  been  retained  under 
arms  because  the  soldiers  who  have  served  full  two  years 
in  accordance  with  the  law  hitherto  in  force  have  been  dis- 
charged. Thus  the  remaining  soldiers  had  to  drill  the 
recruits  for  two  years  at  once.  From  the  professional  mili- 
tary point  of  view  it  was  unfavorable  because  it  rendered 
any  possible  mobilization  very  difficult  and  hindered  the 
first  strategical  moves  in  case  war  should  break  out.  The 
calling  of  two  years  of  recruits  to  the  colors  could  be  done 
only  by  lowering  the  age  limit  for  enlistment.  Thus  the 
age  limit  was  reduced  from  twenty-one  years  of  life  to 
twenty  years.  Consequently  in  the  fall  of  1914  France 
had  to  call  to  the  colors  recruits,  20  years  of  age,  and  at  the 
same  time,  by  virtue  of  the  new  law,  had  to  retain  for  the 
third  year  of  service  those  who  trained  the  first  two  cate- 
gories of  recruits.  France  expected  to  have  in  1915  four 
years  of  soldiers  under  arms  at  the  same  time  and  not 
three  as  it  should  be:  such  a  condition  greatly  facilitated 


— 15^  — 

thd  nMtIi^tio»  and  increased  the  power  of  the  first  attack. 
I#  tK§'Mmeyear>  1915,  the  effective  strength  of  the  Rus- 
sian atey  was  expected  to  reach  the  figure  of  1,900,006 
men,  wTiich  figure  by  the  way  meant  the  strength  of  the 
KtislsiMi  army  on  peace  footing.  The  fall  of  1915  would 
thus  bring  to  Austria-Hungary  and  to  Germany  a  disad- 
v^ta^e  with  regard  to  the  proportion  of  strength  for  the 
first  att^^.'  The  summer  of  1914  on  the  other  hand,  pre- 
sented a  favorable  term  because  then  the  chances  for  a 
speedy  mobilization  of  the  French  army  were  rather  poor. 
In  fact  the  war  hung  in  the  air  for  a  long  time  already, 
^iid  alrthe  expedients  of  peace  have  been  exhausted  at  the 
cohference  of  the  ambassadors  in  London  during  the  Balkan 
#aTS;  Already  then  a  number  of  questions  were  left  un- 
settled and  over  Europe  hung  the  moment  of  calm  which 
generally  precedes  a  storm.  The  shots  in  Sarajevo  which 
killed  the  heir  to  the  throne  of  Austria-Hungary  were  the 
spkrk  which  ignited  the  mine  laid  long  ago.  Austria-Huri- 
g;ary  and  Germany  seized  the  opportunity  of  selecting  time 
and  place  in  the  conflict  which  was  inevitable  for  quite  a 
few  years  already.  The  code  of  honor  has  been  lived  up 
to  because  the  weaker  side  selected  the  time  and  the  place 
6f  the  struggle.  Humanity,  however,  had  to  suffer  and 
wade  again  through  an  ocean  of  blood. 

The  average  public  opinion  charges  the  full  responsi- 
bility for  the  war  to  the  Central  European  powers.  This 
judgment,  however,  is  very  one  sided  and  therefore  unjust: 
Strictly  speaking  Russia  has  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  bur- 
den of  responsibility.  Russian  imperialism  has  since  the 
time  of  Peter  the  Great,  under  the  disguise  of  a  religiou& 
propaganda,  endeavored  to  crush  Turkey  in  order  to  trans- 
lef  the  capital  of  the  Czars  to  Constahtirid|)Ie  -^d  fly  the 
Russian  flag  on  the  Mediterraneah.    The  Russian  imperial- 


—  159  — 

ism  has  also  wielded  the  arms  of  Pan-Slavism,  of  racial 
affiliation  and  of  uniting  the  Slavs  for  the  interest  of  Pan- 
Russianism,  against  Austria-Hungary.  These  methods  of 
Russian  imperialism  are  old,  and  stood  the  test  in  several 
wars  and  innumerous  intrigues.  The  entire  world  has  to 
pay  the  bill  for  these  Russian  methods  in  the  present  war. 
Russia,  bent  on  the  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary 
has  forced  the  latter,  soon  after  the  Congress  at  Berlin, 
into  an  alliance  with  Germany,  although  the  memories  of 
the  Austrian  defeat  by  Prussia  on  the  battlefield  of  Sadowa 
were  still  alive.  Intending  to  destroy  Turkey  Russia  has 
recently  alienated  the  latter  from  England  and  pushed  Tur- 
key into  an  alliance  with  Berlin.  The  continental  imperial- 
ism of  Russia  which  did  not  end  after  thelCoflgress  of 
Berlin  permitted  Germany,  to  increase  her  power  owing  t^ 
Germany's  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and  sub^^ 
quently  with  Turkey.  This  condition  was  the  main  basis 
for  Germany's  colonial  ambitions  which  were  developed 
after  the  retirement  from  office  of  Prince  Bismarck.:  Ger- 
many felt  safe  in  Central  Europe  and  this  prompted  her 
naval  ambitions  of  later  years.  Finally  the  Balkan  war 
broke  out  in  which  Russia  made  the  false  promise  to  Bul- 
garia with  regard  to  Roumanian  neutrality  only  in  order 
to  prompt  Bulgaria  into  a  war  against  Servia,  Montenegro 
and  Greece.  As  soon  as  the  second  Balkan  war  broke  out 
the  promises  of  Russia  proved  to  be  utterly  false  and  Bul- 
garia suffered  a  terrible  defeat.  Russia  was  always  against 
any  increase  of  Bulgaria's  power  because  the  latter  showed 
herself  always  more  independent  from  Petrograd  than  Servia 
who  willingly  played  the  part  of  Russia's  tool.  The  defeat 
of  Bulgaria  at  Bregalnitza  decided  Bulgaria's  sympathy 
for  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Thus  the  imperisil- 
ism  of  Russian  Pan-Slavism  opened  a  road  leading  directly 


—  160  — 

from  Berlin  through  Vienna  and  Sophia  to  Constantinople, 
which  fact  made  the  attack  of  the  Allies  on  the  Dardanelles 
extremely  difficult  in  the  present  war.  Thus  Izwolskij  the 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris  was  quite  justified  in  his 
alleged  saying  that  the  present  war  is  "his  war."  It  mat- 
ters little  whether  Izwolskij  actually  said  this  or  not:  it 
remains  a  fact  that  the  continental  imperialism  of  Russia 
formed  the  basis  for  the  colonial  imperialism  of  Germany 
because  it  pushed  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria 
into  the  sphere  of  influence  of  Berlin.  The  actual  facts 
put  the  blame  rather  on  Russia  than  on  the  Central  Euro- 
pean powers.  It  would  be  a  political  shortsightedness  to 
claim  that  only  a  defeat  of  Germany  can  solve  the  question 
of  armaments  in  a  way  which  would  be  advantageous  to  a 
permanent  peace.  Petrograd  was  for  many  years  past 
by  no  means  a  smaller  source  of  a  danger  of  war.  Further- 
more, who  is  going  to  compel  Russia  to  abandon  her  con- 
tinental imperialism  after  she  has  entered  Constantinople 
and  has  penetrated  into  Western  Asia  over  the  Armenian 
Mountains? 

The  mistake  lies  deeper. 

The  responsibility  for  the  war  should  be  charged  entirely 
to  the  anarchy  of  armaments  and  not  to  militarism.  If 
an  individual  wants  to  rule  on  the  basis  of  the  theory  ''sic 
volo  sic  iuheo,"  humanity  calls  it  anarchy.  Nations  are 
also  liable  to  fall  into  anarchy  the  moment  they  adopt  the 
principle  "sic  volo  sic  iuheo!'  The  will  of  a  country  with 
regard  to  military  armaments  is  a  dogma  which  is  respected 
by  international  law.  Humanity  defines  independence  as 
the  principle  of  free-hand  of  the  nations  or  as  the  principle 
of  anarchy  of  armaments.  The  extent  of  armaments  is  not 
subject  to  any  control  from  the  outside  but  depends  upon 
the  determination  and  desire  of  every  individual  nation. 


—  161  — 

This  being  the  case  no  permanent  peace  can  be  preserved 
nor  can  those  who  apply  the  aforesaid  principle  be  blamed 
for  doing  so.  The  present  war  is  nothing  else  but  the 
result  of  this  traditional  formula  and  the  armaments  of 
France,  Germany  and  Russia  were  based  on  nothing  else. 
It  isn't  Germany's  fault  that  her  population  is  increasing 
nor  that  there  is  an  increase  of  her  national  wealth  and 
power  which  rendered  their  armaments  more  efficient  and 
more  dangerous  than  the  armaments  of  other  countries. 
The  condemning  of  Germany  and  the  sparing  of  Russia 
or  France  obscures  the  issue,  although  it  has  many  appear- 
ances of  correctness.  The  centre  of  gravity  lies  in  the 
anarchy  of  armaments,  and  the  future  peace  congress  will 
have  above  all  to  settle  first  the  question  of  armaments 
before  attacking  those  who  may,  against  the  will  of  the 
world,  insist  upon  sticking  to  the  traditional  theory  of 
armies  and  armaments.  The  present  international  law  rec- 
ognizes the  principle  of  the  anarchy  of  armaments,  but  the 
future  international  law  must  under  all  circumstances  dis- 
continue to  acknowledge  this  principle.  This  is  a  program 
for  creating  honest,  real  and  genuine  bases  for  a  perma- 
nent peace,  and  in  compliance  with  this  program  the  future 
peace  congress  will  have  to  take  away  from  the  nations 
the  liberty  of  making  armaments,  and  will  have  to  entrust 
the  making  of  changes  in  the  rate  of  armaments  to  a  peace 
tribunal  which  will  be  based  on  a  special  international 
agreement.  The  future  peace  congress  will  have  to  solve 
not  only  the  question  of  naval  armaments  but  also  the 
question  of  armaments  on  land;  and  not  only  to  regulate 
the  danger  of  supremacy  on  the  seas  but  also  the  danger 
of  supremacy  on  land.  These  are  the  two  parts  of  the 
same  question;  regulating  the  one  at  the  expense  of  the 
other  one  will  leave  humanity  in  the  same  plight  as  hitherto. 


—  162  — 

Onesidedness  generates  always  the  feeling  of  an  injury, 
and  the  consequence  of  such  a  feeling  is  the  desire  for 
revenge. 

Humanity  has  mastered  the  technique  of  the  war  but  was 
hitherto  unable  to  master  the  technique  of  peace.  Owing 
to  this,  arise  certain  problems  which  are  beyond  the  power 
of  humanity  and  which  cannot  be  solved  without  blood- 
shed. Among  these  problems  were  also  the  causes  of  the 
present  war  or,  in  other  words,  the  continental  imperialism 
of  Russia,  the  colonial  imperiahsm  of  Germany  and  English 
supremacy  on  the  seas.  The  weight  of  these  complicated 
questions,  burdened  besides  by  the  tradition  of  centuries 
has  broken  the  dam  and  caused,  a  flood  of  disasters.  Mil- 
lions are  perishing  on  the  battlefields,  famine  penetrates 
the  dwellings  of  the  families  and  hatred  has  poisoned  the 
hearts  of  nations.  Mothers  weep  not  only  in  France  but 
also  in  Germany  because  the  tragedy  of  war  is  just  in 
distributing  the  share  of  grief.  The  question  is  whether 
humanity  will  succeed  to  be  just  in  distributing  the  share 
of  happiness  when  the  foundations  for  the  peace,  let  us 
hope  a  permanent  one,  are  going  to  be  laid. 

This  is  possible  in  principle. 

The  idea  of  independence  does  not  necessarily  require 
the  anarchy  of  armaments.  A  nation  can  be  free  without 
having  a  free  hand  as  to  armaments.  The  future  peace 
congress  must  not  only  revise  the  frontiers  but  must  also 
revise  the  international  law. 

The  latter  task  is  the  more  important  one. 


Chapter  VI 
THE   PEACE  TRIBUNAL 


165  — 


Chapter  VI. — The  Peace  Tribunal 

One  hundred  years  ago  the  Napoleonic  period  came  to  an 
end  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  which  attempted  to  save  the 
old  order  of  things  in  the  name  of  the  principle  of  legitimism. 
History  did  not  permit  of  retrogression.  Napoleon  fell  as 
the  god  of  war,  but  his  armies  had  crossed  Europe  from  one 
end  to  the  other,  and  disseminated  everywhere  the  seeds  of 
the  ideas  which  were  originated  by  the  French  Revolution. 
Wherever  the  armies  of  Napoleon  came,  there  originated  the 
idea  of  civic  freedom,  and  national  consciousness  was 
awakened.  Some  nations  awoke  for  the  purpose  of  co- 
operating with  Napoleon,  others  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
bating him.  This,  however,  will  not  alter  the  fact  that  Napo- 
elon  was  after  all  the  one  who  spread  the  ideas  of  French 
Revolution  all  over  the  world.  The  militarism  of  Napoleon 
was  defeated,  but  his  democratic  ideas  and  his  ideas  of  na- 
tionalism have  won  an  overwhelming  victory. 

There  will  come  finally  a  time  when  the  present  European 
war  will  come  to  its  end.  Then  humanity  will  lay  down 
arms  and  peace,  calm  and  justice  will  reign  once  more. 
Looking  at  the  things  from  a  broader  historical  point  of 
view,  we  can  perceive  already  now  that  German  militarism 
is  completing  at  present  the  work  begun  by  Napoleon.  One 
hundred  years  ago  the  militarism  of  France  was  spreading 
the  ideas  of  nationalism  and  democracy.  German  militarism 
to-day  is  bringing  in  the  harvest.  The  burden  of  the  results 
exceeds  the  causes  and  the  burden  of  human  deeds  grows 
over  the  heads  of  their  perpetrators.     German  militarism 


—  166  — 

unconsciously  forms  the  prompting  element  of  progress  al- 
though its  purpose  is  to  reach  more  concrete  and  selfish  re- 
sults. Napoleon's  campaigns  also  were  not  always  aware 
of  what  elements  they  were  bringing  into  history. 

Militarism  means  universal  compulsory  military  service. 
This  is  in  other  words  a  return  to  former  times  when  every 
member  of  a  community  of  men  was  compelled  to  take  up 
arms  for  the  defense  of  the  community  within  which  he 
lived.  General  mobilization  nowadays  calls  to  the  colors 
everybody  and  anybody — poor  and  rich,  educated  and  un- 
educated— in  other  words,  all  citizens  without  distinction  as 
to  the  station  of  life.  Wealth  and  educational  level  must 
come  and  serve  the  cause  of  their  country.  Militarism  made 
the  army  a  democratic  and  a  national  institution.  The  sword 
ceased  to  be  the  privilege  of  certain  classes  of  society.  The 
idea  of  duty  towards  the  country  has  made  all  men  equal  by 
force  of  the  executive  power  of  the  state.  The  present  war 
is  still  more  completely  finishing  the  task.  In  the  trenches, 
men  of  all  strata  of  society  meet  and  a  common  duty  and 
common  sufferings  establish  between  them  a  tradition  of 
brotherhood.  Man  is  meeting  man  in  close  contact  on  the 
background  of  this  war,  which  after  all  is  the  war  of  militar- 
ism. 

The  ways  of  history  are  strange. 

Militarism  accelerates  democracy  although  it  does  not  try 
to  accomplish  it  consciously  and  directly.  Nothing  becomes 
lost  in  the  chaos  of  life.  The  individual  does  not  perceive 
the  subsequent  results  of  his  actions,  but  these  results  are 
noticed  by  history.  What  becomes  lost  in  the  apperception 
of  the  individual  becomes  recorded  by  the  apperception  of 
history.  This  is  the  feature  of  the  creative  power  of  his- 
tory, or,  in  other  words,  the  feature  of  progress.  The  logic 
of  progress  is  rational,  owing  to  the  efforts  of  an  individual, 


—  167  — 

and  irrational,  owing  to  the  masses.  A  pearl  can  be  found 
even  in  a  heap  of  mud ;  while  proceeding  rationally — pearls 
have  to  be  looked  for  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea.  Militarism  is 
not  an  organization  for  a  purpose  of  a  political  propaganda, 
but  in  spite  of  that,  militarism  does  more  for  democracy 
than  many  political  parties.  The  genius  of  Napoleon  was 
in  too  many  instances  looking  only  for  the  blind  triumph  of 
the  brutal  material  force,  but  in  just  as  many  and  in  more 
instances  it  has  brought  about  the  triumph  of  nationalism 
and  democracy,  although  not  directly  bent  on  doing  so.  In 
the  battle  of  Waterloo,  the  militarism  of  Napoleon  was 
crushed  for  the  price  of  a  national  regeneration  of  Germany. 
The  casualism  of  the  epoch  of  Napoleon  apparently 
triumphed  over  causality.  The  present  war  follows  the 
same  road.  The  results  will  exceed  the  causes,  casualism 
shall  triumph  over  causality,  and  irrationalism  over  rational- 
ism. New  lights  will  shine  on  the  horizon  of  humanity  al- 
though the  work  of  wholesale  murder  on  the  battlefields  is 
blind.  While  the  flames  of  the  present  war  are  raging, 
foundations  are  laid  for  the  twentieth  century  and  possibly 
even  for  a  longer  period  of  history.  Someone  may  have  a 
hatred  for  Germany,  just  as  England  had  a  hatred  for 
Napoleon,  or  the  Old  World  for  Rome,  but  still  the  armies 
of  Rome  carried  the  sparks  of  Greek  genius  from  the  bound- 
aries of  India  as  far  as  the  Ultima  Thule.  The  figure  of 
Napoleon  becomes  more  and  more  identified  with  the  history 
of  nationalism  and  of  democracy.  When  the  clouds  of 
smoke' obscuring  the  present  battlefields  will  be  dispersed, 
then  real  progress  will  appear  from  under  the  iron  mask  of 
German  militarism. 

Militarism  as  a  system  of  military  duties  is  both  dem- 
ocratic and  national,  consequently  progressive.  The  evil 
lies  not  in  the  universal  military  duty,  but  in  the  anarchy  of 


—  168  — 

armaments,  which  forces  the  nations  to  make  too  large  ex- 
penditures for  the  sake  of  military  preparedness  in  the  time 
of  peace.  From  this  point  of  view  it  is  not  paradoxical  to 
assume,  that  militarism  will  be  more  firmly  established  in 
Europe  after  this  war,  and  that  it  will  even  invade  England. 
England  became  to-day  a  part  of  the  continent,  when  the 
submarine  and  the  aeroplane  removed  the  "splendid  isola- 
tion." Militarism  will  cross  the  Channel  and  invade  Eng- 
land. The  system  of  recruiting  will  pass  into  oblivion  just 
as  the  mercenary  armies  did.  It  is  delusion  to  look  for  the 
end  of  militarism  after  this  war.  The  danger  for  permanent 
peace  does  not  lie  in  militarism,  only  in  the  anarchy  of 
armaments.  The  abolition  of  militarism  and  return  to  the 
system  of  mercenaries  will  not  prevent  the  anarchy  of  arma- 
ments. It  will  facilitate  it.  The  latter  is  not  the  result  of 
militarism — ^because  it  is  older  than  militarism.  The  only 
way  out  of  it  is  to  form  an  international  law  regulating  the 
armaments.  A  general  treaty  should  oblige  all  the  civilized 
states  not  to  change  the  system  of  armaments  or  the  army 
on  peace  footing  without  the  permission  of  the  peace  court. 
This  would  mean  a  definite  change  in  the  practice  up  to  the 
present  day — a  practice  which  is  as  old  as  human  misery. 

An  individual  is  not  an  angel — still  less  a  community.  As 
long  as  criminal  acts  are  committed  among  the  individuals, 
so  long  will  such  acts  be  committed  among  the  states.  It 
does  not  mean  that  the  question  of  peace  cannot  be  regulated 
by  law.  The  fact  of  war  does  not  exclude  international  law, 
just  as  the  fact  of  murder  does  not  exclude  criminal  law.  The 
fact  that  international  law  might  be  violated  does  not  under- 
mine its  authority.  Even  civil  law  is  being  violated  by  the 
wicked  or  powerful,  but  the  transgressor  is  punished  while 
the  law  remains  intact.  It  is  a  mistake  to  minimize  the  im- 
portance and  authority  of  international  law  by  pointing  at 


—  169  — 

its  violation.  General  education  is  here  at  fault.  The 
idea  that  international  law  is  worthless  is  not  true,  although 
it  is  popular. 

Law  knows  physical  persons  and  legal  entities  without, 
however,  specifying  them;  the  definition  of  a  person  ac- 
cepted by  the  civil  or  the  criminal  law  is  of  a  general  nature. 
In  international  law  on  the  other  hand,  the  conception  of  a 
legal  entity  is  specified  as :  Germany,  France,  England,  etc. 
This  conception  refers  to  the  legal  entities  vested  with 
sovereign  authority  or  in  other  words  to  political  organisms, 
alias  states,  strictly  defined  as  to  time  and  geographical 
limits.  Under  such  circumstances  the  international  law  nec- 
essarily must  be  a  code  of  treaties  concluded  between  and 
binding  those  aforesaid  sovereign  legal  entities.  Any  other 
conception  of  international  law  is  absurd  from  the  point  of 
view  of  logic. 

International  law,  as  any  other  law,  is  based  upon  the 
general  character  of  culture,  morals,  science,  and  social 
economy.  These  all  constitute  premises  of  the  international 
law.  A  certain  order  of  international  law  becomes  binding, 
as  soon  as  the  treaties  of  both  parties  concerned  are  ratified 
by  both  of  them.  It  is  not  the  formula  of  the  treaty,  but  the 
signature  of  the  interested  state,  that  makes  a  law  out  of 
the  treaty.  International  law  imitates  civil  law  regulating 
the  mutual  relations  between  the  states.  The  executive  power 
is  principally  invested,  as  in  any  other  company,  in  the  hands 
of  other  partners,  or  here  in  those  states  in  relation  to  which 
any  state  did  not  live  up  to  the  treaty  or  infringed  upon  the 
law.  England  is  the  executor  of  her  treaty  with  Belgium  in 
the  present  war.  The  future  peace  court  must  be  based  upon 
similar  principles  of  executive  power  if  it  is  to  limit  the 
anarchy  of  armaments  and  inclinations  to  war.  Although 
the  idea  of  a  perpetual  peace  is  an  abstract  one,  the  idea  of 


—  170  — 

a  lasting  peace  is  within  practical  possibilities.  The  plan  of 
a  peace  court  is  to-day  only  a  pium  desiderium.  It  has  not 
the  signature  of  all  the  parties  concerned,  consequently  it  is 
not  and  has  not  the  validity  of  law.  Let  us  assume  that  the 
horrors  of  the  present  war  will  force  Europe  to  take  up  this 
question  and  realize  it.  The  future  peace  congress  realizing 
the  idea  of  a  peace  court  will  have  to  define  its  competency 
or  to  give  it  the  form  of  a  law.  In  other  words,  to  insure 
executive  power,  the  treaties  must  be  ratified.  In  order  to 
be  on  a  really  working  basis,  the  peace  court  must,  in  the 
interests  of  peace,  make  it  certain  that  the  system  of  ar- 
maments or  the  army  on  peace  footing  must  be  approved  by 
and  cannot  be  changed  without  the  permission  of  the  peace 
court.  The  peace  court  can  regulate  the  use  of  the  sword, 
just  as  a  civil  court  regulates  the  use  of  money.  As  the  civil 
courts  do  not  eradicate  thefts  or  larceny,  so  the  peace  court 
cannot  be  expected  to  remove  forever  the  danger  of  war. 
An  enormous  achievement  will  however  be  left ;  that  is  the 
limitation  of  the  anarchy  of  the  sword  guarded  by  the  sanc- 
tity of  the  law. 

Nations  are  not  immortal  but  form  only  transitory  forms 
of  existence  in  the  history  of  human  progress.  Perhaps  there 
will  come  a  time  when  nations  will  resolve  themselves  in  a 
higher  unit  of  their  life.  In  the  dawn  of  history,  chieftains 
of  peoples  called  states  to  life.  The  states  became  the  cradles 
of  nations.  Perhaps  the  nations  will  create  in  the  future  a 
new  form  of  existence :  ''mankind,"  which  still  is  only  in  the 
realm  of  moral  and  religious  dreamland,  but  not  in  a  con- 
crete, practical  and  political  form. 

In  the  dawn  of  history,  man  was  the  property  of  the 
sovereign.  As  the  development  went  on,  he  became  the 
property  of  the  state.  The  state  made  him  a  member  of  the 
nation,  which  is  a  historical  brotherhood,  founded  upon  the 
community  of  historical  traditions  and  language. 


—  171  — 

What  is  the  next  step  ? 

A  permanent  peace  and  cultural  penetration  will  bring 
nearer  the  epoch  of  brotherhood  in  the  name  of  civilization 
of  all  free  nations.  This  will  be  a  new  and  higher  form  of 
political  consciousness  but  as  yet  it  scarcely  buds  on  the  tree 
of  history.  The  nations  will  join  hands  in  work  toward  com- 
mon good  and  duty.  The  day  will  come  when  the  truth  of 
God — ''Treuga  Dei" — will  reign  among  the  nations,  as  it 
does  among  the  individuals.  This  is  an  old  and  sacred  dream, 
as  old  and  sacred  as  is  human  suffering.  The  pagan  Plato 
worked  for  it,  and  so  did  St.  Augustine.  Are  we,  the  con- 
temporary generation,  now  bathed  in  the  blood  of  the  present 
war,  capable  of  bringing  nearer  the  day  of  triumph  for 
mankind  ? 

In  the  agony  of  the  present  war  the  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  being  born.  There  must  be  victors  and  there  must  be 
the  victims  in  this  war,  but  there  should  be  no  wronged 
ones,  if  the  future  peace  is  to  heal  the  bleeding  wounds. 

The  coming  peace  should  for  the  sake  of  justice  accept 
for  a  basis  the  following  five  principles : 

I. — Settlement  of  the  divergent  interests  of  England, 
France,  and  Germany  by  the  means  of  colonial 
possessions,  particularly  in  Africa,  so  as  to  pre- 
vent violation  of  the  principle  of  liberty  of  na- 
tions by  territorial  changes  on  a  greater  scale  in 
Western  Europe. 

II. — Enforcement  of  the  principle  of  liberty  of  nations 
in  the  eastern  theater  of  war  by  reconstructing 
Poland  in  the  first  place,  thus  preventing  Pan- 
Slavism  which,  if  established,  would  inevitably 
bring  forth  as  a  reaction  a  Pan-Germanism  or 
Pan-Romanism. 


—  172  — 

III. — Re-establishment  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 

IV. — Submitting  the  question  of  land  and  naval  ar- 
maments, or,  in  other  words,  the  question  of 
changing  the  peace- footing  of  the  army  and  navy, 
to  the  control  of  the  special  peace  tribunal,  the 
legal  authority  and  executive  power  of  which 
should  be  based  on  a  specially  ratified,  interna- 
tional treaty. 

V. — Sparing  the  vanquished  from  utter  destruction  by 
abstaining  from  exacting  excessive  war-contribu- 
tions. 
May  the  conscience  of  nations  awake ! 

Cleveland,  Ohio,  July,  1915- 


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